Russian Propaganda Machine: Mechanics of Success

Cris Martin (C.M.) 

My name is Cris Martin, and I'm the Interim Executive Director of the Davis Center for Russian and Eurasian Studies. We're so glad to have you here today for the sixth session of our year-long series, "Russia: In Search of a New Paradigm - Conversations with Yevgenia Albats." This is the first panel of our spring semester, entitled "Russian Propaganda Machine: Mechanics of Success." Today, we have the privilege of hosting Peter Pomerantsev and Dr. Nina Khrushcheva for a conversation on the impacts of Putin's propaganda machine. I invite you, our audience, to participate actively in today's discussion, which is being video recorded and will be posted to the Davis Center's YouTube channel later this week. And now, I'll introduce our participants. Peter Pomerantsev is a Senior Fellow at the SNF Agora Institute at Johns Hopkins University, where he co-directs the Arena initiative, a research project dedicated to overcoming the challenges of digital era disinformation and polarization. He directed the same project when it was hosted at the London School of Economics previously. He is the author of several award-winning books, including "Nothing is True and Everything Is Possible", 2014, and "This Is Not Propaganda", 2019. He's a columnist at "The American Interest" and writes for publications including "The New York Times," "Granta," and "The Atlantic". He frequently testifies in the challenges of information war and media development and hosts policy seminars on behalf of international and multinational government bodies. He also helped write in-depth policy recommendations on counterpropaganda and media diversity for national governments and NGOs and continues to present and write radio documentaries for BBC Radio 4, most recently on disinformation about climate change. So, you can see we're in good hands today for our conversation. 

Peter Pomerantsev (P.P.) 

That's such a full CV. Did that come from Elon Musk? This is like, broken into by the government. 

C.M. 

I abridged that for the record, for the whole thing. 

P.P. 

Golly. 

C.M. 

From our website. 

P.P. 

Okay, I'm sorry about that. 

Nina L. Khruscheva (N.K.) 

Mine is much shorter. 

P.P. 

Yeah. 

C.M. 

Nina Khrushcheva is a Professor in the Julien J. Studley Graduate Programs of International Affairs at The New School in New York. She is an editor of and a contributor to "Project Syndicate", association of newspapers around the world. She is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations, a recipient of the Great Immigrants: The Pride of America Award from the Carnegie Corporation, something we should all be celebrating, I think, right now. As well as a Gold Medal of Honorary Patronage from Trinity College, Dublin. Her articles have appeared in "Foreign Policy", "The New York Times", 'The Wall Street Journal", amongst other places, and she is the author of "Imagining Nabokov: Russia Between Art and Politics," "The Lost Khrushchev: A Journey Into the Gulag of the Russian Mind," and co-author of "In Putin's Footsteps: Searching for the Soul of an Empire Across Russia's Eleven Time Zones". And her latest book, which I believe she has a copy of right here, is "Nikita Khrushchev: An Outlier of the System". And they will be in conversation of course with Dr. Yevgenia Albats, Russian investigative journalist, political scientist, author and radio host. She has her PhD in political science from Harvard University and has split her time subsequently between academia and journalism. She taught at Moscow's Higher School of Economics and has been Editor-in-Chief of the political weekly, "The New Times", since 2007. She is also the host of "Absolute Albats," which formerly ran on Ekho Moskvy, but is now available on YouTube. So, without further ado, I'll turn it over to Yevgenia. 

Yevgenia Albats (Y.A.) 

Cris, thank you very much for your excellent introduction. So, thank you very much to everyone for coming. It's great, you know. I've been missing, you know, the possibility of these great conversations, and I hope you did too. So, as you heard, we have great speakers, and I will just add a couple of details. Both of my guests were born in the USSR. In fact, I wrote both of my guests were born in Moscow, and then, you know, Peter corrected me. In fact, he was born in Kyiv and Nina, you were born in Moscow, correct? Yes, so, but obviously they came from very different circles. Peter Pomerantsev is a son of Igor Pomerantsev, who was a well-known dissident and a poet, a writer, a drama writer. He worked for BBC. He went into political exile in the late 1970s to London. And Nina Khrushcheva, as you can guess. Yes, that's your book, right? 

N.K. 

Sorry. 

Y.A. 

And Nina Khrushcheva, as you can guess, is a granddaughter of Nikita Khrushchev. Those of you who do Russian history should know that he was the guy who upended the gulag, who was, the Chairman of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, or he was a General Secretary already? Chairman of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, or he was a General Secretary already? It was Chairman. 

N.K. 

He was never, ever, ever General Secretary. 

Y.A. 

I'm sorry, I just don't. 

N.K. 

Never General Secretary. He was always the First Secretary. 

Y.A. 

Always First Secretary, I'm so sorry. You know, it's just the same as the General Secretary. 

N.K. 

It was not the same, it was so not the same. 

Y.A. 

Yes, but of course, you are probably right. Anyways, so, and you know, as a result of the coup d'état in 1964, he was kicked out of Staraya Ploshchad, which were the main offices of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union back then, and then he became a headache for the subsequent leaders of the Soviet Union, especially when his memoirs were published outside the country. So, Peter grew up, as I said, in London and got his education there, then came to Moscow when it was not the Soviet Union but Russia. And I lived in Moscow. She then went to study at Princeton in the United States, and since then, she's been back and forth. She's her life between the United States and Russia. And in fact, you know, Nina was in Moscow for the last seven months. She was on the ground there. It is a rare chance for us to speak to somebody who was in Moscow recently, and not just in Moscow, but around the European part of Russia. She also went to Yekaterinburg, where she was supposed to present this volume (shows the book), which she had huge problems publishing.  She had problems publishing it because, first, of the publisher for whom she worked. They decided to publish, then they got afraid, and then canceled the publication. The galleys were bought by the former editor of Ekho Moskvy, Alexei Venediktov, who has his own small publishing shop called Diletant. They published this book. So, and then, anyway, so, and there were, I think, well, three circulations, right? Three. 

N.K. 

Yes, it was 4,000 copies. 

Y.A. 

Well, yes, so it became sort of a bestseller in Moscow at the time, but it was very strange that all of a sudden, you know, my beloved Chekists got frightened by Nikita Khrushchev. It's very nice, yes. So, Nina, that's why I will start by asking questions, but before I ask questions, I want to say that I have some surprises. Yes, of course you know, I said, you know, about Peter Pomerantsev, you know, that's his book, "Everything is Possible", "Nothing is True and Everything is Possible". It's very interesting reading, very, very interesting reading. You know, even for me, you know, I lived through this time, but it's very interesting to read. And that's his latest 2024 book, "How to Win an Information War," his 2024 book. So, we're going to talk about this, but first I want, you know, I have some surprises for you. So, this book was published in Moscow in 2024 in one of the biggest and wealthiest publishing houses in Moscow, AST. A book was translated from Italian into Russian at the expense of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Italian Republic. It is a book about the icon of the Italian cultural domain, and it is the award-winning and internationally recognized director, Pier Paolo Pasolini. That's a book about him. Now, why, I'm sure, you know, somebody brought me from Moscow. That's how this book came out. Just one second. And that's what's happening now. I mean, even in Soviet times, I don't remember anything like that. Everything that was related here to sex, to gays, to something immodest, you know? For these, my lovely guys who love to have, to go to saunas with boys and girls, you know, but they are so modest now. So modest now, you know? It's a real book. You are welcome to see. You know, it's done through the entire book. I mean, you know, I'm not an adherent of Pasolini, you know? I'm not a movie person, but I was trying to figure out why they did it in such an idiotic way? 

N.K. 

It's not an idiotic way. 

Y.A. 

No? 

N.K. 

No, that was on purpose. That's exactly how it happens there because that's how you fight. After all, because you are going to surrender to what you are, you are not allowed to publish this. So, you are going to make fun of all of those who ordered you not to publish. So, you're going to publish it like this with a message. Look what we have to do to survive here. So, that book actually is a very important testament to what's happening there. That's a protest. 

Y.A. 

Please elaborate. 

N.K. 

Well, that's a protest because otherwise. 

Y.A. 

AST is a very powerful, very loyal publishing house. 

N.K. 

Otherwise, you are not going to publish it. If you have a book like that, what are you gonna do? You're not gonna publish a book like that. You just say, "Fine, you know what? Half of it cannot be seen by people over, below 18 or over 18. So, you, we are not gonna publish it." Instead, they say, "We are going to mock this system. We are gonna publish it this way, and to show you how idiotic that looks." That's a new form of protest. That's exactly what I've been seeing there for the last three years I have been going. People try to do it any way they can. If they cannot do it any other way, that's how they do it. So, that's not a surrender, that's not idiocy. 

Y.A. 

Why are they not afraid, Nina? 

N.K. 

They are afraid. 

Y.A. 

But all our friends are, all my friends are in jail. 

N.K. 

Exactly, but because, I mean, anyway, we already started a conversation. We haven't even gotten to questions. 

Y.A 

No, no, no. 

N.K. 

We haven't even gotten to questions yet, because it is random, because you don't know exactly. That's, I mean, the question is how it is different from the Soviet Union. In the Soviet Union, you know what you can do, what you can't do. Now it's hit or miss. You can, or you cannot. Some people go to jail, some cannot. Some people can put something on stage and some cannot. It is idiotic. For example, I just saw, if we talk about theater, Sergei, sorry, Dmitry Krymov had his play "Seryozha". I don't know, you've probably seen it because it's an old one. It used to have a director. Now, if you go through the site of MXAT, the theater that it's in, there's no director. Everybody's there, the light person, the costume person, the actors, but there's no director. So, that's how they do it. 

Y.A. 

On the poster, do you mean? 

N.K. 

On the poster, there's just not, nothing like that. On the other hand, the Vakhtangov Theatre, they had one of the famous, he now unfortunately died, Tuminas, who right before the war did "War and Peace", and at the beginning. 

Y.A. 

Tolstoy's "War and Peace". 

N.K. 

Tolstoy's "War and Peace". It was a giant poster, and when I first got there in '22, when the war started, I started going every half, every six months. And so "War and Peace" was there. It was like, okay, five more minutes and it's gonna be off. It's still there. So, why would they allow "War and Peace" to hang? So, somebody didn't notice or somebody said, "You know, we look at ." So what I learned also in the places that I went, in all the cities, it depends very much on the leader, on whatever, the governor or the mayor, 'cause if the governor and the mayor say, "We are going to pay tribute to this," like with the book, we're gonna pay tribute to what they tell us, but we're not gonna go further than one has to go. Kazan in Tatarstan is saying, "Oh, we love Putin, we host BRICS, everything is happening, everything is great, everything is wonderful." Two things that you see from the war. On the main square, they have this sort of, this harmonica of Tatarstan at the war, and there's some heroes of whatever. And in the theater, the director said, "We are very special military operation oriented. So, we are just gonna have this Z sign." 

N.K. 

So, see we are gonna have the Z sign. This Z sign is za, which is for the war, on the theater until the war is over. I was there in December, there was no Z. I asked, "So, what happened to Z that it was supposed to?" Oh, you know, 

Y.A. 

 And Z is one of those symbols. 

N.K. 

Right, the symbol. 

Y.A. 

Special military operation. 

N.K. 

Right, it was supposed to blare on in electricity lights. Like, oh, you know, just, the lights burned down. It's like, but aren't you supposed to do this? Oh, we already paid tribute, and so people pay tribute and then they move on so they cannot be accused of something. So, I'm sorry, I didn't mean to interrupt, but actually this Pasolini is going to become a very important artifact, very important evidence of how people in conditions that you are not going to say no, you actually have to surrender, otherwise there's too much risk. And I always say it advisingly because you know, what is a risk in Moscow when there is Ukraine being bombed to pieces? However, when there is a risk, that's how you express your views of that, and I think that's important. So, we can mock all we can, but we also have to understand that that's actually, that's a public statement, that putting it this way is a public statement. They could have just cut out these pages. They didn't have to do this. They could have cut out these pages and how many people are going to read the Pasolini work? Some will and some would say, "Oh, they could put something that this page is excluded for publication." They could have pretended that this order not to publish LGBT and everything else does not exist, and yet they show. 

Y.A. 

I, you're right. I just, you know, think, you know, that it's always better to have information rather than not to have it. We lived through that in the Soviet times when we were able to publish, to say, 1937, it was when Zoshchenko and Akhmatova, I lived through the times when Zoshchenko and Akhmatova were censored, but tell me how comfortable did you feel while in Moscow? Did you feel surveillance? 

N.K. 

No. 

Y.A. 

Were you afraid? Tell me, how did you feel? 

N.K. 

Well, as I said, I first got there in '22 and I was very surprised. What do I do here? Oh, here it is. So, that's my kind of, that the war began. I mean, I was going before the war began. As you can see, there's all these minions and world leaders and you know, there's still Johnny Depp and Elizabeth Taylor and whatnot. So, in 2022, people still haven't figured out that that's what happened to them. So, they're still kind of in this global environment, but that changed. I mean, by '24 you wouldn't see any of this. You would see this, kind of, more of those. This is '22, '23. So, of course, the usual suspects, you would have Tolstoy, you have Peter the Great, you will have Gagarin, and it's interesting.and it what's interesting. 

Y.A. 

Stalin. 

N.K. 

Stalin, but Stalin only appearing. I mean that's what's, that's another interesting thing. By the way, these are soaps, so. If you'd like to wash your hands. 

Y.A. 

And you didn't bring any ? 

N.K. 

I mean, I have a lot to wash. Of course I do, and this is by the way, very tasty chocolate that unfortunately. This is, don't leave ours behind. So, basically it is if you are living in George Orwell. Nobody has ever lived in George Orwell. It was all written about some other country, but here, you walk around and think, you say, "Did it really happen to me? Is it me, is it happening?" So, this is soap, you can wash your hands. Stalin is still kind of slightly diluted by others, but here he is. I mean, that's it. He's basically everywhere now as of '22, '23. 

Y.A. 

Yes, here's Stalin. 

N.K. 

Exactly, and you see there's a lot of Putin because we want Putin, and especially this Putin is the politest man in the world because that's exactly how they troll those who don't like the Russians. This was the shocker. This is the Hermitage Museum. So, when you have a magnet of Stalin in the Hermitage, that's kind of, it gives you a little bit of a pause because until 2023, you couldn't even imagine that this happening. So, no, I wasn't afraid, but it was sort of a social experiment. I wanted to see how long I last, how long I can come in and leave and kind of pretend that I'm like an and I'm going to just sort of between the raindrops. Between the raindrops, and it didn't, it was, it lasted until November, and then I made a mistake of agreeing to go to the Yeltsin Center in Yekaterinburg, and since he's such a beloved character of the hard right of the patriotic politicians, the combination of Khrushchev and Yeltsin, although Yeltsin hated Khrushchev, so the combination of Yeltsin and Khrushchev just suddenly became an explosive problem. Oh, and that's basic. That’s, kind of. "1984," any bookstore you go in, right in your face, right in your face, everywhere up 'til now, it's not. '23, '24, everywhere. So, this is in St. Petersburg in the middle of "1984". This is a '23 display. In '24, there's a different display. 

Y.A. 

Explain, what is it there, I mean? 

N.K. 

Okay, so this is one, this is this bookstore that they turned into the bookstore from a factory. So, that's there. This is another bookstore in St. Petersburg, and "1984", right next to the cash register, right in your face. And I talked to a woman there and I said, "You have an interesting welcome sign," and she said, "We have to remember the world we live in." So, people are very aware of how it's happening. So, this is Pasolini. They can't do it any other way, they're gonna do it this way. So, here is your Orwell. And they're all together, and in some places, which are in some places that are more intellectual, they also have Huxley. So, that combination of Zamyatin and Huxley and Orwell in many, many places. So, you can't kind of, so propaganda is there, but also insidious anti-propaganda is there too. So, there's a reminder all the time that there is something else going on that we need to pay attention to. 

Y.A. 

Why did the event get canceled in Yeltsin Center? What happened? They invited you, Yeltsin Center. That's Yumashev still, you know, the Yeltsin son-in-law is, you know, has his pass to the administration of the president. He meets Vaino, the head of the apparatus, Putin's apparatus. What happened? 

N.K. 

Well, it's actually, the whole thing was interesting because I was very Mikoyan-like, and I have to say I was very proud that for two years I was able to get through. And then that, the place that commissioned this book in 2020 suddenly said, "Oh, we have a, we now have censorship and so we cannot publish it." And one of the problems that they had is with this cover, by the way. So, this is a cover that you cannot publish a book about Khrushchev in Russia. 

Y.A. 

Why? 

N.K. 

Why? Because he looks too good. He cannot look. Seriously, Putin doesn't like him. You, he can, he's an, that's interesting actually, when you said Dima Muratov. Dima Muratov didn't know the story of the cover and he said, "Oh, what a great cover." So, this is 1962. 

Y.A. 

Dima Muratov is the Nobel Prize winner for Peace. And he's the editor of the now closed "Novaya Gazeta". 

N.K. 

And yet it comes out. 

Y.A. 

And 1999 caucus. 

N.K. 

Exactly. 

Y.A. 

That was allowed. 

N.K. 

And yet it comes out. So, this is a comparison once again to the Stalin, because there, if something's closed, it's closed. Now it's closed, it's not closed, it's published, it's not published. Anyway, so Khrushchev looks too good. And so, they wanted a gray, black and white photograph, it's a kind. So, they found a photograph and then they said, "Well, you know, actually we now have censorship, so it's not gonna be published." And so, then actually Vitaly Dymarsky, who is the editor of "Diletant", said, "We have our own publishing house, so we're gonna publish it." And so, they did publish it. And I think what people got interested in it, and I'm actually shocked because unlike Peter, who is a bestselling author, I've never been a bestselling author. And suddenly, everybody wanted this book, and everybody wanted to buy it. And it's very heavy and it's very expensive by the Russian standards. And I start asking why? And they said, "Well, because first of all, we wanna know what makes people serve Stalin?" Because Khrushchev was, I mean he was talking about studying flunky. He was one of the most devoted and what it takes for somebody to turn away and say, "My hands are covered in blood by the elbows. And so, we need to repent." And so that became an interesting thing. So, what happens, because I was also writing about a society and how people surrender to fear, but also how they, I mean basically what happens to Vaino and Kiriyenko and Naryshkin and Lavrov all these Russians who originally maybe slightly more educated than they present themselves now because they have to be tough and patriotic. And so, suddenly people were just reading it for this. And that was an amazing thing. Anyway, so the book came out, it was sold out and suddenly the original publisher called me and says, "We wanna publish it." I'm sorry, what? So, they had to buy the rights from "Diletant" to publish the book they originally commissioned, edited and essentially design, not essentially, design, but they were afraid of this photograph, and they put it inside the book. And this is a photograph, not photograph, this is a portrait of, done by Nadia Léger, Nadia Léger who was Belarusian origins. The wife of Fernand Léger, who is also Cubist. You may have seen her work of this kind. She did Gagarin, she did Yekaterina Furtseva, the Minister of Culture, Tsiolkovsky and others. But this was the first portrait, and it was a little bit of a bribe for Khrushchev because, you know, his views of art were like non avant-garde, to say the least. To say the least. And so, she did, she thought she was going to paint Khrushchev, and he will not cancel the Cubist exhibit in Moscow. So, she did, she gave it to them. My mother was there, and she told me a lovely story. So, she brought it in and said, wow, Nikita Sergeyevich, here is the portrait. It's such a great portrait. And they put it sort of like this to the wall. Thank you so much, and put it on the wall. And my mother said, "Oh, what a great portrait." And my grandmother then turned to her and said, "Why don't you take it? You like things that are so," how do you translate it? 

Y.A. 

Yucky. 

N.K. 

So, not yucky, so, it's not outrageous, but so those who speak Russian, 

Y.A.  

What's the English? How would you say it? 

Audience Member 

In your face. 

N.K. 

In your face, something in your face. So, this portrait was hanging in our apartment, and nobody has ever seen it for 70 years. And suddenly it's on the book and suddenly they are afraid to publish because Khrushchev looks too good. So, I was canceled. Yeltsin Center wasn't the first one. I was supposed to speak in magazine "Moskva" on Tverskaya and it was all great. And then they called me one day before and said, "You are canceled for technical reasons." So, I know technical reasons about five times, have been canceled for technical reasons. It's just the Yeltsin Center was the loudest because it was not about Khrushchev on me as much as it was about Yeltsin and how in the Yeltsin Center, they all, as they say, so they warm up these liberal snakes like me. And of course Khrushchev, because he gave, as one Duma person wrote, and she's in charge of family and children. So, she wrote in her call to the prosecutor's office to investigate me because of, and Khrushchev, let's investigate, Khrushchev, who's been dead for how many years, because he gave birth to such unspeakable bastards as Mikhail Gorbachev and Boris Yeltsin. So, it was that. So, if I didn't go, if I didn't go to Yeltsin Center, I would've been canceled and not canceled for technical reasons here and there. But I could have, I probably would have continued being a Mikoyan for some time to come. 

Y.A. 

Not sure that young people here know exactly who Mikoyan was in this Soviet era. But you know, I'm not going to delve. 

N.K. 

Google, I mean Google is your friend, so. 

Y.A. 

Yes, okay, but may I ask you, do people watch TV? People who were around you, you know, who were neighbors, or you know, who live next to each other, you know? I didn't even send the picture of my apartment building 'cause obviously I miss my home. And so, tell me, you know, people who you dealt with, you know, you spoke with, do they watch TV? Do you, do they talk about the war? Are they afraid, so? 

N.K. 

Just, it's once again, I mean it's not the Soviet Union. There's no monolith way of looking at it. It's very fragmented, like everywhere else. I mean, and people don't watch TV the way we used to watch TV. I mean, it's no longer a linear way of looking at it. A lot of people watch on their computers, a lot of people have Google TV. I don't know what's gonna happen to that. So, you can actually pick your channels and very few people actually go through them, as it was. 

Y.A. 

But you mean YouTube banned now, you know? 

N.K. 

Well, YouTube is banned, but then there's VPN. I mean, and so, and once again. 

Y.A. 

I can tell you, you know, as I, since, you know, I have my show each Monday, the audience in Russia is down by 40%. All of us have experienced this. 

N.K. 

It is absolutely, it is hard and it's getting harder. And of course, they're lying because they said, "Well, it's slowed down." It's not slowed down. You actually cannot log on. But people do log on. People still watch; they still post things on Facebook. So, yes, it is down. I mean, they are really. 

Y.A. 

Even though Facebook is closed, Twitter is closed. 

N.K. 

Twitter is closed. 

Y.A. 

Instagram is closed. 

N.K. 

Instagram is closed; all of this is closed. And yet, everybody's posting. And I think when your audience is down is because it's getting harder and harder and VPN, they also try to, so this one is closed, you have to look for another one. You have to look for the other one. So, it is kind of another thing. It's also, there's a very KGB way. I'm sure you know that better than anybody with a very KGB of doing this. It's sort of this python that is going to strangle you slowly. It's not gonna kill you and poison you immediately, but it's gonna strangle you slowly. But it still exists. I mean that's the thing. I mean it's not a country that is completely turned off. You still can do this. And people do, they discuss it much less. I mean in '22, that's the only thing people were talking about, it's the war. In fact, openly in a coffee shop saying, "Bastards, what are we doing? Oh my God." And somebody would say, "Well how can I find a job? How can I leave the country?" Oh, my friend left the country. Can I go, if I help Ukrainians, I have family in Ukraine, whatever, what is gonna happen to me and whatnot. Much less so. People are much more careful and interestingly enough, less careful about it, in Yekaterinburg. In Yekaterinburg, people, when I was canceled, and I went to a museum 'cause I had to do something for two days before I left. And people were coming up to me and saying, "Oh bastards, this is ridiculous. We wrote a petition." And it was like, wow, you don't know me, I don't know you. What if I'm going to squeal on you that very second? And yet they didn't, even in Yekaterinburg there is one of the museums, they do this, used to do this museum of metal, what's the word? Metal, not construction, but metal, something, I don't even know in Russian, when you made stuff out of metal, this little. 

Audience Member  

Metal sculpture? 

Audience Member  

Metalworking. 

N.K. 

Metalworking, something like that. And so, there's, they had periods, because it began in the last Tsar and they were actually in the Paris Exhibit, the metal gazebo they put forward. So, it's all there and you go, it's 1930s 'cause they have parts in the museum and there's no Stalin. And I said, "Where is Stalin? Where did Stalin go?" Because there's all these others, Kirov and Voroshilov and Budyonny, and but where is Stalin? And apparently, they had a vote and the head of that section wanted to put Stalin in, saying, "That's history, we have to remember." And the Director of the museum said, "No, we're not gonna have Stalin in because we don't put murderers and killers into our exhibits, even if he was part of history." So, these debates are still happening. They're less and less because ultimately, that python is going to squeeze all life out of it. But they're still there. 

Y.A. 

People, are they afraid? Just wait, remember the Soviet times? Both of us lived there. You know, we had to put a pillow on the telephone because, you know, everybody assumed that KGB was there sitting on this telephone, right? You know, people were imprisoned for. Now people imprisoned for post of Kontakte or you know, I had people who are working for me out of Russia and they're afraid to write about it. They still write as war, not They cannot say war, right? They cannot write war, they write. 

N.K. 

Yes, and still, they're afraid. I don't, I mean, yes, people are afraid, but a lot of people are not afraid. And you, because once again, it is hit and miss. And I think it's the story of Buyanova, that children's doctor. 

Y.A. 

Pediatrician. 

N.K. 

Right, pediatrician, that's a very important story because that's how it works. She is a random person who has been vocal, but probably didn't say whatever she was told, it was said that she said. But it was an example for everybody to be afraid. Those who are not afraid may not, for now, nothing may happen to them, but because you don't know. Once again, it is random. With Stalin, you know that it's gonna happen to you. So, you are going to be silent. If your Stalin statue, little bust broke in your bedroom, you are going to put, spend the whole night turning into dust, and then say, "Well, you know, it was moved to another room", because you cannot break Stalin. You can break, you still can. So, it's not, it's fragmented. It's not the same monolith. And that's why it's so difficult because somebody from whatever, the original publisher of this book, the original, the commissioner of this book, in which universe they first say they cannot publish and then they publish. That cannot happen in the Soviet Union. For something like that cannot happen in the Soviet. 

Y.A. 

Especially since the commissioner of this book one of the richest men in Russia. 

N.K. 

One of the richest men in Russia. And then they started explaining, "Oh, you know, Patrushev," the KGB man, the main KGB man, "Oh, he was, he vetted it and he said that there's no way." And said, well, but it's still me. It's the same Patrushev. And suddenly you do, so it's, you can't, it's almost impossible to rationalize. And that's why I keep thinking that that's how we live in Orwell. Because even Orwell, when I'm there, and I'm sometimes thinking Orwell would say, "I cannot write this because it's just way too far. Nobody's gonna believe this." 'Cause this, so this is, this was last April. So, I'm travelling, I'm riding around Moscow, and you can see all of these things. I mean, that's your propaganda. It's in your face all the time. But the problem with propaganda like that is that ultimately you just stop noticing it. Like, ultimately you are noticing things only that you want to notice. And that's what they did. They're not stupid, what they did afterwards. Now, because this is all basically almost stationary, but now it's turning around. So, you have bought this new car or the new musical is great and wonderful. Oh, the section is lovely. The hair you can bring, you know, you can color your hair in different colors. And then this, the special military operation, which is clever because it shocks you when you see it. But it also, it's like, you know, in war in Afghanistan, there was a ticking. So, let's talk about, you know, great, I don't know, the great musical and then so many people were killed today. So, it actually diminishes the experience at the same time. That's what I'm talking about. I mean, that is beyond, beyond Orwell. So, "Barbie" comes out, very quickly, very quickly banned. And yet here it is, Yevgenia, this is for you. This is in Depo. 

Y.A. 

It's on the street where we live. 

N.K. 

Exactly, right. 

Y.A. 

I live on this street. 

N.K. 

In Moscow. So, it was banned and yet this is right inside Depo when, which is, this is probably a year after. So, "Barbie" is totally banned, and yet you have all this "Barbie" crap right there. This is. 

Y.A. 

And the movie "Barbie" also. 

N.K. 

And this is also amazing. So, this is 20, it's December '23. "Barbie" came out, as you remember, in the summer. So, it's already thoroughly forbidden in Russia because it's against some values of whatever. And so, you walk on Nevsky, and here it is, the "Barbie" and "Oppenheimer", and they're both forbidden because there's a problem with values, whatever kind. So, here it is. And I actually talked to people who were coming out of the movie theater and some couple, young couple, watched "Oppenheimer". It's like, oh, it's too wrong. And you know, we went just because we wanted to see why it's forbidden because, you know, forbidding something, it's a great, great way of people wanting to see it. And they said, "Well, the movie theater will get closed probably, but very brave of them to show it." So, everybody's, not everybody, people are aware. And actually, by the way, the movie theater is not closed. They continue to show. 

Y.A. 

That's Nevsky, in St. Peter? 

N.K. 

In St. Petersburg, yes, because St. Petersburg is also interesting. It's kind of in Moscow things that get, 'cause it's so much going on, but in Saint Petersburg it's, and also, they hate Putin more. So, kind of, it's clearer. So, all of this is what, that's what I mean by war is peace, ignorance is strength. It's just Orwell would say, "I cannot invent this because nobody's gonna believe my formulas, it's just way too, it's way too outrageous." But it is happening right there in your face. 

Y.A. 

What's that? 

N.K. 

Oh, anyway, you know, turn into presentation. Part of the propaganda also is that almost every, basically the Soviet and Empire comes to you from everywhere. So, you go to the Russian Museum, and you have this exhibit, the "Scenes of Life at War". And you imagine that the scenes of life at war it's all to the SVO, to the special military operation. It's a tribute to the special military operation. Then you go in and it's a destruction upon destruction upon destruction. But the Chinovniki, the Apparatchiks, they're not gonna go and see the exhibit. They just see the title and that's it. And so, people actually go there because they want to see the destruction of war. And that's another kind of clever way of circumventing what's being pushed at you. But at the same time, every, almost every exhibit is about something Soviet. So, this is the Museum of Decorative Art and supposedly kind of artistic every day in the USSR. Kind of very liberal people put it on. But you could see Soviet achievements. This is a Sputnik, this is, you know, Khrushchev, I thought I couldn't resist doing the Sputnik by Vologda factory called or "Snowflake" in 1960. So, basically, even if you don't want to have Soviet surrounded you, it surrounds you everywhere because the museums are pressured to have references to Soviet life. 

Y.A. 

To Soviet Empire or to Russian Empire? 

N.K. 

And that's, so that's another kind of a fascinating thing. Here, mostly Soviet. But this is, I don't know if you remember, in 20, I think '23, Putin started talking about the cultural code. Suddenly, the cultural code of Russia, the unity of the people, of the nations and whatnot. And once again, not stupid, actually quite creative. So, the Hermitage had, these statuettes, the porcelain dolls that were studied being done during Nicholas II for the anniversary of the Romanov, the Romanov House. And so, they started doing that. They didn't finish because the Revolution happened. So now, they pulled them out of the basement, finished them up. So, there are 400 nations, 400 statues there. And you could see the culture, the Russian, the Russian nation, the Russian nationals, the cultural code. And it is also incredibly clever because it's given for three months to every region, and it travels around Russia. And everybody sees what a wonderful, multinational country it is. And when you go far, I mean, people don't pay attention that much. So, when you have the Georgians there and the Armenians are there, and the Malorussians, the Ukrainians are there. So, somebody who comes in and says, "Oh, these are beautiful dolls, oh my God, all these other nations, they're all ours." So, that's how you also make it. 

Y.A. 

Ours. 

N.K. 

They become ours, even if they're not ours. The Moldovans, the Latvians, the Lithuanians, part of the Russian Empire, 400 of them. And so, that's another part that comes to you. I mean, and Peter knows it much better than I do, but how propaganda really hits you here. I mean, you don't even know how it came into your brain, kind of Orwell thing, the two plus two is five. And so, that's, so the Imperial and the Soviet, of course the war. So, you have this ribbon, the current formula for patriotism, the military patriotism. And you just add it to the old story. And that's how you connect it to today. So, this is a beautiful place. That's where they do golden embroidery. It's not far from Tver, a very tiny town. Yeah, but, and it's, it has nothing, it has really nothing against, I mean it's nothing. It's a very small town. But the golden embroidery was amazing thing. And until '22, it was in great disarray, the Museum of Golden Embroidery. In '22, suddenly they decided it was going to be serving their propaganda. And so, they put up Stalin, they put up all this religion. I mean, I love when religion and Stalin and Lenin, they all together, but here it is. These are all, I mean you can see from here, but these are pictures of Stalin, Voroshilov, Medvedev and Putin. So, they are all doing, to be take and whatnot. So, it comes to you, basically my point is it comes to you from different angles. And if you are not trained to see it or if you are not looking for it, it's very hard to escape. Ultimately, that becomes the cocoon you live in. And yes, there you can do VPN, you can do this, but this is surrounding you 24/7. And that's how, and so it's, you know, once again, propaganda needs to be total. And in some ways, this is very total propaganda, but it's also porous, unlike the Soviet, because you can still break it or come in from, in different holes. Kind of a favorite Putin thing because he's a judo master. So, he sees an opening here, he goes in and suddenly it's a war. It's sort of this porous way of existing today actually somewhat helps Russia. It doesn't save it, but it somewhat helps Russia. 

Y.A. 

Last question before, you know, I will ask Peter to speak. Attitudes towards war. We understand that in these types of regimes, you know, and it's very difficult to run, you know, even though, you know, I understand that people are trying to do it somehow. But what is your, you know, being on the ground, what did you feel? Did people support the war? The majority of people support the war, or they don't? And did you see any deviation, you know, in small cities or you know, in the cities outside Moscow? Do people, you know, feel different in the provinces than Moscow? No, because once again, I remind you, we lived through the Afghan war when, you know, at some point, you know, all these corpses that were trying get from Afghanistan and, you know, Russian cities, et cetera, they were wailing, you know, they were burying, you know, their young and you know, their sons and brothers, et cetera, on a daily basis. Now we know, you know, numbers, you know, about 700,000 dead and wounded. So, what's the attitude towards war, is it different? 

N.K. 

I think at the beginning it was very negative and it's getting less and less negative in, and it also depends on the places. I did have pictures here, but I was in Omsk last year, in villages around Omsk, and I was shocked because suddenly there's beauty salons all over villages. I mean, how many beauty salons do you have in villages? Usually, people go to big cities to do their nails and suddenly, there are three of them for tiny village of, I don't know, 70 people. And some hut, kind of old hut, almost broken. But it says "Beauty Salon" in English, which is insane because you're supposed to not to have beauty salon in English. And I walked in and the women there, and one of them was a widow. And she said, "Well, I'm a widow now, and thank you to Putin, now live well, and you know, I have to make myself beautiful because I'm gonna marry again." Or my husband is serving, is serving the war, and thank you to Putin because now our economic conditions are better because in these places, especially places that produce arms, they're really living better. They, because another thing, and everybody knows that but it's worth mentioning, that kind of empowering small life through the great idea of the state is a very powerful way of doing it. Suddenly, small life becomes needed for this greater project of unique civilization or whatever Putin is doing, saying he's doing with the war. But it also depends on, I mean, what I found remarkable, it depends on the city, it depends on, it depends on town, as I said. In Yekaterinburg, they have the most squealing it seems from all the cities, and yet they are the most open in saying how horrible it is. You get into a cab, this is such a trite story. You get into a cab, you start talking to a cab driver, but most of the time you get out of the cab, you wanna hug the cab driver because the cab drivers like, "What the hell, where are the people? What?" And usually it's, you know, great Russian language of things that I cannot repeat here. And so, and a lot of them are from other countries, a lot of them from Central Asian countries. And the Russian state is very kind to them right now because suddenly they found an enemy that they need to eliminate. And some of them lived in Russia forever, they married Russian women and they're being stopped. I mean, we were in a cab and suddenly the guy got stopped, from Kazakhstan, because he looks Kazakh. And then of course he has all the documents and whatnot. But it's humiliating. And so, you talk to them and you see how non-monolith it is and how even sort of in Yekaterinburg, even the state media, state media, whatever, some something that is supported by the governor's office, there's a guy who I had an interview with, and then of course they couldn't publish it because suddenly I was persona non grata. He used to be at Ekho Moskvy. He was at Ekho Moskvy, Yekaterinburg. So, it just depends on if they trust you enough to tell you. But in some places, it is, yes. I mean, I was in Kostromo, which is a remarkable city, and there was a woman selling Stalins, just Stalin, Stalin, Stalin, Stalin. And I said, "Well, you're selling a mass murderer." And she said, "Well, I, my grandfather gave his life to the." Gave his life to... 

Y.A. 

To the state security. 

N.K. 

Right, to the state security. "And I am a proud descendant." And I said, "Well, unfortunately then we're gonna disagree." And she said, "Well, but it's wonderful if everybody's gonna be healthy." And said, "Yeah, because then we'll die. We're all gonna be healthy." And she said, "But would you like to buy it? Would you like to buy a Stalin?" It's like, no, thank you, I don't, but it's so, it's kind of, it's once again, it's not a Soviet monolith. There is no monolithic anything. It's very porous and very different. And so, to conclude this other thing that. So, Putin and see an old Putin and war and Putin and war. This is actually, this was amazing. This was the most militant city I visited. This is Tula, where they produce cannons. This was the most military. 

Y.A. 

Yeah, well it is a military city. 

N.K. 

This was unbelievable. I mean that whole. That was the whole thing. I mean for peace, for Russia, for president, for the army, for bravery, for truth. And of course, I love peace and doves with all the cannons that they produce. Just once again, very Orwellian. Soviet nostalgia. Oh, it doesn’t matter. Harry Potter is our everything by the way. He's forbidden. He is forbidden because J.K. Rowling is forbidden. And yet wherever you go in every city, there is something Harry Potter. And I tell, when I tell them that it's forbidden, they say, "Really?" Nobody's aware of it and nobody's gonna cancel it. And so, this is, you ask about the return. So, this soldier, I took a picture of myself. He's missing his left arm. So, this will be more and more. But once again, Putin doesn't want to repeat the Afghan mistake when these people came in and they were not needed by anybody. So, now they're becoming governors, they're becoming mayors, they're studying to become the greatest thing that happened to humanity. And he said this is going to be our elite. And so, oh, and I knew, actually this is an old presentation. I deleted the cities just in case. So, this is in Murom, this is a monastery in Murom. And I was having a conversation with people. We were discussing whether it's specific message about Ukraine or not, and well, it cannot not not be. So, it is a specific message. 

Y.A. 

Ah, because of the colors. 

N.K. 

Exactly, it's the. 

Y.A. 

Yellow and blue. 

N.K. 

Right, and it's sort of, it's a monument to the dead. 

Y.A. 

Yes, and over there. 

N.K. 

It's a monument to the dead. And this is also, so this is Yaroslavl and this is in Murom, this top one. And I asked, I said, "Well, isn't it a little brave because you can get arrested." I don't know, these are very beautiful colors, and they sell products really well. So, these people say to me, so once again, it's not. 

Y.A. 

But you sound more optimistic than when, you know, we spoke when you came, when you came back. 

N.K. 

I was very freaked out. 

Y.A. 

Yes. Nina, thank you very much. We are going to, I'm going to return it to you now, Peter. So, do you think, you saw, you know, these examples of this current Russian propaganda. To which extent is it different, you know, the techniques, the language, the tools, from what it was in Soviet times? And to which extent you see that because many people say that the current, contemporary Russian propaganda is a very effective, that it does have impact on Russians. So, the floor is yours. 

P.P. 

So listen, I was born in the Soviet Union, but I only had time to throw up over it. And then my parents left and I was nine months old. So, it's very hard for me to judge anything about Soviet. 

Y.A. 

But you said probably something about that, no? 

P.P 

Yeah, I've read a couple of books, but I mean, I never really, I never studied, I mean, what, you know, when I lived in Moscow, 2001, 2010, you know, it was obviously a very, very different propaganda system based on manipulating kind of a pseudo-democracy, which it's clearly not, now it seems to be a sort of, that was an limitation, democracy. What you are talking about sometimes feels sort of a pastiche on dictatorship but with, you know, with. 

Y.A. 

With capitalism in it. 

P.P. 

Yeah, where and bits of gaps. So, listen, I mean look, usually this is quite a surprising position for me because usually I'm surrounded by very serious, data-driven academics and I'm the one telling the great anecdotes. This time, it's gonna be the other way around 'cause Nina's actually been in Russia and because I haven't been there since 2014, in the utter agony of trying to understand what's happening there, I've had to turn to completely alternative ways of understanding what's going on there. But some of the conclusions echo Nina's. Let me go through some slides. So, at the start of the war, I wanted to know what was going on there. And also my last book is actually a book about how the British launched a covert campaign to subvert Nazi propaganda. So, I wanted to help subvert. 

Y.A. 

Sorry, I didn’t read. 

P.P. 

I've read propaganda today. And so, I turned to actually a team of people who are at Harvard and sort of like came up with the idea, I'll come back to stuff later, came, come up, look, said, "How can I know what's going on in Russia without going there?" And sociology is hard. I think we will come back to sociology. I think there's things you can do in sociology. And so what they did and what you're going to hear, I'll tell you more about it was kind of did this incredible data fusion of putting in all the available social media sources. Everybody does that. All the available state media sources, then all the economic data, all the behavioral data, basically all the data that you can get from Russia into a kind of a data crunching machine to try to understand what was going on there, or give some sort of perspective. And I think once you sort of, you partner the wonderful sort of anecdotal, visual stuff that Nina has, that the data people have, that the sociologists have, you start to get a three-dimensional picture approximation of how the propaganda works. But I'll give you a couple of little things. So, this is sentiments around NATO in Russian news. One of the things that we do is contrast what is being said in the state media, in the news, and on social media. Now social media is, there is some censorship and then you can say things. So, look, there's a discrepancy often between what's said on state media and in social media. And by looking at that discrepancy, we can see where propaganda has difficulties. Yeah, because as we see something like NATO, this is what they're saying in Russian news. Basically, NATO did something naughty in August '24, I can't remember what it was. And the news is like, that's the sentiment going down. It's basically that's Russian state news goes, "NATO is evil", and on social media people are saying "NATO is evil", which either means the troll farms are working or people are agreeing with it, but this is something they don't dare or don't want to disagree with, yeah? But the minute you get away from something like that to the question of salary increases, as you know, yes there is this huge economic kind of boom, fake boom in Russia, but at the same time, salaries, you know, aren't keeping up with the rate of inflation. So, even though there is actually high employment, people don't necessarily feel the economic benefits. A little bit like under the Biden era here, but more extreme. So, this is Moscow Oblast. So, you see the sentiment in the news on salary increase going up and up and up. And if you sort of like, you know, like delve into that graph, you'll find lots of sorts of slightly Soviet-style articles and news articles saying your salary is better than it has been before. The wonderful salary increases are even greater. The farmers and the bakers of Moscow Oblast are very happy with their salaries. And some of it is actually like that. It actually, some of it really feels like, you know, here we are opening a new factory, sort of propaganda. But online, you can see it's completely different. So, that means people are complaining about it. 

Y.A. 

When you say online, what do you mean exactly? 

P.P. 

So, it is, some of the data experts are in this room, but it is all types of social media forums do a lot of that as well. So, you're scraping up all the kinds of conversations people are having on VK, on Telegram. City forums are very interesting. There are all these forums in Russia which are still actually used, or professional forums, veteran’s forums, baker’s forums, sports forums. People are actually, there's less censorship on them. People talk more there. All of this is a massive approximation, yeah? But again, you see straight away, look, there's stuff people can complain about and complain about quite angrily. Another one is, another big topic that people seem to be very, very annoyed about online and don't believe propaganda is the topic of taking out, well in England, we call them payday loans. You know, when you take out really bad loans because you're an academic and you don't have enough money, right? Yeah, we know payday loans, but, and the government's always trying to stop people from doing that. They're like, don't do that. The ruble is fine, you shouldn't take out any loans. And actually, Russians are taking them out like crazy. Basically. I won't get into the details, but when you see these sort of crazy up and down spikes in social media, that's a troll farm saying don't take out payday loans. The ruble is strong. And people are like, no, we don't believe in the ruble. We're gonna take out payday loans. We don't have enough money. And then there's a troll farm saying, no, you must stop this. So, again, there's this battle going on in the social media space between sort of the state-sponsored propaganda, the sort of troll farms they use and what people say. So, again, it's quite, you know, it's quite an active discussion on things like that. The reason we looked at Samara Oblast was because Samara is doing very, very well economically on paper, as in like, it's a boom place. Like, you know, all the Volga regions, everywhere around there. Huge boom in their industrial production. 

Y.A. 

Industrial complex. 

P.P. 

Yeah, exactly, so, the Volga region, if you look at this is what's so interesting in Russia. If you look at the kind of economic data for Samara region, it is a booming town. Businesses opening, salaries, sort of unemployment going down. People are spending like crazy on restaurants. All the behavioral data tells you of a kind of golden age. Then you go to what people are saying online and all they're doing is complaining, about what is largely to do with inflation, largely to do with the fact that even though there's so much economic activity, they feel poor, they have to take out payday loans. So, there's this tension even in Samara. If we're talking about regions, there's a new, you know, as we all know, there's always been different types of polarization in Russia. The new type of polarization that we're seeing is actually between the economic winners and the economic losers of the war. So, the economic winners are obviously the military industrial complex regions around the Volga, and then in the Far East, on the border of China, those regions are doing incredibly well because of the new trade with China. The places that have lost out and are really angry, if you were doing some sort of, you know, counterpropaganda activity, you would probably look at regions along the western border, Pskov, places like that who have been really affected by the lack of trade with the rest of Russia, Kaliningrad, all these places, they're kind of economic losers. So, there's a new polarization in the country to do with the war as well. This is on medical services, again, this is the next one that really matters. Something that people are really, really upset about is, you know, bad medicine that's on the market. I mean, that's a really, really big issue. Anything to do with health supplies, health services. And again, there's nonstop sort of campaigns by the state saying we have opened a new hospital or we've opened a new pharmaceutical factory in suburban Moscow that will produce medicines that are better than anywhere in the West. And you can see the, you know, the government trying to push that propaganda and people disagree with it and saying, "No, this is rubbish. We want other types of medicine." So, it's all, you know, there is nothing as good as sort of actually being there. But looking at this sort of like dynamic between what the state propaganda is saying, what people are saying online, gives you a sense of the differences. I mean where, so. 

Y.A. 

Wait a second. Do you want to say that? 

P.P. 

Yeah. 

Y.A. 

The, like it was in the Soviet Union, the propaganda in effect ineffective, that people do listen to all this bullshit that comes out of the TV, from their TVs, but they don't trust this the way we didn't trust the Soviet propaganda when they were telling us that we're building, tomorrow it's going to be communism and tomorrow there was no fish in this market and meat across the street. 

P.P. 

So, there is meat and fish. So, I don't think it's a meat and fish issue, but clearly on the economic stuff, people, there is scope for criticism, for a little bit of pluralism. Look, take China. Yeah, Putin is totally like saying all the time how wonderful the relationship with China is, how big the investments are. If you actually look at the business newspapers, the forums for like elite conversation about the economy, you can still hear academics, business experts saying, "This is all bullshit", that, you know, business with China is very weak, that we're actually in a very bad position vis-a-vis China. So, there's all these different spaces and topics that you are allowed to talk about stuff. And then on state media, you can't talk about that obviously. So, it is a much more complicated picture. Certainly, when it comes to the economic stuff, there seems to be a lot of scope for being allowed to voice criticism. It can also be that people are sublimating a lot of criticism into that. That, I can't tell. But there's definitely variation. In terms of the propaganda working, not working. So, this is from a bit of sociology I've been doing. I'm not a sociologist, but like I try to feed into the question and we were much more about this question about what you hear on state TV, the questions about identity, which I think Nina just mentioned, this idea of a large sense of grandeur being popular among people, that we're part of something big. And what we're, what this sort of survey did, and the survey was online, on the telephone, checked in little groups to make it as precise as possible. All caveats apply for any kind of polling in a very unfree system. But we were really trying to like burrow into this question of identity. Yeah, and essentially we were using an approach that, you know, looked at the relationship between support for the war and other attitudes and its relationship with different models of identity and kind of the, we're looking at it in a scale, identity as something quite aggressive where you feel not simply that your country is nice, but that it's better than others, kind of. 

Y.A. 

Right? 

P.P. 

Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, so that's kind of like, yeah, probably was a variant. Anyway, that's the question I always point out about. And then it went down from I'm proud of my country, I think my country's better than others, down to other pieces. And we kind of did find that there were kinds of people who were more supportive of the war, yeah. And that's an AI generated image there on the left, top left, that's an active supporter of the war. We did not draw that, like AI produced that. The more, basically, look, the more supportive you are, the more you have this chauvinistic idea of identity, then you have loyalty, loyalists who have a, they're kind of patriotic but less chauvinistic. And then you have critics who are less. This sense of chauvinistic identity in the survey was deeply connected to your support for the war. Again, the more TV you watch, the more likely you are to be, have that chauvinistic model of identity. So, something there is genuinely working. If we're asking, is it working? No, that sense of chauvinistic identity is there. Wait, we can go on and on. That's the, yeah, that's our, okay nothing, this really was AI. This is the chauvinistic. So, our survey had them at 55% of the population. So, over half the population. Look, segmentations are, we could probably take this 55% and segment it further, but you know, in the segmentation that we did, over half the country displayed some of these chauvinistic attitudes. 

Y.A. 

When you say chauvinistic attitude… 

P.P. 

As in like my country. 

Y.A. 

What kind of nationals? Russian nationals or only imperialist nationals? 

P.P. 

So, it was Russian.  

Y.A. 

Because we are Russians. 

P.P. 

Where Russia is superior to. 

Y.A. 

Ethnic Russians. 

P.P. 

I think Russia, I dunno if we got into the ethnicity. That's a very good question. I dunno if we did that one. But it was all about how Russia is superior to other nations, yeah? We are better than other nations. 

Y.A. 

Okay. 

P.P. 

Yeah. 

Y.A. 

Okay. 

P.P. 

We can go back to the being, we can go back to which specific ones, which I don't think we got into questions of ethnicity, though. I don't think it was about, I know what you're trying to ask. I don't think we got into that level of detail, but here's where it gets more interesting, yeah. With critics, we had around 11%. Here's about whether the propaganda is working, yeah. So, we them in the survey ask these different groups questions which I think were a way of asking something about the war that was safe because obviously, you know, it is hard to ask about the war in a survey because obviously people are very suspicious. But this one we kind of said, look, Putin has said, yeah. So, both of these are things that Putin has said, and Putin has said we should start negotiating peace tomorrow. And the other one, Putin wants the war to go on. So, it's both Putin has said, and Putin by the way has said both these things. So, this is not, this isn't something that people should be scared of. You know, we're trying to find a way of asking people things that they won't be scared of. And essentially, cutting a very long story short, if people had been primed with questions about identity, they were much more likely to say they wanted Putin to continue the war. If they hadn't received a bunch of questions about identity beforehand, they were much more likely to say they want peace. So, essentially if you've just been prodding people saying identity, identity, identity, they don't want peace. If you don't talk to 'em about identity and just talk about, I don't know, inflation, they're more likely to say they want peace. Sorry, more, you know what I'm saying? So, again, what we're trying to get to in our very way, you know, because this is all very like, you know, like all these data sets, they're so, attempts at approaching a reality, but it does suggest that it does work. If you prod the identity issue, if you prod the question like, are we better than others? People seem to then be more supportive of war. And if you don't manipulate that, then people will, are more likely to go for peace. Again, these are the different ways I've been trying to probe what people really think and feel. Very, very, they're all, you know, they're all approaches with massive kinds of caveats attached to them. But to your question, does it work? Yes, sometimes, depending on the context. Oh, I'm trying to switch this off. Yeah, I think so. Good. 

Y.A. 

The end of the presentation. 

P.P. 

Yeah, I think so, I think we'll end it there. There's more, but I think we haven't. 

Y.A. 

Thank you very much. Tim, may I ask you, you did, you know, study of public opinion in Russia in mid-'90s with, who had right at the end of '90s. So, what conclusion do you draw from this research? Do you think we can rely on this type of data? What do you think? 

Tim Colton (T.C.) 

I think it's a question. It is discussed a lot that people do this kind of work. I think there are ways you can minimize the, you know, the risk, but it's, I mean it's real, but there are techniques for doing this that are pretty well developed. I'm sure it would be better. So, I think it's worth trying and there's probably a lot to be learned. Yeah, we started doing this work in the mid-'90s and did it without impediment until very recently. We still do some of this stuff under, there are Russian contractors who will do it. They're taking a certain risk, perhaps, and they're familiar with the danger, the various biases that can be there. But you know, I think both of our speakers were clear on one point, which is that, you know, this kind of evidence, whether it's taking photographs in the markets or doing survey work or scanning the social media, you know, if you're doing, if you're doing it right and if you know what you're talking about, there should be some mutual reinforcement. So, we shouldn't be shocked that one kind of evidence produces one set of conclusions and the other doesn't. And in these two particular cases, it seems to me they're quite reinforcing that from that point of view, rather reassuring. Now it is easier to say what Russia is not than what it is. It's not a monolith. What exactly is it and how we choose to label it. And whether the current synthesis is going to persist after the war, that's another matter. But as we all know, it's very hard to predict the future, especially in Russia. 

Y.A. 

But you know why during Soviet times, everybody laughed at Brezhnev, you know? People didn't trust whatever was coming out of TV, propaganda obviously didn't work, and we didn't have, you know, back then social networks, you know, we didn't have alternative information. We had Radio Liberty, BBC, Voice of America. That's basically all the alternatives we had. Why now are people much more prone to believe in what they're told? Why don’t they laugh at Putin? In fact, there are many of them that are in love with him. Why? 

T.C. 

Well, I'm not sure I'm willing to answer that question, but I don't think that what we heard today suggests that everybody believes everything that they're being told. And sometimes of course, it's true. I mean, it's not all fantasy, it's not all made up. Russia is at war with the West now, essentially. And so, it shouldn't be shocking that many Russians will, after this initial shock, which Nina for us, rally around the flag. It may not last forever, it probably won't, but this is a rather short war, you know, in terms of the wars that the US has fought. So, but as for, you know, do they fall for it? I think the message, I mean, as Nina said, is not, this is not Soviet propaganda. It's different. It's more subtle and it's messier and it has these ridiculous sides, of course. But I mean, just take the basic thing, there's no personality cult. It's a personalized regime without a personality cult. I mean, that's hard to imagine in terms of, you know, Soviet experience. So, of course there are some similarities. If I was a Russian, especially if I was living in Russia, I would be deeply concerned about them. But it's not black and white. So, I commend both speakers for getting that across. 

Y.A. 

Thank you so much. Yes. 

N.K. 

Can I just sort of add to, when you said we laughed Brezhnev, it has been 70 years. So, of course originally, propaganda was quite successful because it actually delivered the working-class better conditions, at least better than they originally was. But all these hopes, I mean I think you were talking about the fake democracy sort of, this, the fake version of democracy of the Soviet Union. 

Y.A. 

Okay, so what you are talking about, Novocherkassk happened. You know, in 1963. 

N.K. 

So, few people knew of Novocherkassk. Novocherkassk was hardly known, hardly known. Oh, please. It was, I mean it was a weird Soviet formula is that you are not talking about the event, but then you have trials of those who participated. They were actually open trials. But Novocherkassk, we learned as en masse, we learned about Novocherkassk much, much later. But this is all later. This is, I think Tim said that it has been three years. It's not enough. And actually, it is very similar in some ways, very similar to the Brezhnev. But at the same time, I think what helped, and we didn't talk about this, is that, you know, show me the country that wants to be defeated. I mean, that whole onslaught on Russia needs to be that Russia needs to be defeated, that's also on TV. And when it goes on TV. 

Y.A. 

Vietnam War in the United States. 

N.K. 

Pardon me? 

Y.A. 

Vietnam War. 

N.K. 

Vietnam War in the United. I mean, I, right, but I wouldn't compare them directly. But this is all kind of animosity from the outside actually helps Putin quite a bit. Because I remember when Josep Borrell would say, I mean now he's retired, would say something, it would just be running on TV all the time. 

Y.A. 

The General Secretary of NATO. 

N.K. 

General, well he was, right. He was a diplomat of NATO and without even suggesting, yes, he's a diplomat, he wants more war and whatnot. Of course, it was propaganda because it was too much of it. But ultimately, that's exactly what was happening. So, I think, I don't think we can compare the late Brezhnev, when everybody knew, remember that great expression, great joke? If they pay, they pretend that they pay us, and we pretend that we work. It's different now. It's not the same. It's not of the same pretense, but also the economy did go down, but there's still no lines. You still can press a button and whatever your food comes to you, the services are still, the services are still available. I think when the economy collapses and people are standing in line, then all hell will break loose. But for now, they are keeping it afloat. And I think another, what seems to me the case is because Putin now is clearly descendant of Stalin. As a descendant of Stalin, he doesn't think he's gonna die. So, basically it's for the time that he's, all of this is needed for the time he's in because the world doesn't exist outside of Stalin. I learned it from doing research in my book, 'cause Stalin really thought that he's going to be there forever. That paranoia. I mean, he did not, he talked about sometimes that he would die, he would say to his disciples, "Oh, you are like blind kittens, the world, the West is going to eat you up." But he really didn't think he was gonna die. For Putin it's, I'm gonna go in history as this, but whatever happens after that, that's not my concern, so. 

Y.A. 

I think I have, I think, you know, I'm sorry. You know, I have some narrative about, you know, the way Soviet propaganda was worked, how it was taught, you know? I graduated from the Department of Journalism of MGU and the male part of the student body, they were prepared as a propagandist and there were, you know, specific topics that they were taught how to do propaganda. But unfortunately, I don't think we have time for that. You know, maybe, you know, I will just put it on somehow, you know, on YouTube. We'll find out how, because I really want to give now space to the audience to ask questions. Let's, yes. Mark Kramer, of course, Mark. 

Mark Kramer (M.K.) 

In light of what Tim has said and both speakers, could I ask, it's a point that Jenia briefly raised, but the war in Afghanistan lasted nine years and there were 14,500 soldiers killed. You know, this war has lasted three years, and they've been, you know, 25 times that number killed. So, why, I mean, it's not to say there wasn't popular outrage in the Soviet Union about the number killed, but still, it does seem surprising that he wouldn't, especially in regions like Dagestan and Buryatia and others in which casualties have been much greater than in other regions, that you wouldn't have popular protests breaking out. I mean, there've been a few. The wives of soldiers who were killed have gone out onto the streets in a few places, but nothing like happened, say, during the first war in Chechnya when there was, and again, Russia was a different place then compared to now. You know, the popular protest was feasible, and the media were mostly independent and the like. So, if you could comment on that specific issue about why you, having, you know, an entire generation almost partly wiped out hasn't sparked outrage. 

Y.A. 

Thank you, Mark, who's going to pick up the question? 

P.P. 

I mean, again, my, I think Nina's actually in a much better place than I am, but what I've seen in the research I've come across, so, you know, look, firstly, there's the obvious thing. When they did mobilization for the whole country, a million people left, and they didn't do it again. Yeah, so, it's something that they are actually kind of very careful around and you know, and they distribute it around the country in certain ways and they create all these economic perks. Miscellaneous bit of data, talk to journalists and sort of human rights activists, the main complaints are not about death, yeah. The main complaints from the families of service people are that they're not being paid the money they were promised to be paid. Yeah, for the beauty salon. Lots of stories about how people, sort of Russian soldiers are left as they famously are lying on the battlefield on purpose, because then the body's unidentified and then you don't need to pay. So, all the tensions are about money and about that contract among those people, the people involved. Among the general population, the strongest story is about the rise in crime as a consequence of the war. So, the release of the convicts into the army and from there into society is a huge issue. And actually, like when I talk to journalists, they basically say that that is the only issue that will get the most patriotic, chauvinistic bits of society upset. And I think it's because those people are more than ready to admit sacrifice to the big idea, but the undermining of order, 'cause they'll be obsessed with order and security and the strong hand, that worries them. So that's what I see in the very sort of like, you know, pouring over bits of data and talking to journalists. So, if you were, you know, there could be outrage and they are careful around it. We saw that with mobilization, one of the few moments when they've sort of, you know, essentially changed the policy. But those would be the main issues that seem to rile people. 

N.K. 

But they also catered to no Afghanistan and no Chechnya. They would come back and they would be completely lost. And now there are a lot, I mean, if you travel around and you see all these billboards, some sanatorium, whatever, some convalescent place. So, now a lot of those places actually, people can go on vacation, but they also have special wings. They built special wings where people come and convalesce. So, they are treated in a very different way. They're treated, so they are the heroes that defended the Motherland from the onslaught of Western hatred. So, it's a very different, it's a very kind of KGB figuring out how to influence your mind. But it will, I mean, it will happen. It just hasn't happened yet because I only saw one person without an arm. And there will be many, many more coming after this experience because for now, they're hidden in all the sanatoriums where they stay for six months, for a year. They paid off, I mean, some of them are not, but a lot of them are paid off. But once they start coming out and once they start walking the streets, that's gonna happen. We just don't know how long they're gonna be hidden away because that's another. 

Y.A. 

What Stalin did. He sent all those amputees to, to the island. 

N.K. 

Yeah. 

Y.A. 

Near Saint Peter, yeah. 

N.K. 

It depends on how long they're gonna hide them. 

P.P. 

When my mother immigrated, well, my parents immigrated in '78, my mother's first shock from the West was suddenly seeing disabled people everywhere. She's like, is there something wrong with the West? And she's like, oh no, they've been hidden away in the Soviet Union. I mean, it was, this is one of, this is her first impression. I mean, the bananas and the disabled people. And she's like, what's going on? 

Y.A. 

Yeah, for those who are interested in the subject, it's very interesting. That is, you know, Yuri Nagibin wrote a big, big piece. You know, there was the most famous writer in the Soviet Union, and he wrote a big piece about this. It was, you know, this island where Stalin and then, you know, such Soviet leaders sent all these amputees, you know, thousands and hundreds of thousands of them who came from the World War II. And all of a sudden at some point, they just disappeared from the streets of Moscow, Saint Peter, Leningrad and so on. And so, they were sent too. Other questions, please. Yes, please. 

Audience Member 

So, I used to go to the Soviet Union and Russia from the mid-'80s to the mid-'90s, and I actually have a lot of good memories. I made friendships, I remember a lot of positivity and then I stopped going after '94 because I had the sense that the mafia was just taking over. And then I got married and I. 

P.P. 

Are those things related? 

Audience Member 

I got married here and my wife said, "You know, I'd love to go to Russia someday," and now this has happened, the war with Ukraine. And I look at the attitude of Russians towards Ukrainians and I'm horrified. I could not bring my wife to Russia with such attitudes. And I don't know if that will change, when it will change, if it will happen in my lifetime. But that to me is something I find completely unacceptable, the way Russians look at Ukrainians. 

Y.A. 

You don't have question? 

Audience Member 

Can that, is that going to be fixed ever? 

Y.A. 

By whom? 

Audience Member 

The people. 

Y.A. 

People are, unfortunately, not just in Russia, but many other countries. But anyway. 

Audience Member 2 

 Well, can I just weigh in with an answer or an attempt at an answer? I think in this too, Russia isn't monolithic. There was some terrific reporting done, especially early on in the war about the Russians who at great risk to themselves were helping Ukrainians get back to Ukraine. So, and as Nina has described, and Yevgenia showed with the redacted book, you know, people are in the spaces that are afforded to them. Those who do think differently do what they can when they can as much as each is able. So, in that way too, don't forget that it's not a monolith if that's any. 

P.P. 

But when you were there, you did not notice the jokes about, did you not notice them? 

Audience Member 

It wasn't that I would've never imagined. Oh, what I remember at the kitchen table was when Ukraine became independent, oh, what about the nukes? Oh, well they don't want them. Oh, that's good. What about our summer holidays in the Black Sea? Oh, the Ukrainians say we can still come. What about the Black Sea Fleet? Oh, we can still be there, okay, well, no problem. I mean, I never would've imagined that there would be this war. I was wrong. 

Y.A. 

Yes, please. 

Audience Member 3 

Yevgenia mentioned that during Soviet times, the alternative was BBC and Voice of America. And I wonder to what degree today the Voice of America, BBC, Dojd, matter or don't matter at all. So, what, who is listening? Who is watching, who is connecting to that? How much information people get from outside of Russia, or care about that information? 

Y.A. 

Yeah. 

P.P. 

So yeah, largely from that survey, largely it's the 11% of liberals. So, if you're looking at the segmentation, we had the patriotic 55%. One of the things that defines them is that they both watch and say they trust the sort of Russian news, state news. The other lots, they watch and follow Russian state media of different types, but they don't necessarily trust it. And then the liberals are the ones who tune in to other stuff. Look, I think if you look back at what the West did in Soviet times in terms of supporting media and other types of information into the Soviet Union, it was really actually a very wide range of activities. You know, there was like, you know, there was, it wasn't just Radio Liberty, which was the Russian branch, it was radio for Europe in many, many, many different languages. It was talking about issues that were really kind of sore points for the Soviet system. And we still don't know how effective they were, but they were very intentioned as you know, there's this very famous document, which was written by Pipes, Richard Pipes, known for his strategy to sort of like defeat the Soviet Union. And he definitely saw the support of dissidents, different types of information activity as part of a war. And the point of the war was to get rid of the regime. No, or I wouldn't say regime change, but you know, a new type of regime because you can't use that word 'cause it got polluted. But today, if we were to do something like then, if we were to make any kind of comparison, it would have to start with a much more effects-driven approach. What are the vulnerabilities of this information ecology? Yeah, so the fact that we haven't done a huge media targeting Russian soldiers and their families shows that we're unserious about tackling Russia. You would think about regions, you think about social classes, you definitely wouldn't be thinking about intelligentsia. They're actually quite well catered to, and they're not a political force at the moment. So, you would think about those sorts of things and then you would think about a much larger theory of change. What's the point of any of this? But we have no Richard Pipes writing a note to Donald Trump. We have Musk tweeting at Donald Trump. And repeating Kremlin propaganda. So, we're in a very different world to that. So, yeah, I mean I, it's really quite remarkable that the extent of efforts that were put in the Cold War, you know, the supporting of, you know, Ukrainian dissident journals, I mean, it was a whole effort which played some sort of part in winning the Cold War. We have nothing like that today, sadly. 

N.K. 

Very difficult to do today, once again, because it's porous and fragmented. Because there, you know what's bad and what's good and people who live in that bad world don't know the good world. So, they can actually listen to what the good world is. But now a lot of Russians know what the West is, and the West is not necessarily something that they, that they'd like to emulate. So, it's so many Russians now that I talk to, they say we want our Russia back. We don't want to immigrate because we don't think that the West is that. Because the West, as you know, was that land of freedom and land of opportunity. The West is not seen this way anymore. So, it would be very difficult to present the same kind of. 

P.P. 

Well, as I explore in my latest book, we have a very rich tradition of understanding that dynamic in our struggles with authoritarian regimes. And I think you are quite right. You know, just taking a cut and paste from Cold War tactics is not, wouldn't work the same way. But I think it's clear from both our presentations that this is a propaganda model rife with cracks and vulnerabilities. Just, nobody is doing anything. 

Audience Member 

First, thank you so much for such an interesting conversation and all this material is great. My question is about we, for those who are interested in the subject, we already learned, heard and read so much about Russian propaganda. My question, is there academic research in different academia, sociology, economy maybe, media studies about how to break the propaganda? My, if I just lower this question, in my case, I don't know how to speak with my own parents who live in Moscow. I'm Russian also, and I live here for many years. But we stopped understanding each other. So, now at this point I'm looking for information about these magic words of strategists about on how to break and how to break the wall of propaganda. You know, maybe it's about psychiatry, sociology, I don't know. But I'm really interested in getting this information. 

Y.A. 

Thank you, Nina? 

N.K. 

No, I think Peter is the. Psychiatrist. 

Y.A. 

Psychiatrist. 

P.P. 

So, look, there's a lot to think about. We can chat afterwards if you like. It'll be here. I think there is research being done, but for obvious reasons, they can't be very public. And there's different sort of like, you know, independent Russian media who think about it, who are out the country. Ukrainians think about it. There's a lot of thought going into it. But as we are here, and I have Pasolini here, in Pasolini, he created probably the most powerful anti-fascist films. And you mentioned psychiatry, you know, his great film about the psychology of fascism was "Salò" you know, which is a film about the end of the Mussolini regime. But essentially, it's an orgy. It's a sadomasochistic orgy. And you mentioned fascism and while. 

Y.A. 

I think it's a fascism, exactly the type of Mussolini, Franco, Spain, all of that, not of course the way, you know, it was in Germany in, you know, it's not Nazi regime. 

P.P. 

But you know, when the psychiatrists talk about, and then psychiatrists were still sort of like seen as serious people, when they wrote about fascism then. But Erich Fromm, you know, they're definitely talking about the sadomasochism involved in it, the desire to submit and to dominate others. So, maybe there is something to burrow into there, is there's some sort of like, you know, pleasure historically in submitting to, which is a bizarre concept. You know, I remember coming to Russia when I lived there and everyone's like, "We need a Stalin." This wasn't like now, this was like, we need a strong hand to punish us. And you're like, okay, maybe this is more Erich Fromm territory. And then the desire to compensate for that on others. But I remember walking through Yahidne, which was this now very famous village in the Chernihiv region, which was sort of liberated quite, quite, quite early in the war. And it was famous because basically Russian soldiers held a whole village captured there for a month. Yeah, 300 people in the basement and kept in quite horrifying conditions and did all the things that you would expect in your worst nightmares. And I remember walking around there and there were these bits of propaganda there everywhere. These sort of special newspapers that the soldiers had left behind. And they were all of this very, very Soviet-style propaganda. Like, we are saving Ukraine from the evil fascists and all this kind of stuff. All about how the soldiers were liberators and how Ukrainians were fascists. And look, the soldiers that spent a month with these people knew perfectly well that Ukraine wasn't occupied by fascists. 'Cause they told them. They knew perfectly well that these people spoke Russian to them and were free to speak Russian. So, the whole argumentation for the war was bullshit. And so, then you get into a space where people know that propaganda is nonsense, but it allows you to do the sadistic things that, not saying everybody, but that maybe sits in all of us but is particularly strong in some. So, this idea that propaganda then becomes the legitimizer of the evil and the sadism that you want to do. I think that might be something to look at. So, we all, we often think about propaganda as brainwashing, you know, as it is like, you know, it came like a spell and like, you know, in fact people, and sometimes it works like that. We have many studies that show that propaganda can somehow, you know, persuade people. But sometimes it's just there to do the really horrible things that you always wanted a chance to do. I dunno if you remember this, one of the best films to come out the war is this incredible film of intercepts between Russian soldiers. Yeah, and it's just, it's actually a very arty film. It's just scenes of Ukrainian life, of the intercepts of Russian soldiers. And some of them are just so honest about it, it's like, finally I can do what I always wanted to do. Some aren't, by the way, some are appalled. Some are like, I don't believe what we just did. But many others are like, finally, finally I've got to do to what I did. And I'm talking about rape and mutilation. And the conversation I'll never forget and that I think will stay with me was a soldier talking to his mother. And the mother's like, "Oh, I've always wanted to do that too. Me and you are so similar. I'm so glad that you're out there raping, murdering, pillaging, mutilating." So, maybe propaganda just releases something that was waiting to get out. 

N.K. 

I've been teaching propaganda since Dick Cheney. 

P.P. 

That's an era. 

N.K. 

Oh no. That was my total, he was my ground zero for all of this. And what I've learned in the teaching, you had on-hand experience, is that you can't unpropagate people. People need to want to get unpropagated. You really have to decide or see that that's a whole, like Khrushchev. 'Cause he was totally brainwashed, and he brainwashed himself and he explained all the famines and you know, the horses are dying in thousands is because some Western British person came in and sprinkled something. So, you have wanted to do this, something has to happen. And there is actually, I mean I know you work on how to confront it. I have never seen something useful that can come about and unpropagated people who do not want to get unpropagated. Something needs to happen. 

Y.A. 

But you teach Hollywood. Apparently, it's a very effective tool. 

N.K. 

Hollywood is the greatest prop. But it's, I mean that, but that's the greatest thing about American propaganda. I mean, Putin can only dream of those because you are selling a wonderful life. I mean, that's a wonderful life. You are selling things that the whole world needs to be, and actually that's sort of fascinating about Trump is that he's arguing for things that America great again, but America is great, is because give me your poor, your, because that's what made America great anyway. Yes, I do teach it and Hollywood is a great tool, is a wonderful tool. But Putin doesn't do Hollywood. Putin does hammer over the head. 

Y.A. 

Right, exactly. Valerie. Okay, Valerie? Yes, yes please. 

Valerie, Audience Member 

Thank you. Thanks for these interesting presentations. My question is about the Russian propaganda machine and how sophisticated is it in terms of targeting different sectors? So, you know, you think about the way that there was Russian propaganda intervention in the US election in 2016, and it was really specific. It was like down to the ZIP codes. Like, let's target these Black voters in these areas and tell them to stay home. How sophisticated is it inside Russia? Are they targeting different messages to men and to women? Are they targeting different messages to the old and to the young? Are they targeting different messages to Russians and to ethnic minorities? You know, what's your sense of that? 

P.P. 

Look, it's as Yevgenia pointed out, and I think most people are aware of it is, it was, it's a market economy and it has market everywhere. And obviously they know everything about segmentation, and they work together with the propaganda bodies. And that's been going on for a very long time. And it's as sophisticated as it is anywhere. So, you know, they will be using exactly the same techniques as any other marketing company in terms of segmentation and they will be able to channel it through much more concentration than you could in a democracy. But listen, it's quite sophisticated also in the way they've distributed between TV and online. It's very, very interesting today how, you know, every security service has its own kind of Telegram army. And often they're fighting with each other 'cause Putin wants some pluralism between them. So, no, no, no. It's, there is not a managed democracy anymore. But Putin wants to keep the different clans fighting. So, they, there's a little bit of tension there. Not out in the open too much, but if you know where to look. And I remember at the start of the war, Russian sociologists were kind of leaking quite a lot of the sociology that was being done internally by the Kremlin. And it was going around academic circles and talked about a lot. And I showed some of the surveys to American pollsters who work in elections, and they said they were superb because, superb in the sense of really accurate in the sense that it was all about emotion. Like, very few questions about what you think and page after page, what you feel. Yeah, so they're looking for an emotional barometer of the country and of course what they're looking for, most likely, we don't know what they're looking for, but they're most likely looking for where people have explosive emotions and they don't want that, you know? They do want to keep the population apathetic. And if we're talking about vulnerability, a structural vulnerability to their propaganda going back really since, you know, since I lived there is, on the one hand, they want to keep people pretty passive. Yeah, they're very worried about protest potential. You know, this sort of like, when people start getting too agitated, but then they need to motivate them. Yeah, whether it's to go to a march or to go to a war and if there is a structural vulnerability in what they do, I think it's actually around that. And I think they've always had problems with the kind of mobilization, literally, part. They had to find different ways of counterbalancing that. So, I think that's, I don't know. I remember talking to Pavlovsky before he died. 

Y.A. 

Gleb Pavlovsky. 

P.P. 

He was a fascinating guy, a dissident turned Kremlin propagandist. And he used to be quite honest about this, that this was the great problem they had. That, on the one hand, they wanted to keep people passive. On the other hand, they had huge problems with mobilization. So, that was actually more than yours, I went from sophistication to vulnerability, but yeah. 

Y.A. 

Yeah, more questions? Because we have three minutes left. Yes, please. 

Audience Member 

Yeah, oh, my question is about what Nina said about the propaganda, like basically, you know, glorifying the Chinese or the Chinese regime. I'm curious, like is, do you see a disconnect in Russia today? How like the citizens feel like about China versus like, you know, the politicians, or like, you know, what the political class feels about, you know, the thoughts of the country and whatnot? 

N.K. 

Well, the story with China with the greatest relationship and, you know, we are going to march together into the sunset. There's a lot of Chinese visitors. There's something I don't know if you know, it's just a remarkable propaganda tool 'cause the Russians kind of got tired of their Lenin for a long time because now Lenin is back. I mean, Putin doesn't like Lenin's revolution, but at the same time it gives us something to love because it was still the Soviet grandeur. So, there's a Red Tour, I don't know if you've heard of it. It's amazing. So, the Chinese groups come and travel and see all the Lenins, take pictures of all the Lenins in the universe. I actually did, I witnessed a couple of them, and it was absolutely amazing because it is at the time, it was about before, right before COVID-19. So, they're the only people who cared about Lenin. But I also witnessed an amazing thing that there's a, which is on the border with Heihe, which is, you know, Amur River is a 500 meters in between. And so, the China is on one side and a Russian village, Heihe Chinese village. And the shuttle traders go and bring products from one side to another. And I've never seen so much hatred on personal level and disrespect and disrespect and sort of the Chinese would go over the Russian heads and the Russians would go over the Chinese heads. And I was standing in line and the guy in front of me said, "Well, he's a Chinese, what are you waiting for?" And so, but it was still, I mean it was still not the same friendship that it is now, but it was kind of like, just fell flat into Putin's face, how we are going to be living happily ever after. And it's interesting because, you know, some of the pictures that I had, because I also photographed foreign signs in Russian cities. And that's also amazing because it's a unique civilization while you are having fashion. It was one of the greatest things that I've seen, one, many great things. But one of them is Fashion House, Venice, Russian Fashion House, Venice. That's exactly what Russian Fashion House is, how little China is present. It's getting worse. But, so it's not, I mean, dragging Russia away from Europe was a violent, violent thing because Russian culture is part of the European culture. People don't need to know to know something specific to know about Leonardo da Vinci. But you need to be Sinologist to know China. And so, for the Russians, it's Chinese, great, we're gonna be just like them. But that, I mean Peter mentioned, have you heard of? So, the Russians are, unfortunately, Putin brought it back, that kind of the sense of superiority and imperialism. And so, it goes for the Chinese and like, well, we need them now, but we are the white people. And you can hear it even for, even from those who you wouldn't think are racist. But there is something, and I think that's another thing that has been done in these three years, people stop paying attention to things that even before they probably would be embarrassed to say. But now with the rhetoric that coming from the Kremlin with Dmitri Medvedev going crazy every day on in his Telegram channel, kind of, it takes down all the civilized formulas. And I think that's another value of propaganda. Suddenly, as you said, you know, they wanna rape, suddenly people are allowed to be horrible because that makes us better and nobody understands. I think Zakharova said, or somebody said, "Well Putin". 

Y.A. 

Press to the Minister of Foreign Affairs. 

N.K. 

Right, press person. She said, "Well Putin," or maybe somebody, one of them, he said, she or he said, "Well Putin did, he was very nice to the Western leaders and then they betrayed him. So, because they betrayed him, we can do anything." So, it's, I think it's one of these moments I think Russia is going through. Somebody asked about what are we gonna do with Ukrainians? I mean, what are Ukrainians are gonna do with us? I mean, forget us, what are we gonna do with them? How can they forgive? I mean, what are they gonna do? And so, the same thing I think that not that Stalin first created when he moved nations around and never really got resolved. I think Putin has created the same kind of, I mean we are hearing from Finland things that during the Cold War, the Finns were like, oh yeah, those Russians, I mean you can deal with them though, it's fine. And I think China is gonna be one of those. 

Y.A. 

Okay, I think, you know, that's our time's up. Thank you so much, let’s. I want to remind you that on February the 16th, it will be the anniversary of the mother of Alexei Navalny. I will be given a talk at Carmel Institute in Columbia University, maybe on February 18th.