Cris Martin (C.M.)
Good afternoon and welcome everyone. My name is Cris Martin and I'm the Interim Executive Director of the Davis Center for Russian and Eurasian studies here at Harvard University. We're so glad that you've joined us for tonight's session of our year long series Russia in search of a New Paradigm, conversations with Yevgenia Albas. Today we have the privilege of hosting both Dr. Fiona Hill and Lucian Kim for the conversation, Unfair Triangle Ukraine, US Russia. I invite you, our audience to participate actively in today's discussion, which is being video recorded, and we post it on the Davis Center YouTube channel. And now I'll introduce our speakers, but please note I have made their biographies brief because if I read them in full, we wouldn't have any time to have a conversation. So Dr. Yevgenia Albats is a Russian investigative journalist, political scientist, author, and radio host. She received her PhD in political science from Harvard University and has since then split her time between academia and journalism. She taught political science at Moscow's Higher School of Economics, where she was the first professor to be fired for her political views. She has been editor in chief of the Political Weekly, the New Times since 2007, as well as the host of Absolute Albats, which formerly ran on Ecco Moscow and is now available on her YouTube channel. Since being forced out of Russia in 2022, Dr. Albats has taught at NYU, served as a media and democracy fellow at the Harvard Kennedy School and is now a visiting fellow at the Davis Center for Russian and Eurasian studies. She is the author of four independently researched books including "The State Within The State, The KGB and Its Hold on Russia, past, present, and Future." Dr. Fiona Hill is a senior fellow at the Brookings Institutions Center on the United States and Europe. She also serves on the Harvard University Board of Overseers and is the Chancellor at Durham University in the United Kingdom. Dr. Hill served as deputy assistant to the US President and Senior Director for European and Russian Affairs on the National Security Council from 2017 to 2019, as well as a National Intelligence Officer for Russia and Eurasia at the US National Intelligence Council from 2006 to 2009. She's the author of the bestselling memoir. "There Is Nothing For You Here, finding Opportunity in the 21st Century" and the co-author of "Mr. Putin, operative in the Kremlin" and "the Siberian Curse, how Communist Planners left Russia out in the Cold," both published with Clifford Gatty. Professor Hill is also a Davis Center alumna. She holds her master's degree in Soviet studies from the Davis Center and also has her doctorate from Harvard in history where she was a Frank Knox fellow. She also holds a master's degree in Russian and modern history from St. Andrews. But we prefer to talk about the Davis Center first.
Fiona Hill (F.H.)
Yes.
C.M.
Yes. And she studied at Moscow's Maurice Thore Institute for Foreign Languages as well. Lucian Kim is a senior analyst for Ukraine and the International Crisis Group. He has reported on Ukraine and Russia since Vladimir Putin's first term in office based in Moscow and Berlin for more than 20 years, he covered Central and Eastern Europe as a correspondent for National Public Radio, Bloomberg News, and the Christian Science Monitor. He's the recipient of the Wilson Center Fellowship in Washington DC and without further ado, I'll turn it over to Dr. Albas.
Yevgenia Albats (Y.A.)
Thank you very much, Cris. Thanks a lot. Thank you very much to all of you for coming and of course, thank you very much to Dr. Fiona Hill and to Lucian Kim for coming to this event. I headlined this event as unfair triangle. It is an illusion to the famous Russian painting, the Unequal Marriage. A young, beautiful woman from a low-income family is forced to marry an old bold and ugly man, three, if not four times her age. No comparisons, just my emotions about what is going on concerning negotiations between the US and Russia and the US and Ukraine. And you can guess who is a young woman in this triangle. We are going to discuss all these questions today, you know, these negotiations outcomes of what to expect, what, how it's going to go. There was a lot of news, you know, in the last month regarding the all these questions. So with Fiona Hill and with Lucian Kim, by the way, with Fiona, we were grad students at one, at the same time. He had Harvard, she was a student of Richard Pipes, his history historian of Russian history. And I was a student of Timothy Colton, you know, of course, who was back then, the faculty director of the Davis Center. It was Russian Research Center, which was of course established 76 years ago. Okay, so Lucian Kim is also the author of the recently published book, "Putin's Revenge. Why did Russia invade Ukraine?" I am very interested in your answer to these questions.
F.H.
Got to buy the book.
Y.A.
Yeah, I know Lucian from Moscow when he covered Russia and Ukraine, and I'm eager, of course, you know, to hear his thoughts about these questions. But first we're going to show you a short interview with Aleksandr Dugin. He's a right-wing Russian philosopher and inherent of another Russian fascist, Ivan Ilyin, Dugin whom American media named Putin's brains and who is not by any means and who had never been an advisor to Putin. It's all myth that for reasons, you know, kept repeated in, in the foreign media. But you know, he's a dare patron of the KGB people. And after Russia Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine, he got a chair at the Moscow State University. Now, you know, he's a professor, he's teaching students of course, who else, you know, of course you need a fascist to call to teach students. So I would, and you know, we'll see this, that's interview of Aleksandr Dugin to the CNN's Fareed Zakaria. So, and then I would like to ask both of you to comment on it. Thank you.
Video, Fareed Zakaria (F.Z.)
You write in your most recent book that "Putinism has won in the United States." What do you mean by that?
Video, Aleksandr Dugin (A.D.)
I think that now we assist a huge transformation of the global system, Trump, in my opinion, and something very special. It is not just a charismatic leader, but he represent the kind of ideology that changes the balance of the power in the world. So we have the different United States, not the strong cold and the headquarter of globalism, but kind of sovereign national state, global power with traditional values as well, with totally different agenda on the level on the international affair. and this new conditions, I think the Putin's Russia and Putin personally stops to be the main enemy, the main the main evil guy, bad guy. So I think that Trumpists and the followers of Trump will understand much better what Russia is, what who Putin is, and the motivation of our politics. So we, so we have now, immediately we have discovered many points that are common for United States of America, Trumps America and Putin's Russia.
F.Z.
Would it be fair to say is what you're saying is that there is now a kind of deep ideological alignment between Trump and Trumpism and Putin and Putinism, and it is against Europe. The United States and Russia in that sense are now together, and Europe, European liberalism is in some sense the new enemy.
A.D.
We have many point in common with Trump's America, much more that it seems on the surface, but maybe it is too early to speak about the real alliance between US and Russia against against Europe. Because it is not against Europe, it is against globalism. But nevertheless, I think that if, for example, Trump would withdraw United States from a war against us in Ukraine, there could be situation that we will fight against European globalists, European liberal liberals in Ukraine without America. So I think that Trump, sooner or later, and maybe sooner than we presume, than we presume, he will discover that Putin has absolutely nothing against United States, no reason to continue the fight. No reason. So to oppose or to no way, no field of competition that is different from China.
Video
Money makes the world go round and now-
Y.A.
Museum won in the United States of America. And second, my question, he basically says that if United States of America stops supporting Ukraine, then Russia and United States can fight together against European globalism. So basically, I don't even, you know, I, what is it, you know, the four, the world war three, but you know, in some different configuration when it was back in 1939. So what do you say?
F.H.
Well, actually I'm not all that surprised by this. I mean, I've, I, it is kind of weird, but I met Dugin 25 years ago when he'd just written his book on the pivot of history. And I met him when I was doing the research with a book with Clifford Gadi on Siberia back in very early 2000. I'd gone to Kaza to a conference and I was there with Michel Toman, who from, who's also written a book about kind of Putin and you know, Putin's kind of revantism and et cetera. And we spent an entire day, just the two of us with Aleksandr Dugin. I mean, I'd never not met him before, but I do remember that our Tata host said, "Well, you must meet him, he's a fascist." And this is in the early 2000s. And I thought, well, what does that mean a Russian fascist? You know, in that kind of context. Well anyway, then I met Aleksandr Dugin and I quickly realized that basically this is somebody who's kind of obsessed with basically passing out this whole, you know, as I said, these pivots of history, we spend most of our time talking about Sir Halford Kiner, who many of you will know who that is, of course, who wrote that very for a pamphlet in 1904. So this is really what he's taking us back to about, you know, kind of basically the pivots, the fulcrum, and it obviously being on the Eurasian landmass. And at that point there was Britain and the kind of the great sea empires. The United States was kind of part of that. And his whole thesis at the time was that through the revival of Eurasianism, that Russia would be back in its kind of rightful place in the world, and probably would cooperate with the United States of the gray ocean going palace. So he actually was thinking about things like this back, you know, 25 years ago. And I mean, interesting enough, you know, there's more of a hearkening here to 1984, not just 1904. I've had a number of students come up to me at various talks, not unfortunately with either your book or my book Lucian, but carrying copies of 1984 that they've got from their grandparents, you know, kind of all, you know, kind of bundled up in their pockets and saying, aren't we in 1984? Well we have Oceania, East Asia and you know, kind of basically you Eurasia dividing the world up among them. And that's a very Halford McKinney, but it's also an Aleksandr Dugin thinking. So this is kind of vintage Aleksandr Dugin. But what he's touching upon is actually a very perplexing and troubling set of circumstances, which, you know, I'm sure that Lucian will also speak to here, that indeed if the US is kind of pulling away from supportive Ukraine, that in fact does leave Europe exposed to a war that is with Russia, but where Russia is backed, not perhaps by the United States, although, you know, I think that we are seeing Trump trying to draw closer to Putin and to reset the relationship in ways that he wanted to in his first term, to be frank. But one that is actually supported by China, by North Korea and Iran. So we're in a actually rather difficult position for Europe. And this raises a lot of questions about European security, which is why of course Europeans, you know, are trying to figure out what, what to do. I mean, Dugin himself is a kind of a throwback, no offense to gentleman with beards, but to, you know, kind of a different, you know, kind of peerage of Tolstoy and he's always been, he's been cultivating this for the last 25 years. His beard is just longer and grayer now than when I first met him. And he did,-
Y.A.
But was a fascist.
F.H.
Yes. Which is ironic of course. But he did talk a lot about Solzhenitsyn and Tolstoy, you know, many others in that very first odd encounter that was seared on my memory, you know, forever as well. But it's kind of vintage Dugin. I'm not surprised in the slightest that you're seeing things in this way.
Y.A.
You mentioned I will, you know, I will ask you Lucian a question, but very quickly, you mentioned China and just recent news, Ukraine has reported capturing Chinese citizens fighting alongside Russian forces. So would you say that Chinese are ready to put boots on the ground? Oh, yes, please.
F.H.
I'll bring Lucian in in here because.
Lucian Kim (L.K.)
Well, I also-
F.H.
He's been looking at this bottle for some time,
Lucian Kim (L.K.)
Well, I also, that report what it seems like what we're looking at with these Chinese soldiers is more probably someone troops that were recruited there. And I think what this indicates to is also Russia's desperation to find troops from other countries. The fact that North Koreans are fighting there, but is, is one indication of course that was an offering from Kim Jong-un to get into Putin's good graces because he saw a lot of benefits from getting North Koreans to fight.
Y.A.
Just added the number 3000 soldiers or troops, North Koreans.
L.K.
But we know that there are also hapless Indians and Nepalese and people from all sorts of backgrounds that are being somehow recruited, even unwitting into this war and find themselves on the front line. So I think one way of reading it is, I don't think this is necessarily with any Chinese state sanction, but we are looking at a situation where Russia is really desperate to find the manpower.
Y.A.
Mm but so you don't think that these Chinese, you know, in any way that China sent, you know, this, you know, a battalion say or something like that. No, you don't think that you're just somebody, some Chinese, you know, across the border on Namu River and just went all the way, got to Ukraine.
L.K.
Well, we know that there have been recruitment efforts right-
Y.A.
In China?
L.K.
That we don't know, but I mean in other places, for example, in India. So I don't, I don't know, I don't, I, you know, this-
Y.A.
China is a surveillance state, you know, there are cameras in each and every lavatory. So, you know, I I just cannot imagine how it's possible to recruit Chinese soldiers. But there, without knowledge of the Russian, there-
F.H.
There are lots of Chinese, well, we have to find out, first of all, were they actually soldiers or are they being trained in Russia? Right? So they're members of the Chinese military. That's, that's an open question and, and perhaps not, perhaps as likely as Lucian is saying, but I think Lucian is absolutely right that Russia is recruiting everywhere. Lots of Central Asians, particularly those with dual nationality and passports, as you mentioned, are in India without some. Yeah, and the question is whether these are Chinese who were, you know, working in the Russian Far East, or you know, elsewhere in Russia that have been recruited. If you talk to Paul Whalen, you know, basically the American who was kept, you know, hostage in Russia after being seized, he'll tell you all kinds of stories of people he met in jail. And I hope he'll, you know, at some point come, you should probably have him come and speak. It's actually a fascinating insights into the way that recruitment was taking place for the front people being swept up, being arrested, ending up in Russian detention, then being sent to the front, you know, for example, of all kinds of different backgrounds and nationalities and citizenship status. I think what's going to be the most important point is how China responds to this and how the Chinese state deals with this in their bilateral relationships with Ukraine. And also, you know, how they deal with this publicly. That might tell us a lot because as I said, the, I mean the real, you know, kind of question is now if the United States is not just switching sides, but is moving out of the conflict because China, North Korea and Iran have seen this as a proxy war against the United States, and they've been very open in telling the Ukrainians this, it's not about you, it's really about our relationships with the United States. How do they then, you know, react to the US shift? Do they continue to support Russia in its war against Ukraine? Because this is now a European war very clearly, and one about the future of Europe and European security.
Y.A.
Judging by Russia's latest piece published in the New York Times, this is a huge investigation about the war in Ukraine. You know, we found out that there was a headquarters, joint headquarters, Ukrainian and Americans in Germany. And that apparently, yes, we do, we did know that Americans were instrumental in providing intelligence for the Ukrainians, you know, missiles and for their attacks. But now, you know, from judging from this investigation, you know, especially at the first part of the war, Americans were instrumental in helping Ukraine. To some extent, it is a war between a proxy war between Russia and the United States. Not, what would you say?
F.H.
Lucian?
L.K.
Well, it has certain, I mean, you bring up a good point. I mean, there are certain characteristics, and this is of course what the, the official Russian narrative has been from the beginning. That this, they used their favorite phrase, the collective west, that we were fighting the collective west. And so certainly reports that come out showing the depth of the US involvement would seem to confirm that on the same, at the same level as someone who's spent a lot of time in Ukraine in the last year, I would say there's also a quite a lot of frus-, there's been such a high level of frustration with the Americans. So even though that there was this joint, there was a joint staff in Germany doing, you know, it seems like it, its main purpose was to figure out what were the proper weapons that should be supplied to the Ukrainians. At the same, at the same time, there was such a deep level of frustration with the Biden administration and that the speed with which weapons were being delivered. That what was interesting, I was just in Ukraine in February and you know, I didn't hear the, I didn't hear the name Joe Biden one single time. It's not like I felt like even anybody really was missing the Biden administration, which is maybe surprising. And I heard those signals already last summer. There was the naive hope, I think you can say naive hope that people thought Trump, despite his record already in Ukraine, and during his first term there, that he would somehow be able to rattle up the situation enough that something, something would better would, there would be a better outcome than if the war simply continued in its present direction. Of course, I think now just in the last couple of weeks, I think the Ukrainians have been disabused of those illusions.
Y.A.
Yeah, but you know, did you see, you know, I traveled also, you know, through Ukraine in March of 2023. I never met, you know, there were a lot of Americans, of course, in Kyiv, but nowhere in the west or in the south where I was, you know, I didn't see any, I didn't see any Americans, but still, you know, I keep asking myself if this war was so essential for the united, so substantial, even for the United States.
F.H.
It wasn't, though. That's the whole point.
Y.A.
But why did you allow yourself to lose the war?
F.H.
Who allowed themselves to lose the world?
Y.A.
You Americans.
F.H.
Or Lucian or the audience? You mean Americans?
Y.A.
No, I'm so sorry. Yeah, I mean, you know, the, you know, the government of the United States of America, everybody was saying, you know, everything was too little too late. Judging by this piece in the New York Times with, you know, long, long investigation, it turned out that there was the possibility to finish this war in the sum of 2023.
F.H.
Well, I think you've just put your finger on it about the, well, there's a big difference between what military assistance was trying to accomplish, which is to help you Ukraine defend itself, potentially turn the tide, and a political sense. Getting back to what Lucian has just said about, you know, the disappearance of Joe Biden, that it wasn't an existential conflict. I mean, if you think about it right from the very beginning, President Biden made it very clear that his number one goal was to avoid World War III, nuclear Armageddon, World War III, and Trump's been talking about the same thing defined as a nuclear exchange. And if your number one goal was to kind of basically avoid a nuclear war with Russia, that's not the same as actually, you know, kind of basically persecuting a war that would allow Ukraine to win. I mean, I've been, you know, many of you have all been in the same, you know, position. If you were doing a kind of a decision tree and your number one, you know, goal was avoiding nuclear war at all costs, then all the other things about Ukraine come much lower down. But for military people who are set to a task was, which is about, you know, how do you help Ukraine defend itself? You know, they're then of course they're going to be setting up a very different set of decision treat to figure out, as Lucian pointed out in Vis Barden, rather than with boots on the ground, how are they going to help Ukraine figure out what kind of weapons systems it wants? But all the time there's been a constraint on, you know, basically going on the offensive. and you remember that general Millie, you know, made it very clear, what was it now a year and a half or so ago, maybe two years ago, that he thought that the Ukrainian should dig in and it should basically do be defending the line, and that that would be the, you know, the line of contact as it was, as it was then and really kind of lean into that defensive war. But at the time, Ukrainians didn't want to do that because that would've meant giving up the opportunity of retaking back Ukrainian territory. So there's always been these kinds of competing things going on at the same time with different, you know, levels of engagement, different viewpoints and different goals established. Now, of course, Ukrainians always wanted to win the war, and that's why there was, that's been always a very explicit for them, because it is existential for them. And that's kind of basically what you've been trying to cover the whole time, Lucian, but it's not been existential for the United States. And again, that gets to the complexity of what China and North Korea and Iran and others have thought that they were doing, you know, around the war or what Europe was doing. A lot of Europeans were actually of the view, well the United States has decided to step in so maybe we don't, and now an awful lot of Europeans, not the UK, it has to be said, and the poles and bolts and many others are now realizing this is actually existential for them now too.
Y.A.
Okay you know, setting one of our common friend, you know, Americans did want Ukrainians to win, but not too fast.
F.H.
But nobody defined what win was. I mean, Lucian, you could probably talk to this, because you tried to talk about this in the book as well.
L.K.
Sorry, who was saying?
F.H.
Well, people have been saying that they want, you know, Ukraine to win, but not too fast for some people.
Y.A.
So to bleed, to bleed Russian. So to bleed Russian economy, to exhaust it. So to destroy, you know, Putin a law, you know, at the expense of-
F.H.
Some people have said that the UK but that wasn't necessarily the Biden administration's policy.
L.K.
Well, and it seems, I mean, even I've, I heard that frustration last summer already in Ukraine, because for a long time you were hearing from Russians, oh, those Americans, they're ready to fight, you know, us, until the last Ukrainian. But then I started hearing that same thing from Ukrainians, that, you know, the Americans want to fight, want us to fight the Russians to the last Ukrainian. So I think again, it was that level, level of frustration and the inability to understand what the, what the Americans actually wanted. Because simply, you know, to keep, at some point there was a lot of Ukrainians had the feeling that they were simply being sustained and as opposed to be given the equipment and the weaponry to actually succeed and to actually, to actually win.
Y.A.
Thank you. Russian sources report that the first round of talks between United States and Russia represents, which happened, you know, in Saudi Arabia lasted 12 hours. The second round lasted for nine hours. So what did they discuss that took it that long? 12 hours and nine hours. Can you, but you, you probably, you know, Fiona, you took part in many negotiations including, you know, these semis secretive negotiations in Geneva and et cetera. What did they could discuss for 12 hours? Do you think that they were discussing, you know, really Ukraine or there was something else like, you know, the discussions between Churchill and Stalin, you know, in 1944?
F.H.
Look, you've, you've got, I've, I mean, I've talked about this in other settings. You've also got to think that the people around Trump, most of them who were going to these negotiations or discussions have never met with Russians before. I mean, you've got Witkoff who's a real estate, maybe real estate deals take 12 hours or nine hours. I don't know, I've never been in a New York real estate deal. I'm sure they take a lot of time getting to know the person. I mean, they don't know anything about Russia or Russians or even, you know, the basically the, you know, the terms of what Russia is putting on the table. Now, we do know that a lot of these, were taking these meetings, were taking part in English, which is different, because previously you could have said, well, they have to be translated, you know, so that takes up a lot of time. I don't think you can say that this term around, because people like Ushakov and Navrov and Kiro Dmitri, I mean, their English is impeccable. It's better than mine, you know, I mean, not, not, not joking here. I mean, these are, I mean, amazing, you know, diplomats on the Oshakov and Nakov who've just been around the block over and over again. But on the US side, although you've got, still got people that, you know, I and others, you know, worked with graduates of the, you know, the REECA program who are still there in the state department and in the intelligence services prepared materials, they're not there with them. So, I mean, and maybe they haven't even bothered to read their materials. So they're just kind of getting to know them and getting to know the situation. And we know from some of the statements, and you can speak to this as well, that the statements that were made by the Russians, just rehashing the whole kind of history of US Russian interaction over the last several years. They're just kind of picking up where they're, you know, left, left off, behold, yet rehashing, you know, the same things that bilateral irritants, the terms that we used. I mean, basically they're kind of going back to the basics and kind of starting again. So I'm not surprised it would take 12 hours or nine hours.
L.K.
It's my understanding that those talks were on a pretty technical level. And that's why, what's the talks that were really important were Steve Whit's two meetings with Putin, which we, I think both of them lasted at least three hours.
Y.A.
Yeah, probably Putin gave him a lecture on the Russian and Ukrainian history in which-
L.K.
And he was ready to, he was ready to repeat that in his interview with Tucker Carlson.
F.H.
Yeah and mean, remember how long Putin talked to Tucker Carlson in the same way. And Tucker Carlson kept saying, is this relevant Mr. President? And Putin said, yes, of course it is. And then he went on again. So I can just imagine, just as Lucian says that this was a lot of being talked at. And then the question is, you know, what did they take from that? And then the technical issues do take some time to thrash out.
L.K.
I tend to think though that the Steve Whitkoff meetings were maybe more flattery because in the Tucker Carlson interview, Steve Whitkoff claims that he was not manipulated by Putin. And then he turns around and the next second he's saying that Putin presented him with a beautiful portrait of Donald Trump, which he took back to the White House. So, you know, the inability to understand that you've just contradicted what you just said is rather astounding.
Y.A.
Right, there were reports that agreement was reached on specific ceasefire, such as those concerning energy infrastructure. However, in the last two weeks, Russian forces attacked the Ukrainian city, Sumi, 70 people, 70 people, seven zero people killed and wounded Kyiv, four people killed, including a dad and his son, Kiwirock and Missile hit the children playground, nine children age three to 17 killed, finally while visiting the new submarine in Serabinsk on the bank of, you know, that's the city, close city on the bank of the White Sea. Putin said... We will finish off Ukraine. So what kind of ceasefire or peace negotiations are there? You know?
F.H.
Yeah, you got it. Yeah.
Y.A.
But so what?
F.H.
Should we answer more?
Y.A.
But, so you, you want to say that there is no really any negotiations, but, you know, people say that President Trump is, you know, does want to get a peace deal. And to be honest with you, Fiona, I did think that if anybody Trump was capable of doing this because he's as ethical as Putin is, but apparently, you know, I just really don't understand what it's all about. Then what did they talk about 12 hours and the 9 hours?
F.H.
I think it's actually, and Lucian, let me just jump in here as well. I think it's like, it's fairly straightforward. Trump wants a ceasefire. He wants to be able to say that he's bought a peace deal, put neither Putin Zelensky asked him to negotiate or to mediate. And as the rest of the world has thought that the US was a party to the conflict. You know, it's also kind of a bit complicated here, you know, to mediate, Trump is always talking about, you know, the Nobel Peace Prize, as we know. And Teddy Roosevelt, and many of the people here in this room know about the Portsmouth Peace Treaty. It's just up the road. And after the Russo Japanese War, in that case, Teddy Roosevelt was asked to mediate both Russia and Japan. And the United States was a neutral party back in the 19 hundreds. It had no real beef with either Russia or Japan. And this was a real negotiation. The people of Portsmouth, New Hampshire were basically part of this was a great act of public diplomacy. It was in the Wentworth Hotel, it was in a kind of a neutral space, and they thrashed it out the, basically with a bit of mediation. That's not what's happening here. Trump is trying to force basically a peace deal. And it now seems to be on Russia's terms, but it's really, you know, from the point of view that he has all the leverage, as he told Zelensky all the cards when it comes to Ukraine, because the, from his view, and look, we all heard what he said in the Oval Office. He made it very clear that he thinks that America made Zelensky a tough guy. That yes, America has been basically making this war feasible, and this is what news says can we speak to for Ukraine. And therefore, if he decides to withhold US arms and intelligence, he can force Ukraine to basically, at least on its part hold to a ceasefire. But he never obviously got any agreement from Putin at all. He got a portrait, he apparently got prayers, and he got, you know, kind of, you know, all kinds of opportunities to have to have a chat to Putin as he kind of wanted. And he's now getting a whole host of discussions about the reset of the US Russian relationship, which is something that he wants. But his ability to actually have a genuine ceasefire that's two-sided, not just sided, and a peace deal remains elusive because for Putin, this is all about the US Russian relationship. And Putin's goals for Ukraine, which Lucian, you know, lays out pretty clearly in his book, have not changed at all. So Trump, you know, can't do anything and basically provide for Putin anything that he particularly wants in this moment.
L.K.
And so to, just to follow up on that, so what we're seeing is actually a decoupling of bilateral relations between Russia and the United States on one hand and the UK Ukraine War and asked Genia. So, you know, what were they talking about? I think what they were also talking about special, especially Kiro Dimitriev when he was in Washington last week, was about deals. This is what we can do together. And this is something that again, also came up in, in the Tucker Carlson Witkoff interview, wouldn't it? Just think of all the great things we could do together in outer space and AI.
Y.A.
Like what?
L.K.
Just think about it.
F.H.
Look, the space issues are real because, I mean, look, NASA and, you know, the Russian Space Agency.
L.K.
Mars.
F.H.
Yeah, it's Mars. Exactly. It's just Lucian as says here. What was also interesting, one of the things that Kiro Dimitriev did announce someone after reading, he said he was going to be talking to Elon Musk. So there's a Musk factor in all of this as well. And he said that they were going to talk about space flight, including Mars. And also, interestingly, and I, you know, about the whole issue of atomic energy and Russ Atom was going to be, you know, part of these discussions as well. The US Russian space cooperation was actually one of the great bright spots of you know the whole kind of period after the collapse of the Soviet Union. If you think about Elon Musk, who's also been having his own conversations with Putin and others, this is probably a childhood dream come true. What's the country that created, you know, the first space rocket, it's Russia. It was thought of by, you know, a credible autodidact, fairly quirky guy, you know, a little bit like Elon Musk himself, Korolev you know, out there, you know, and Kluger, in the middle of nowhere in the 1880s and 1890s. It's amazing story, you know, and if you are a space wonk, I mean, I kind of love some of these stories as well. What a dream come true to be able to work with the, you know, the Russian space sector. First man in space, first dog in space, first woman in space, you know, I mean, and then first possibility of getting to Mars. It's all about this at the moment. And I think, you know, the sky is the limit is basically, or Mars is the limit of some of these discussions. It's about all kinds of other things, but not what's happening on terra firma in Ukraine.
Y.A.
Space industry in Russia is basically in ruins.
F.H.
Yes, but that's-
Y.A.
Russia failed time and again.
F.H.
But this is an opportunity, you know, to put this on another path. And for somebody like Musk, this is a, I mean, I honestly genuinely think this is a dream. I mean, you know, come true.
L.K.
And I think, so going forward, I really, I do think that we will see a wider separation and kind of a certain dissonance between what's happening in US Russian bilateral relations and what's happening on the ground in Ukraine. And they will no longer be sort of mutually contradictory. They will just be two different things in as far as the Trump administration sees it.
F.H.
And Trump has seen it like that from the very beginning, honestly. I mean, he keeps saying it over and over again and people don't necessarily listen to him. This has nothing, got to, not got anything to do with me or Ukraine, nothing to do with me at all. In the very first conversation that he had with an Angela Merkel chancellor of Germany, she said something to Ivan, what are you going to do with Ukraine? And he said, what do you mean Angela? What am I going to do with Ukraine? What are you going to do about Ukraine? What's it got to do with me? That was a bummer. And you know, all those kind of people, you know, beforehand, I've nothing to do with Ukraine. So he is been pretty consistent. And now he'd really like nothing to do with Ukraine. He would like to have this ceasefire and hand it off.
Y.A.
Fiona, you advise Prime Minister of Great Britain and president of France on their strategy with respect to Putin. And you know, especially as far as I understand, you know, if Russia will start the war against Ukraine. So you does have money, but it doesn't have army. United Kingdom does have army, but to certain extent, at least what, what, you know, some specials who may ask told me that, that United Kingdom does, but you know, of course know better. Will you expect deployment of British or French as, or both peacekeeping or both as peacekeeping forces in Ukraine. And do you think that Europe, given the position of the president of the United States, will be able to help Ukrainians to, you know, to end this war at least?
F.H.
Well, I think these are all complicated and also very different questions because I mean, we're so far from a peace plan or kind of basically a peace process. I mean, these negotiations, I think as we've all, you know, kind of agreed, are much more about us Russia at this point than they are about Ukraine. And even, you know, in the case of a ceasefire, look what's just happened in Gaza. I mean, the ceasefire seems to have vanished, you know, entirely. All of these things are pretty tenuous. In any case, we know that for many conflicts we think about the Balkans, you know, for example, I mean, it took a long time, you know, before we really were, were able to get something in motion there. So, you know, there's a possibility for Europe to help Ukraine hold the line, you know, and deny Putin the ability to move further forward. But that, you know, is kind of a different set of discussions. But we're way away from peacekeeping, I think what we, what you heard Kier Starmer and Macron are the saying that if there was really genuinely a peace deal, and if Trump was able miraculously 24 hours, if he was really correct that Putin had promised him all kinds of things to happen, then they would be prepared to do something basically to tend to signal this is about Europe as well, and it's France and the UK, because France and the UK have the Allied Rapid reaction core, the Arc, which is kind of part of this sort of NATO reaction, but it's kind of done through a bilateral arrangement between France and the UK. But these allied reaction calls before were meant for more expeditionary activities, which is, you know, a bit different from what we would be, you know, dealing with on the ground in Ukraine. But Europe is now talking very seriously about the whole future of European security. The war in Ukraine is seen as like World War I, World War II, a massively pivotal event. It is the largest land war in Europe since World War II. That changes everything. And if the United States is doing a, you know, what it has often done in times of history, which is pulling out again after 80 years of being the most consequential military power in Europe and is pulling itself out, that means that Europe has to start thinking very seriously about the future. And the war in Ukraine becomes that pivotal moment. And what they do with Ukraine becomes very important as well. And of course, Ukrainians have put 800,000 men in the field and they've also, you know, turned around their whole in defense industrial, they're producing drones themselves, they're producing armaments themselves. Ukraine is a completely different place than it was before. Not just in terms of losses of territory and losses of population, but in terms of the whole way it thinks about defense more like Finland. And Finland was after World War II. So we're seeing a massive change here. So it's, in a way we're kind of distracted by this whole talk of ceasefire peace negotiations and sending in peacekeepers when really something bigger and more fundamental is taking place. I don’t know what you would, you know, say from your time in Ukraine as well. I think there's definitely a dramatic shift here that's going on within Europe and how European think about their defense.
Y.A.
How long will it take for Europeans to build an army you know, people, you know, once again, you know, I'm talking, you know, I spoke, I know nothing about that. You know, I spoke to some specialists and they say that there are still, you know, each country produce Jeeps and you know, there is no coordination. And even though we think about European Union, you know, you know Spain, she, you know, her contributions 1.2%, GDP, she couldn't care less. And you know, anyway, so are the Europe, do you expect European Union really to stand up and to get, how long will it take to prepare?
F.H.
Although European Union isn't going to do that, because that's not the role of the European Union, and it's the European pillar of NATO that we're really talking about. And then other bilateral relationships. And I mean, I want to bring, you know, Lucian in, you know, and this is all about how it looks in the Ukrainian perspective, but there's actually a lot more capacity in Europe than we're giving it credit for. There's also all kinds of arrangements. There's something called the Joint Expeditionary Force, which is all the Nordic, you know, countries in the Baltic countries, all of which spend way more than 2% of GDP. And it's not about the percentage of GDP, it's what they actually do. And you know what they can, you know, actually what the capacity they have, Finland, which is a country of 5.5 million people has a standing army of 125,000 and can pull up even more. Look Ukraine overnight created a massive army because it had to, out of necessity, if countries have to mobilize, they will do it in the face of a threat. But the big question is, you know, what happens in the future of Ukraine, getting back to, you know, what we're talking about and what Europeans see as their future long-term threat. And there's all kinds of threats that don't require having hundreds of thousands of people in the field. You've just probably been reading in the press about these sensors washing up on shore from, you know, Russian ships that were clearly meant to be, you know, basically picking up data from the seabed about undersea cables and pipelines. For the UK, one pipeline from Norway carries 70% of UK's gas. I mean, you know, we talked about what happened with Nord Stream.
Y.A.
And there were Russian submarines just recently. Right?
F.H.
Exactly. I mean, so there's critical national infrastructure that's, that's at risk. There's, you know, GPS blocking and there's all kinds of things that could happen. There's poisonings and assassinations and acts of sabotage. There's all kinds of things happening in Europe that have to be addressed. And then there's what's happening on the ground, Ukraine, and I'll push back over there to what's happening on the ground in Ukraine, because that has to be factored in about where the state of players in Ukraine right now, because what it is it that Europeans could do, you know, the most help Ukraine at this point.
L.K.
Right? I mean I don't think it's, what can the European Union do? I agree with Fiona. I mean, I think we are looking at what, what they're calling coalition of the willing that can be much broader than the European Union. And certainly a country like Turkey could play, play a key role in a coalition of the willing. So, I mean inside Ukraine...
Y.A.
But a certain, you think that Erdogan will go against Putin?
F.H.
He already is.
Y.A.
Really?
F.H.
Well look, because I mean they're limiting access to the Black Sea as they are supposed to do with the Montrose Convention.
Y.A.
Yes.
F.H.
In times of war also, the Black Sea fleet of the Russians is not being replenished by ships coming from the Baltic and who provided Ukraine with drones in the first instance?
Y.A.
Yes.
F.H.
Anyway, back to Lucian again, but just to be clear that, you know, Turkey is doing various things.
L.K.
Turkey is walking a very fine, fine line, a very fine line also because of its energy dependence on Russia, and it's quite, quite large bilateral trade. So I think in Ukraine there is a lot of, I mean, the only, the only hope that the Ukrainians have now is on the Europeans somehow getting their act together. But again, I mean, this, you, you asked, you know, how long is it going to take to create a European army? How long is it going to take to have a integrated Ukrainian defense, or I'm sorry, excuse me, a European defense industry that's also capable of supplying the Ukrainians. And you know, for the moment it's still only the United States that can sort of pull up, pull together enough resources to supply the Ukrainians. So it's often, I think when we're talking about UK what the Europeans can do, we're talking about something that's happening in the midterm or longer term. And for the, for the Ukrainians, this could become an issue of this summer when the last USAID runs out.
F.H.
Yeah can I just add onto this, just to make it very clear to people, you're not creating a European army. What you're thinking about is how existing European armies come together, because the United States has been the glue there in terms of leadership, you know, within NATO, the Supreme Allied Commander, general Cavalli, who you know, recently testified and actually made it clear Ukraine's in better shape than, you know, people have been giving it credit for. But it's that kind of leadership. And then it's the equipment, as Lucian talked about, that's pretty critical. The Europeans probably could fill in for US equipment, but over time, because they need a bridging capacity, there's also the intelligence, but you know, there's intelligence collected by Europeans as well. It's just that the United States is too scale all the time. But look, if, if the US pulls out of Europe, Finnish troops don't pull out of Europe, Turkish troops don't pull of Turkey, British troops don't pull out of Britain. You see what I'm saying here? These are voluntary contributions of those national armies to a larger European endeavor. There is a European army because there are European armies. It just depends on how they configure themselves and how they organize themselves. They can use the basically the frameworks of NATO, the NATO policy plans don't disappear. They've already been training and operating. And there are sub NATO entities like the Joint Expeditionary Force that has a headquarters in Britain. And it's again, like I said before, includes all of the Scandinavian and the Baltic countries. They could add on Poland to this. there are relationships between the UK and France we mentioned before, Germany and France, and Germany and the UK and you know, there's all kinds of other bilateral and regional relationships that could come into play. It's just a question of time. And then the question is, what are you doing? Are you helping bolster Ukraine or are you kind of defending your own territory against Russia or what other kinds of operations you conducting? And all of that is being discussed. And it's, as you said though, they're having to discuss it in real time very fast because within the hundred days of Trump, everything has been turned on its head.
Y.A.
Europe leaded with two Germans, right? For 40 years. Moldova has a secession region for almost 30 years. Germany reunited and Russia is lacking resources to support transtria. Would you envision two Ukraine’s pro European West and pro-Russian East as an outcome of the ceasefire, whatever?
L.K.
I think that's, that's the most likely outcome of any ceasefire. I mean that's the Trump administration has made it clear that they expect Ukraine to cede territory. So the idea that somehow in the foreseeable future Crimea or Donetsk would end up in Ukrainian hands is almost hard to imagine. So I think-
Y.A.
What about Mariupol, Zaporizhzhia, Kherson region?
L.K.
Well, I mean including those areas, I, Ukraine doesn't have the military force to reconquer them. But where I think it's the difference with, I mean you talked about east and West Germany, of course East Germany was still a country, right? And the problem is that these, that these areas that we're talking about are now, you know, integrated into the Russian constitution and into the Russian state. And how are you ever going to, you know, pry them out, back out is, is hard to imagine. They certainly, it's even not really comparable so much to the Baltic states. Because the Baltic states had a very, their own languages and they're very distinct identities. Whereas these regions are depopulated to a large extent and ravished by war and are being populated by people coming from Russia. So the, I think even the whole character of a lot of those regions is changing,
F.H.
Which is obviously a deliberate policy on the part of Putin.
Y.A.
That's, that's exactly what Soviets did after the war with Baltic nations.
F.H.
Yes.
Y.A.
They sent half of the population to Siberia and they brought Russians to settle there.
F.H.
But you'd already, I mean on the language, I mean so many people are making the argument that these regions born with Russia because a predominantly Russian speaking. I mean all of us know here that language is not the only bearer of identity. We're all speaking English, but I don't think any of you guys think you're English. Right. Even I don't think I'm English. So that's a kind of another kind of question. Don't, don't tell an Irish man that he's English. That's because that's what I'm saying. Because I mean part from my heritage is Irish and Scots and Welsh and you know, so I'm confused like most people, you know, so, but so this is kind of, you know, a problem though is basically that the Russian state is actually saying if you speak Russian, you are a Russian. And the idea of people identifying with UK Ukraine and Ukrainian language in Russia, you know, has, has come under attack. Even in the most recent census, you saw the number of people self-identifying as Ukrainian, you know, really massively reduced from 2000, you know, back in 2000 because it was like 11 million, I think it was people who identified as Ukrainian might have had Ukrani, you know, in the passport. But you know that that's kind of been diminished. But that's what happens over time. If you went around in England and asked everybody with a Scottish last name, if they thought they were Scottish, they would probably say not. Or even with an Irish last name. You know, that's over time those identities, you know, tend to fade. And that's what basically Putin is banking on, that there will be no way for Ukraine later to, you know, try to take back Zaporizhzhia and Kherson and everything else as well. Look, even reincorporating, the eastern parts of Germany in Germany has proven difficult. Look at the voting patterns for alternative for Deutschland. And I was in Germany two years ago doing an and producing, lived there for many years doing a lot of interviews of people in what was formerly East Germany. And they said they didn't feel parts of the new Germany, because they did have their own states. And I mean you can, you know, you can speak to that. The experience that you had being in Germany for so long, that has wasn't an easy transition. So even miraculously, if those areas came back, it wouldn't be that easy.
L.K.
And if, I just want to add one point to that is these regions that we're talking about, these four regions plus Crimea, that was never the goal. I mean, incorporating them into Russia was not, was never Putin's goal. He said on the eve of the full scale invasion, we have no plans to occupy any Ukrainian territory. And I don't think he was, he was lying. I think his idea was we are going to have a shock and awe invasion, we'll decapitate the Ukrainian government and we will install a puppet sympathetic regime that will not require us to occupy these regions. So of course everything has gone completely differently than what Putin wanted. And he's almost had to incorporate these regions into Russia because no one else is controlling them. But that's not, he's not going to be happy. I mean, Steve Whitkoff also said it in his interview with Tucker Carlson that he's, that, you know, well maybe they should get these regions because they had these fake referenda. Of course that's not what it's about. The Putin is not going to rest until Ukraine is subordinated to the Kremlin. And so, you know, moving some borders around this is, this is not what this conflict is about.
Y.A.
You know, Russia, Russian Army was supposed to occupy Odessa in August, 2022. That was the initial plan. So it wasn't just, you know, to occupy Kyiv and retract and just topple the government and retract. But you know, obviously there was more efficient plan because for some reasons Russians do want a port of Odessa. And so I'm not, I'm no longer sure that, you know, that Putin had, you know, this short term goal to be honest with you, you know, there was several plans. And anyway, I would just say...
F.H.
To that though, Jean, I think Putin was always willing to just take what he could get.
Y.A.
Yeah.
F.H.
You know, so you can have different stages of a plan. You know, you, you, you might not have enough military to occupy it. But you know, over time, and I know we've got colleagues from Georgia here, we talk about creeping occupation, reoccupation of Georgia. And we think, you know, scaling that up is really kind of part of, part of the goal and what was happened in Georgia, you know, with a kind of complete reversal of Georgia's position and diluting of its, you know, identity again, return of Russian language. We were talking about this a little bit earlier today. You know, that would be, you know, kind of another possibility of Ukraine if you could pull that off Odessa. Absolutely I mean, I worried actually when I heard Witkoff talking about ports, I thought, God, were they talking about Odessa? You know, because that was, if you look back to 2014, in fact when, you know, basically, it was all of these insurgent movements of being encouraged in Donetsk and Luhansk. And you remember also in Odessa there was this effort, the whole idea of Noveresia of going back to the period of, you know, Catherine the great's acquisitions, and that's what Putin was trying to tell Tucker Carlson, look, anything that we ever touched in the past, everything that we ever had a treaty of everything that we ever occupies in giving him the letters from Bogdun Klasky, you know, in nine, in 1647 and 1648. You see, you see this all kind of belongs to us. Anything we had before, you know, is, is up for grabs. I think that, you know, still as, as Lucian is suggesting, there's still all of those kind of ideas there. They haven't gone away and he'll take what he can get in whatever way he can.
Y.A.
Peace deal, United States proposed a plan which principles a huge investment of the United States in Ukraine. However, you know, I spoke with some people who were, who are involved with those plans, both in Washington and Kyiv, and I asked them about, you know, the deal, and the answer was that in order to get rare earth elements worth 500 billion US dollars, United States will have to invest more than trillion dollars. So, you know, someone told me that it probably be $1.5 trillion, assuming that, you know, some money will get lost in the middle. So they, but they, but some other people, they say that the, that deal, you know, can serve as a sort of a security guarantee to Ukraine if the yes, take control over major ports in Ukraine and gas pipeline Putin will think twice before bombing Ukraine. So what do you think about that? So two sides of this story that, you know, it's not about really, you know, ports or pipeline or are Ukrainian resources. So what do you think about that?
L.K.
Well, I think it's important to remember the pre-history of this so-called minerals deal that when the election campaign in the US was still in full swing, Vladimir Zelensky actually proposed some kind of minerals deal in what he called a victory plan, which he presented here in the United States. He presented it to the Biden administration, but the part about the minerals deal seemed, especially aimed also at Donald Trump, this offering a very transactional deal. And so what I find rather astounding is almost within a week or so of taking office, the treasurer treasury secretary traveled to Kyiv with this deal, which seemed at that point pretty half baked and really was presented to the Ukrainians as an ultimatum. And of course we know that it's now gone through several iterations. It was supposed to be signed in Feb on February 28th When Zelensky had his unfortunate meeting in the Oval Office and it has since then been revised. And what we're hearing is that of course it's much more now than rare earths that it includes all of Ukraine's natural resources.
Y.A.
And he, and, you know, and ports, that's the most important.
L.K.
And it's a, that it's an extremely expansive agreement that in, that includes, that involves a fund that would be controlled by the United States.
Y.A.
Right but you don't think, don't you think that it can be on some sort of a martial plan the way, you know, the United States created this fund back in to rebuild Germany and you know, Europe in general?
L.K.
No, because I think, no, because I think exactly the point that your context were saying about the initial investment, you need to attract private American business to Ukraine if you wanna develop those resources, and I have a, I have a hard time imagining an any American companies putting, investing so much money in a country with such an uncertain future. So I don't, I don't, I think I don't, I don't see, I don't see how this, this would really give Ukraine any security guarantees in a concrete way.
F.H
No, I look, I agree, but I think there's, there's also some other things going on as well. I mean, in all these cases it's never just, it's not just black and white or, and, and all, there's always all kinds of other, you know, hidden motivations in part. I mean, Trump is the, you know, the master of the art of the deal, and he wants to show that he's got a good deal out of, you know, support for Ukraine. So, you know, what's the big issue of the moment? It's a rare earth and, you know, raw materials and minerals for the 21st, you know, kind of century economy. And, you know, everybody seems to be in the business of expanding their territory for the, for those purposes. I mean, Putin himself remember, was part of the justification for invading Ukraine. I mean, he had some of his own ministers sitting there talking about all of the abundance that Russia was going to acquire from the same property set of minerals and, you know, raw materials and rare earths and agricultural products. You know, at one point, I mean that, that was a feature just not so long ago that I think you were, you know, kind of covered in some of your media and certainly in your, in your book. There's also the fact that Kidal Dmitri and others have told Trump that the US has lost out on all kinds of business opportunities through sanctions and this rupture in relations. And, you know, that that figure of 500 billion and before 300 billion has come from Dmitri saying this is the opportunity lost, you know, to the United States. I mean, there was never that level of investment or of of trade between the US and Russia, but it's that idea, you've lost something. And Trump's always exaggerating the amount of money that they've been ripped off about. And so he wants to kind of show that the US is being compensated. There was a kind of a shock and awe for his base that he was hoping was going to happen in the Oval Office and you know, basically Zelensky didn't play along. And the other thing is that Trump's all about making deals with him personally. And basically, as you recall, he told Zelensky that any deal that had been made with Obama or Biden or anybody else in previous US administrations with Ukraine was null and void because nobody respected all these previous other idiot presidents, only people who respected him, that's exactly what he said, remember. And that this deal had to be with him. So this kind of personal gifting who sort like a dowry, getting back to the image started off of the young lady having to produce her, you know, her dowry chest and her fine linens and you know, is that kind of suitable? I mean honestly, I've been thinking the same image that he's not going to marry Zelensky unless he's got a fine dowry to go with it. If he doesn't like the dowry, is going to, you know, send it back again. And even the whole way it was talked about that sort of transaction where kind of having a marriage of convenience, you and me, nothing else before, you know, cancer, but none of this, you know, is equivalent as Zelensky was pointing out to some kind of security guarantee. There are also lots of other people of those same concessions. There's been 30 years of investment, you know, in Ukraine and elsewhere, other businesspeople. It's just the same with Greenland. You know, Greenland would be delighted and would've been delighted to have all kinds of US investment. the Danes and the, you know, Greenland government made this entirely evident to the United States, but there was more UK and Canadian investment than there was US investment because of the basically the upfront costs that, you know, the trillions of, you know, investments you, you know, extract because of lack of infrastructure. So I mean, it's the same, it's the same set of problems. So this is all, you know, unfortunately a game that's going on and it's, it's not a very nice one, but it's all about appearances and it's all about, you know, trying to kind of show that you're getting something out of everything and that the United States is not just going to support Ukraine for nothing.
L.K
Well, and it makes a caricature of reality in, in the sense of showing that telling the world this is what it was all about all the time anyway, it was all about resources. Whereas I don't think the United States initially had any interest in Ukrainian resources when the war started.
F.H.
And that takes us back to Dugin and Sir Halford Kiner in 1904 when, you know Britain and others have been carving up the world for resources for colonies. And we're now to seem to be back in that, you know, kind of period again. Certainly and then Putin of course encouraging Trump to think about Greenland in a recent speech.
Y.A.
You know what's interesting that markets are much more enthusiastic about the perspectives for the peace deal. Goldman Sachs stated yesterday that markets pricing in 70% probability of Ukraine peace deal. Why? What do they, what do they understand that at least all three of us don't. No, I'm serious.
F.H.
No, no, I know you're serious. I'm trying to compose myself to think about this. Lucian, any thoughts while I'm thinking through about what they might understand?
L.K.
I mean, was there down, was there rationale presented or anything?
Y.A.
No, no, no it was just the analysis and you know, it's not just JP Morgan also, you know, they said, you know, 70% probability, I just, you know, I'm perplexed, you are a capitalist. I am, you know what, you know, I'm a Soviet, we understand nothing about that you know?
F.H.
Look, I think when it comes to the markets, there's a lot of gambling going on, right? I mean, that's kind of purely what this is in terms of speculation. And there's a kind of a, certainly a hope all the time that there'll be some breakthrough, particularly in the US Russian relationship, you know, getting past whether there's going to be a ceasefire and a peace deal in Ukraine. That this is more about the kind of travel line of travel of the US Russian relationship. Kiro Dmitri was of course at Goldman Sachs, you know, at one point when many other places as well, he knows how to play this game. He's probably talking to the markets that's kind of going to encourage, you know, Trump, you know, to go further in all of this. I mean, well talk, talking to markets, I mean talking to people who talk to analysts who then, you know, try to shape the markets because there's this whole idea that there's a lot of money to be made in all of this. That's basically what the message, you know, for Trump and Whitkoff and others is, you know, we all need to have this peace deal so we can all make a lot of money. And, you know, what's not to like about making a lot of money? This is kind of like the messaging that's out there. And getting back to what Lucian said, it was all about this all the way along. Putin really did genuinely think that, you know, dealing with Ukraine was all about getting the price right, getting the price right. What was Ukraine willing to pay for its freedom? Or us? What was the cost he's shown that he's prepared to play an enormous price and a cost to get what he wants. 800,000 casualties, you know, kind of on the, the Russian side, not just people killed, but grievously wounded, you know, all of this, you know, efforts, you know, for overall it is time to keep focused on this. It's just getting what's the price that's right. And markets are trying to figure out the same thing. If the US Russian relationship is going to change, maybe we'll make some money. Maybe the sanctions are going to lift the financial sanctions. Maybe there's not going to be secondary sanctions. Maybe the US going after the shadow fleet is going to disappear, and lots of people are very willing to go back into Russian financial markets and to trade Russian debt and bonds and things. There's, but whether, you know, people are willing to go back and invest in material things in the Russian market is another matter. But if space is, you know, kind of in your future and Mars is the limit, you know, all kind of space futures. Look, Elon Musk was selling land on Mars. You can sell anybody anything It appears. I've got a nice piece of Mars I'd like to sell you.
Y.A.
You did.
F.H.
A Mars Bar, but anyway... Lucian, are you selling anything?
Y.A.
Thanks, God, I have nothing to sell. Lucian so why did Putin invade Ukraine at the first place? And what are motives that will make him to agree on real cease fire? I know question is a simple question, but you wrote a book.
L.K.
I wrote a book about it, and the subtitle is Why Russia invaded Ukraine. So I identified two main drivers for the Russian invasion. the first driver is Russian imperialism. So it's this idea that Russia has a historic mission to be at the center of a great Eurasian empire. And I think this had a lot to do also with the fall of the Soviet, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the legacy of that empire, which weighed so heavily on so many people. And we certainly know that was the case with Vladimir Putin and his clique. But I also argue that, you know, just this nostalgia for an empire or for the Soviet or the Soviet Union, it's not an, you know, it's not enough of a motivation then to attack, go ahead and attack your neighbor and try to conquer them. So the other element or main driver that identified was Putin's dictatorship. So the fact that after 20 years in power, Putin had evolved or devolved, you could say, as a leader. And, you know, he increasingly saw his power being threatened by, by the west. And in his paranoia, I mean, he saw that all these so-called color revolutions were getting closer to his border, and that he was the ultimate target of some kind of regime change in Russia. And so I think the combination of those two things were what ultimately drove him to attack. I do also discuss in my book, you know, what the United States was doing this whole time, what was in fact the role of NATO. And I mean, just to put it very succinctly, I mean, what I found was that there was only one US president that really pushed for Ukraine to join NATO, and that was George W. Bush. And the reason he did it was as a reward for Ukraine taking part in the coalition of the willing and participating in the occupation of Iraq. So that was kind of a, he was ready to go ahead and, and push that. Of course, as we know, in 2008 at the famous Bucharest Summit, NATOs Summit, there was a lot clashing views. The Germans and the French did not want to do that. And they came up with this compromise wording saying one day, Ukraine and Georgia will join NATO without any timeline or any kind of guarantee. So that put Ukraine in an extremely vulnerable position because on one hand the door was open. And from the point of view of the Kremlin, that was a great threat. But on the other hand, they actually had no chance of go of ever getting in, especially as I point out in my book, all the subsequent US presidents, Barack Obama, Donald Trump in his first term, and then Joe Biden at the beginning of his term, they were completely uninterested in Ukraine. Contrary to the Russian propaganda, or I think also to Putin's paranoia, all of those three presidencies put Russian US relations at the top. Also, what you were talking about earlier, Fiona, that sort of the avoiding World War III is sort of paramount of paramount importance and everything else is subordinated to that, including a country called Ukraine. And so, I mean, I find the tragedy of Ukraine story is that in fact, no US president actually cared enough about Ukraine and that it was left in this limbo for such a long time.
F.H.
I mean, just to add to that, I mean, you know, when I was in the administration, we were always being asked by Russian counterparts, why do you care about Ukraine? And honestly, you know, the interlocutors never came up with real rationale. I remember, you know, ambassador Bolton said, well, we've got Ukrainian Americans, and then you could see them searching, you know, for like the next thing to say, you know, we're a country that loves freedom, you know, and kind of revolutionary, you know, kind of country, which actually we apparently don't really, but it kind of comes down to it. And you know, kind of basically that principle of territory integrity, which frankly Donald Trump is now blasting all the way through with claims made against Canada and Greenland and Panama, you know, so we were never super convincing that we actually really cared all that much. And in fact, in 2008, it was really more about Georgia, you know, to be honest, than it really was about Ukraine. I mean, it absolute right.
Y.A.
I think that was the response, by the way to Bucharest.
F.H.
Yeah, exactly. I mean, it was kind of, Ukraine was there, of course, but Ukraine themselves were a bit more ambivalent about NATO at that point. Georgia was all gung-ho. I mean, as you rightly pointing out, there was all the backdrop of Afghanistan and Iraq and coalitions of the willing and Ukrainians had this heavy lift capacity. And you know, we thought, you know, at the time of a significant military, which actually they've proven to be the case, but there was a real desire to reward Georgia. And then, you know, the, I mean, I've got a colleague here in the audience who remembers all of this. We did all these, you know, deep dives and discussions about it. And it was really more about the whole idea of the freedom agenda than it really was about Ukraine and Georgia and democracy, the freedom agenda, you know, the failure in fact to nation build in Iraq and you know, Afghanistan and thinking that, you know, you might be able to pick this up somewhere else. And you know, George W. Bush, he liked Georgia and Ukraine, he thought there were plucky countries and you know, he wanted to support them. But, you know, there wasn't really a thinking through, even though we actually did try to think through what the consequences of all of this would be. And then as you know, you point out there was the invasion of Georgia that all of that, you know, kind of underscored the fragility on which this was all based. And that should have been a lesson for basically beefing up European and other security at the time. But it wasn't taken that way. It was thought of, it was because of Mikheil Saakashvili and, you know, kind of temperate actions on his part. Ukraine, I think, you know, when Ukrainian leadership at the time read the writing on the wall, and of course after that they conclude the Black Sea deal with the Russians for the longer term leasing of Sevastopol and the other Black Sea Fleet facilities. And actually they pulled back from pushing on NATO. So, you know, it was only really after Russia's ceases Crimea that the whole idea of basically Ukraine going back towards NATO gets back on the table and as Lucian points out, no one was super interested in putting Ukraine into NATO at that point.
Y.A.
So what will, what kind of incentives Putin has to conclude, you know, to fin to to end this awful war and to make some peace deal?
F.H.
I don't think really has any incentives at the moment.
Y.A.
Really.
F.H.
I think it's more about whether he realizes he can't achieve what he wants to achieve. It's like denying him, you know, the ability to kind of move forward.
L.K.
I completely agree with Fiona. I would only say he, he does have an incentive though, to go into talks.
F.H.
Oh yes, absolutely.
L.K.
Yeah, right he has an incentive to normalize the relations with the United States. So I think that's why we see him talking. I mean, it's, he's on the world stage and I really don't think we should rule out a meeting maybe in Moscow between Trump and Putin in the foreseeable future, whether there's a peace deal or not. I think they can separate these two issues so far that, that I can certainly imagine that.
F.H.
I was thinking today a terrible thought because I noticed in the press again, that there's a talk about having a military parade on Trump's birthday, which also happens to coincide with something else. I'm sure Vladimir Putin would be very happy to put on a military parade for him.
L.K.
Right?
F.H.
So I've said that now, so that if Putin does that, hopefully he'll stop him from doing it because we've already talked about it at the Davis Center. So he wouldn't want to talk about that. But, because I had office thought, oh God, what if, you know, Putin calls up and says, hey, I've got this military parade for you. Please come.
Y.A.
But you both said that Putin does, doesn't have incentives to end this war. But look, you know, he had to give up on Syria. He lost his bases in Syria because he just didn't have resources, troops, to support Assad and even to preserve his bases. They were unable to take out the weapons that was, you know, in those bases in Syria. So he, he's definitely losing, you know, he doesn't have the possibility to sustain, you know, different wars.
F.H.
But that's what we just said. It's about denial, right? That's not incentives. He wasn't incentivized to leave Syria. He would've liked not to leave Syria. It was because the whole calculation changed. And, but, and he couldn't maintain it because this new Syrian government didn't want him to be there.
Y.A.
Right.
F.H.
And, you know, he lost that because of Asad. Now, I mean, look, he could easily have lost the ability to push forward had not that Trump came with the Trump card and suddenly, you know, getting back to what you said before about, you know, losing, I mean, basically Trump is playing a different hand and is basically playing away Ukraine at this particular point. So why would Putin do anything at this point till he sees how this game unfolds?
Y.A.
Because he doesn't have manpower. He has to bring troops from North Korea.
F.H.
Yeah, but he's got, he believes he is got much more manpower than Ukraine has. And because we're all sitting around in meetings, you know, talking about when Ukraine runs out of weapons. I mean, why, again, I mean, he's listening all the time to all of this stuff. He's reading the Wall Street Journal. Well, he isn't personally probably, but I mean, he's getting somebody, you know, providing him with all these clips. You know, the Americans are talking themselves out of this, again, Europe's talking itself out of relevance. The Ukrainians are going to run out of weapons.
L.K.
Well, and the, the US will completely decouple from NATO or maybe even leave NATO. So, you know, the longer-
F.H.
So why would the longer you wait.
Y.A.
Agree that, that yes, we'll leave?
F.H.
But that's what the us that's what was being talked about. So why at this particular point would Putin do anything? I mean, in Syria, you know, it all kind of went in a different direction.
L.K.
He just, I think he has to wait, right? I mean, a war of attrition. They believe in a war of attrition. I mean that no matter how difficult things are for Russia, they're even worse for Ukraine, especially if USA does now get cut off and the Europeans are unable to come up with adequate-
Y.A.
Still oil prices go down Euros today slightly over $50. Russian budget is sustained at 45 at best. The reason Putin was able to run this war for these three years because he was getting $350 billion in oil revenues, and that's what he needed to sustain the war. So if oil prices will go down, if Americans will manage, you know, Saudi Arabia voted for more output, you know, a attack basically collapsed. So we can envision something, or at least I would like to think that there can be something like the kind of deal that Reagan did with Saudis back in 1980s when oil prices collapsed and Soviet Union finally collapsed.
F.H.
I mean, Putin's watching all of that very carefully. And I think his calculation even in listening to that is like, well, no, I still think that the, you know, I have more advantages here because he can still keep hanging on, I mean, we, he's got a really cracked team of central bankers and economists around him. He is got people like Kiro Dmitri running around, you know, kind of all over the place. He's got a Trump who really, really, really, really, really wants to have a deal and to have something that he can point to. And, you know, he's betting on the Europeans not getting their act together. I'd like to bet that Europe would get its act together, but Putin wouldn't agree with me. He'd certainly counter my bet.
L.K.
Yevgenia, I can actually imagine a scenario in which some sort of ceasefire peace agreement even comes together and everyone is overjoyed about it. and especially the market, right? And then what happens, and this is what I have been hearing from Ukrainians since last summer, what happens after the shooting stops? And the idea that once domestic politics returns to Ukraine, Ukrainians who have been so unified and so cohesive in fighting an external aggressor will begin to turn on themselves. And I can imagine that this is also one reason why we keep on hearing out of the Kremlin, the need for a legitimate leader in Ukraine. We will hear more and more calls for elections. And elections is only, it means opening the Pandora's box of all the internal disputes and aggressions that exist inside of Ukraine so-
F.H.
Trump's calling for elections as well. So you've also got the US doing the same thing and shopping around for another Ukrainian president. Same as, same as Putin is. And again, it gets back to Georgia. We have some Georgian colleagues, you know, sitting at the back of the auditorium here. That's what happened in Georgia. Everybody started fighting with each other, you know, once, you know, the kind of the Russian threat morphed in a different way. And where is Mikheil Saakashvili really right now?
Y.A.
In prison?
F.H.
Correct and I'm sure that that's Trump, you know, kind of probably wouldn't mind seeing Zelensky in jail either, by the way he talked to him, and Putin Absolutely, most certainly would. I'm sure he would have a live cam feed for Zelensky in whatever prison he ends up in. And I'm sorry to put it in that such a cruel terms, but you know, that that's what they want.
Y.A.
I cannot allow myself for such pessimism. I have too little years to leave and I need to see Putin down and Ukraine free. So, and my, of course, you know, my country Russia free. Thank you so much. And now, you know, questions from the audience. You are so pessimistic. Yes.
F.H.
Please.
Y.A.
Yes please and over here, yes, and then Cris?
Audience Member
Thanks very much to everyone on the panel and also to the Harvard support staff who do important jobs. I have a question for Dr. Kim. And it involves politely dissenting from what you said about the course of Putin's war. It began as a war for influence. It became a war for annex of annexation. And now it's both the two are not mutually exclusive. And for Ukraine it is a ramifying tragedy and not recognizing that tends to let Putin and Russians off the hook. So my question is simple, would you please, if not tonight, then in the future, would you please reconsider that opinion? Thank you very much.
Y.A.
Okay. Cris?
C.M.
Yeah so Dr. Hill, you have been in the room where it happens, right? You have been, you have served under a Trump presidency. I'm wondering what you're seeing now from a Trump 2.0 that, what your impression is of their foreign policy direction, if there is one, if you're seeing that things feel largely the same, or is there a difference? And I know there's been so much noise about Doge and you know, obviously a lot of domestic issues. Sometimes the foreign policy can get lost. But do, are you seeing sort of a through line from your experience to what we're seeing now?
F.H.
Do you want us to respond to these?
Y.A.
That's was question to you.
F.H.
Yeah, but I mean, I don’t know whether Lucian, whether you want to clarify, because I'm, I'm not quite sure that that's quite how you describe things actually but-
L.K.
So your understanding was that, sorry, you don't have a microphone now.
Audience Member
What would you like me to say?
Y.A.
No, no, no. The question there was, you know, there was a statement, it wasn't Lucian it was a statement that he wants to, that he, you know, I'm sorry, you know, what's your name, please?
Audience Member
Oh, my name's Tom Johnson. I teach history at UMass Boston.
Y.A.
Yes so, and he, he hopes that you will change your view, but really Chris Fiona, it's very interesting, you know, this question that Cris placed, what's the procedure? You know, I was asking Rory Macker the other day when we were talking about tariffs. What's the procedure? Who advises Trump? How do they make decision? You know, who decided that? Yeah, yeah. Look, you know, how, who's the International Security Council who covers Russian desk? Who is, who his, who you know, is, are there any people who are capable to tell him, you know, a thing to about Putin or, you know...
F.H.
Look, we also know that for Putin himself, he made the decision to go into Ukraine with a very small number of people,
Y.A.
Right?
F.H.
I mean, you know, kind of, he made decision and was encouraged on that. What doesn't isn't just really about that. It's about, look, if you're in charismatic, hyper personalized presidential systems, think Macron and France as well, you know, there aren't always that like, and a lot of people who get in the room to be able to talk for anything more than about two seconds. I could not say that I advised Trump at all. I mean, he asked me two questions directly to me.
Y.A.
But you call you Russian bitch.
F.H.
Well, apparently to somebody else, but not to my face, thank goodness, because I don’t know how to responded.
Y.A.
Write your book.
F.H.
But it's basically, I mean, I didn't get a chance to sit down and say, hey, you know, President Trump, here's my thoughts on the matter. That never happened. And it, you know, it doesn't happen with people like Macron. I'm pretty sure that, you know, Putin, you know, didn't ask, you know, for a kind of a great long, you know, appraisal of the situation from Sergei Ramkov or something like this. Or even, you know, Labrov, others getting a chance to do their kind of spiel on foreign policy. Trump goes with his gut as he tells everybody. There is a through line, a through line of things that he has believed in for a very long time. Tariffs, for example, tariff man. He said that he's believed in tariffs since the 1980s. He believes in tariffs now. Ukraine, he doesn't believe that, you know, sadly, you know, Ukraine is a country just like Putin doesn't think Ukraine is a country. And when Putin told him he didn't think Ukraine was a country, Trump agreed with him, you know, right at the very kind of beginning of the Trump presidency. And he says it all the time about this, maybe it's Russia, maybe it's not Russia. Maybe it'll be an independent country, maybe it won't be an independent country. He's always kind of going with whatever it is that his gut tells him. He would say repeatedly, you know, I know better than you always in public, I know better than my generals. You know, he, he does this all the time. So I think you can really kind of see, you know, the answer to this question is that, you know, people will try to get in there. They will, you know, try to shape his views. You know, why did Whitkoff spend so much time talking to Tucker Carlson? Because Trump will watch him on television because Whitkoff probably wouldn't get more than a few minutes. Even though he's a, you know, a famous real estate mug. He is now on the staff, you know, he is basically somebody who's sent out to, you know, basically, you know, go and do things. But he's not going to be able to do a debrief of 12 hours or nine hours or however long he has. But if he goes and talks to Tucker Carlson Trump will listen to it. When I was, you know, kind of working in the Trump 1.0 and Buster Bolton came in who was a, you know, a very, you know, kind of clever guy when it came to, you know, how to present things. He would go on the Sunday shows every Sunday if he could, so that Trump would have to listen to him because he wasn't going to have, you know, Trump listened to him, if he went in to do his briefing, Trump would listen to, you know, some of his briefers. But, you know, kind of, it depended on who they were and what he thought they were.
Y.A.
You mean briefers from the that's-
F.H.
And others, yeah. If he thought that they'd, you know, kind of got some interesting stuff to tell him, but even they had to kind of be figuring out how to present it to him. So this is kind of part of the problem that you have here. And I mean, look, I'm, you said at the end we're very pessimistic. I'm not necessary. I think all kinds of things can happen. Because everybody has agency and Trump isn't infallible. He is, he is eminently fallible. But he is a very clever politician. You shouldn't, you know, kind of rule him out. Just like Vladimir Putin's been unbelievably lucky.
Y.A.
Yes.
F.H.
But you know, you like might run out, you might choke on a pretzel as George Bush almost did, you know, watching television when no one was there and had to do the self Heimlich maneuver. I always kind of think of that thinking, God, thank God he knew what to do, because the secret service wouldn't have come in. What if Putin's, you know, choking on some borsch right now as we're speaking a bit late actually. But anyway, maybe drowns in his swimming pool or something, you know, if he still swims, you know, there's all kinds of fall down a fight of stairs. I tripped in the street and broke both my wrists. All kinds of things happen. You know, there's all these weird things that can happen. So, you know, all kinds of stuff can shift. But the, in terms of a through line, the through line is Trump still, and Trump's even more convinced of his genius now. He survived an assassination attempt. He came back in a way that nobody said he ever could. I mean, he's the first president in, you know, a hundred plus years to get reelected after being away from office. Why should anybody know any better than him? And so all of the people are trying to figure out how they influence Trump. And Putin's got a much better chance of influencing Trump because Trump thinks of him as a peer. Kiro Demetriv has got all kinds of ways of influencing Trump because he used to work for Goldman Sachs and he knows how to deal with high net worth individuals, client management, because that's where your money comes from right? And I mean the most effective person I thought in the previous Trump version was Mnuchin, who used to work Goldman Sachs because he just kind of had his Goldman Sachs, you know, kind of approach. So this is a person who has high net worth in terms of power and, you know, influence. And I need to manage him because my job, you know, basically depends on that. And Putin's, you know, kind of position to keep the war going and all and but keep Trump engaged, all depends on how he manages him. So it's no surprise whatsoever they pick Kidal Dmitri instead of Ushakof and Navro, who by this time, you know, kind of a bit boring and you know, wouldn't talk to him in the same way. And that's why Whitkoff is out there, you know, for Trump, you know, kind of acting in the person Trump. But really what Trump wants more than anything is to sit down with Putin and to do it himself. He's just wants Whitkoff to prepare the way.
Y.A.
Yes, please.
Audience Member
Oh, it's such a treat. So much better than watching you all on YouTube. So my question is, to go back to what Europe can do, I also watched, besides all of you wonderful people, sir Bill Broder Browder, who has been really advocating for the money that Europe has frozen specifically in the UK, I think, and to take that money and to throw it back in, to fight against Russia, in other words, to fund everything. Is there any possibility of that happening?
L.K.
From what I hear, the possibility of that happening is actually very slim.
Audience Member
Really? And why would that be?
L.K.
Because most of the money is in Europe and European governments are still quite adamant that that money, that would create a legal precedent and it would also deter future investors and people from, I mean, sovereign states from holding their money in their banks. So there's very strong European opposition.
Audience Member
Kind of like the Swiss and World War II? Little bit like that?
Y.A.
To be honest with you. I would also be against that because it creates a very bad precedent because, you know, take private property and without procedure, just like we see now in the United States, that you, you can be kicked out just, you know, without an procedure, right? So to take somebody's property. And that's exactly what Putin by the way, does he privatized, you know, he nationalized, you know, he's done some, you know, other companies. I think that it is very, very dangerous way after all, you know, it's not, it's more important. It's a question of values that Europe and United States can project to the out world. And private property is a very important value. And so, and you know, procedure, and rule of law, that's a very important value. So when you tell people like, you know, Russians, you know, I listen, I constantly listen to Russians just because, you know, I run a website the New Times and you know, they, even smart people, people whom I knew very well and know very well, they keep saying that they, they're so disgusted now with the Western model that, you know, they never expected that the West could do it. You know, just grab property and go. It is, I think it's from, you know, perspective. We're not going to die tomorrow. I hope we're going to live. And for this, we need people to believe in the values, in the role of law, in procedure, and in the value of private property.
Audience Member
Do you think it's unusual that he's doing that?
Y.A.
Bill has very, listen, you know, Bill has a lot of personal reasons. He was kicked out of Russia. He was very successful businessman. He was very much involved in green mail, if, you know, what is it, Greenmail, using media on the ground that, you know, write some dot about, you know, company company's shares go down. And at, at that point, his fund was buying, you know, shares of the valuable companies. So he was a great support of Putin, by the way, you know, I remember we met in 2007 with him and you know, and he published in Moscow Times where also was a columnist with the Moscow Times. And he published a column saying that, you know, when Putin imprisoned Kosodov, he's finally, finally, you know, Russia got leader who is, who is going to clean the space and blah, blah, blah. And he was all proud. I felt like, you know, all proud got out of the ground, you know, his grandfather who was the leader of the communist party of the United States. So, and then he got kicked out. That's what happens. Like, you know, now, you know, they arrested Kovich, you know, the guy who was, who is worth $2.6 billion, he believed Putin, he repatriated his money from Cyprus. And you know, a year ago, would you believe it? You know, you'll think that people are smart, but they idiots, of course, you know, and, and they're arrested now and they're going to take everything just the way they did it with Michael, who also was a great support of Putin, you know? Anyway, I'm sorry.
Audience Member
Thank you.
Y.A.
Yes, please. Yes. But you know, we need Hannah, ah, okay. I'm so sorry. Oh, yeah.
Audience Member
We all know that Putin has a very keen sense of symbolic politics. And a month from tomorrow is May 9th, the 80th anniversary of the victory. Do you think that Trump will go to Moscow for it, first of all? And do you think that Putin has any special goals that he insists need to be achieved by midnight and celebrated on that day?
L.K.
Well, I think to answer that question, I'm thinking of, you know, the final chapters of my book, which go back to 20, the year 2020 when right before the pandemic Putin went to Israel to mark the 75th, then 75th anniversary of the Liberation of Auschwitz. And he gave a speech in which again, he dropped hints that it would be great if the leaders of the victor powers of World War ii, if they could get together and sit, sit together. So obviously he meant Donald Trump, who was president at the time and probably the Chinese and maybe some Europeans to get around and sort of have a reunion and figure out the fate of the world. Of course then the pandemic hit and, you know, any, any thought of Donald Trump appearing at, at, at the May 9th parade was off the table. So, you know, with that in mind and sort of Putin's idea that he would like, you know, this idea of Yalta two is always out there, that he would, he would really like to get together with the other masters of the planet and sort of, you know, just decide, you know, decide the fate of the world. I do think there, that's certainly going to be a temptation. And we know that after the first Trump, at least the first public Trump Putin phone call, Trump said that, you know, they discussed visits to each other's countries. So I can, I can imagine that there will be a push for May 9th. And of course it's not unprecedented. American presidents have attended the May 9th parade. So, and even US troops have participated in the May 9th parade. So I can imagine that there will be a big push and it creates, of course, I mean it's a great question. I think it, it presents some kind of deadline, right? Can they, we had been hearing for a long time that there was an Easter deadline, so April 20th, because in this year, the Orthodox and the, and the Western calendars align, and so that you would have a ceasefire by April 20th. Of course, that seems quite farfetched, but maybe they'll find another reason to meet. Maybe they have to meet and talk about how to solve the Ukraine problem.
Audience Member
Well, I think he's more likely to do that than to come to Concord for the 250th anniversary, because every 50 years the American president has come to Concord, Massachusetts. Yeah, Concord, Massachusetts. He's more likely, I think, to go to Moscow than to Concord. But I'm only a historian, so I don't have to predict things.
F.H.
I would, I would just say though, Nina, that if, you know, kind of this is being posited and Putin extends an invitation, obviously this would be a massive provocation because I mean, this is, you know, V Day, you know, day for and in Europe as well, and there's a lot of debate about this. You've got the NATO summit coming up, you know, in June. And it would really, then this would be a test getting back to sort of foreign policy as to, you know, what Congress thinks, you know, the Senate and what the American public think. There's a lot of support still for Ukraine out there. I don't think this would be an easy, I mean, Trump could go ahead and do it, but I don't know. It depends on, you know, what, whether he thinks he can get away with it. Because I, as you said, I mean he's been invited, but this would be for, for Putin, this would be a real test to see how far he is got and be test for all of us to see, you know, how that is debated. If it's debated whether, whether the pushback, you know, would come from, I mean, we know that JD Vance, you know, went to Munich because I was there, heard him at the Munich security conferences, others did. He went to play, you know, kind of Wreathed Auschwitz said never again, and then was supporting the AFD, you know, by the time of his speech. So I wouldn't say that there's consistency and not, you know, kind of no shortage of hypocrisy, you know, kind of in the current administration. But, you know, they might actually do that argument. Well, you know, we were invited before, couldn't go because Covid, you know, whatever or other US presidents have been. But yes, but not in the time when, you know, there, there was a massive, the second, you know, after the, after World War ii, the largest military conflict in Europe, and it's by Russia being the aggressor rather than, you know, the kind of the country that was purportedly on the defensive during World War II.
Y.A.
Yeah, it'll be an awful message.
Audience Member
Yes, please. Yes, very interesting discussion. Thank you very much. I wanted to loop back to the Black Sea Basin. It's come up several times and to try to put a more constructive spin on things. Clearly many countries involved in the Black Sea Basin is there, in your view, any, any theme, any issue and opportunity for cooperation around the Black Sea? Or will it forever be overshadowed with what's happening in Ukraine and with the war?
F.H.
I personally think, yes, there's lots of prospects for Black Sea cooperation and lots of discussions were going on before the war, but the war makes that very complicated, unfortunately, because you've now seen also the renaming of the Gulf of Mexico to the Gulf of America. There's a big push, you know, for Russia to, you know, kind of also you saw in the Domer an effort to call the Black Sea, the Russian Sea. I mean the Sea of Azov which is part of the Black Sea, has obviously being pretty much laid claim to by Russia. But of course I mean that when you talked about the Mariupol, and you know, the other, sea of Azov ports and you know, the future of Odessa, you know, there's a Georgia, you know, also another kind of country on the Black Sea. This has been a push for cooperation about the, around the Black Sea. And again, I do think that, to be frank, of course, as prospects, but the wall, you know, makes that incredibly difficult. There was a hope by the Turks and others that by having the Black Sea grain deal, that this would actually become, you know, kind of a, a basis for, you know, basically putting the Black Sea off limits for, for the war. But of course, that hasn't transpired at all. But I think when we do think about a real, you know, proper peace deal, the Black Sea's going to have to be, going to have to be part of that in the future. And what happens to sea of Azov, I mean, the Sea of Azov is part of the Black Sea, but it's been denied freedom of navigation actually going back to 2018 when Russia seized a Ukrainian ship and the sailors, that was the first kind of crisis, you know, kind of going back there.
L.K.
Well, and now it's been turned into a-
F.H.
Yeah.
L.K.
A defacto Russian Lake.
F.H.
Exactly.
L.K.
Right.
F.H.
So that kind of complicated, but at some point, yes.
Audience Member
Can you hear me?
F.H.
Yes.
Audience Member
So Fiona, I have a question for you, but Genia Lucian please weigh in if you have a different view. The question touches on European security broadly. You were talking about it earlier, you were NIO in 2008 when the Russians first began to table ideas for new European security decision making architecture.
F.H.
Put it closer. No, no, just closer, closer, closer.
Audience Member
Can you hear me now?
Y.A.
Yes.
F.H.
That's good.
Y.A.
You have to speak right in the mic.
Audience Member
I have a question about proposals that the Russians started to table in 2008 and for years thereafter, which no one on our side was particularly interested in having a conversation about. I'm curious now, since you touched on it in your view, looking at European receptivity, how ripe in your view is the idea of a conversation about new architecture for European security broadly? And if you do sense more ripeness today than then, to what extent might this be an inducement for Putin to try and move him forward toward what we want to simply agree to have discussions about new stuff?
F.H.
Yeah, I like the way that you use the word inducement because you know, obviously we we're talking about incentives before an inducement involves a bit of a push rather than just an attraction. There is a whole debate about a new European security among the Europeans, but it's also because it's been, you know, kind of looked at as, as a reaction to what Putin has done in Ukraine, but now, frankly, a reaction to what the United States has done. And one of the reasons that it didn't take off in 2002, 2007, 2008, when Midriff, which I think you're probably alluding to, went to Berlin, and of course remember Medve was president for a while. We've kind of forgotten all of that. And then it was one of his kind of maiden speeches in front of the Bundestag. And he was talking about a new concert of Europe. And then Navrov went around Europe talking about a new concert of Europe, 18th century style, Metnick and you know, the great powers, you know, getting together. There was still a kind of feeling that one of those great powers was the United States. And it was kind of not just a pitch to Europe, but it was also the idea that this would be about the United States and the big powers in Europe include the United States and then Germany obviously, and maybe some of the others have, you know, they kind of looked like they were meaningful at the time. It certainly didn't involve Belgium or, you know, kind of the Baltic states or Finland or Sweden at that, you know, particular juncture. Well now the debate is among all of those other states, the Finland, you know, kind of a part of NATO along with Sweden who are actually leading and in many respects, some of this new discussions. It's the Baltic states who have been punching way above their weight diplomatically, you know, ever since the war came out. So this is very much a different debate. It is a bit exactly that about the new European security, but it's also without the United States. And the question is, where would Russia come into it as something other than adversary? And that's, you know, kind of a very interesting point. If Putin's still kind of waiting out for Ukraine to be handed to him or for Europe to fall apart, there's not much of an incentive, you know, for him to do anything, to have a discussion. But there might be an inducement if something looks real in Europe because we get back Turkey, you know, obviously it's come in the context of thinking about the Black Sea and the Turks have been a bit worried that they might be left out of a kind of a new European security discussion despite the fact that Turkey was off, you know, kind of playing around in the Middle East and, you know, kind of various points, the idea that there might be a new European security discussion without Turkey as brought kind of the Turks back in wondering why they're not being invited, you know, to, you know, all of the various meetings they have been, but Erdogan's been a, it's got bit preoccupied at the moment, but there's, you know, for Turkey there's been an inducement to come back and talk to the Europeans, because there's a feeling that something might happen without them. So I think that you're actually right and onto something, if Europe shows that it's really serious and gets its act together, this could be something a little bit more in the positive vein that Putin might suddenly feel. And it'd be interesting to see Genia, when you're picking up on what Russians are thinking about Europe at this moment, that they might feel that they might need to have a completely different discussion. Because up until now Putin thought, well, you just talk about Europe, you know, with the US it's the idea of Margaret Thatcher and her entourage. And somebody asks about the meat and the vegetables, and she said the vegetables will, you know, basically the idea that, you know, everybody around her is just a vassal or a vegetable. That's kind of been the Putin view of Europe is just like, who cares about Europe? We're not going to talk to Europe because Europe is meaningless. But if US is out of the picture and Europe's doing something, maybe this is, you know, a very different place. And we've recently heard a lot of anti-European sentiment coming out of Moscow. Is that a reaction to that? Does that, you know, is that because, because they think something's happening? That'd be interesting to see what you think.
Y.A.
Putin always wanted to destroy the European Union because, you know, from his perspective, it was much easier to deal with each country one by one rather than the European Union the size. It's the size of the American economy. It's the biggest trade partner to China, so bigger than the United States. So he always was very interested in destroying the European Union, that what he was doing all the time. Now what, you know, when you say Russians, listen, 2 million Russians left after the war started.
F.H.
And the Muslim are living in Europe.
Y.A.
And most of them live in Europe across approximately 500,000. We don't know how many, you know, return back because they didn't find jobs. But it's very difficult for them to live in Europe because, you know, you can get visa. I cannot get visa to Europe. I, you know, they don't have, you know, bank accounts. It's, it's very, very different. And you know, I don't complain. We're responsible for what we did because, you know, we allowed a leader who started this awful war and killing, you know, people in Ukraine. So I mean, I bear responsibility for that full, you know, a hundred percent. And so I think that Europeans are right to be afraid. You know, when I see Russians in Lithuania, when I, I was still in Moscow and I was running, you know, after the war already started to Lithuania, I was, so, I saw Russians, I thought, you know, wait a second, it took slightly over a hundred special forces troops to topple, I mean, to kill the president of Afghanistan and to change the whole regime of Afghanistan, what it takes, you know, just to change regime in Lithuania with Lavia on in Estonia, you know, Estonia, 1 million people, Lithuanians, 2.3 million people, you know, so it's so easy just to topple the government, bring another puppet there. And so they should be concerned because there are a hell of a lot of group people, KGB people and et cetera, Europe should be, should be concerned about that. We see about all, you know, this sabotage terrorist attacks all across Europe. And there will be escalation over that for sure.
F.H.
Well just, I mean, basically to sharpen that point, see, you know, kind of Lucian and there, I mean, the thing is if Europe actually starts to counteract that which they are starting to do, because it's not just concern. There's actually a lot of anger about Russia. There is a desire among a coalition for sure of Europeans to build something real. And then does that change the calculation, I think is what you are asking there. And it might, I mean, at some point it just, you know, right now, perhaps not basically if Europe, if in Russia, Putin is still not taking Europe seriously, but I saw the last couple of weeks a bit of an inkling that there's a bit of a harsher tone towards Europe rather than just looking at Europe as a bunch of vessels of the United States, realizing that Europe might have agency and that, you know, kind of might shift things a bit. I don’t know, Lucian, if you-
Y.A.
But you know, Russian media kept, you know, they were running this propaganda machine, which, you know, United States, you're not evil, you know, it was the, the symbol of evil United States. And all of a sudden, you know, they fell in love with Trump. You know, there is just this bromance going on and, you know, and especially Russian reach, they were so, they were so excited that now, you know, the moods go down. So they do realize that probably it's not going to happen. Yes, please. We have somebody there. Yes, please.
Audience Member
Oh, thank you. There's a follow up on the Black Sea question. So there's a long article in today's Times about how Ukraine would have or appears to have no interest in a ceasefire on the Black Sea front because a, they were already successful with their drone and other attacks on the Russian Black Sea fleet. They move their ships north, grain export and traffic has increased almost to pre-war levels. And that Putin, on the other hand, does have any interest in a ceasefire there. Maybe because they could inspect the ships or delay the shipments or whatever. So I was just curious as to what your take on the ceasefire potential there is that supposedly is being negotiated, but the interest seem very far apart.
L.K.
I think that assessment is correct. I mean, the Ukrainians are actually in the Black Sea in a pretty good place. And if the Russians get what they want, I mean they would, they would actually have access to parts of the Black Sea that they might not have now. Plus they're demanding that one of their state banks gets access again to international markets through the SWIFT system, which of course is not a decision that the US can take, but the Europeans. So yeah, it's sort of a, you know, it's sort of Putin asking for something that, that they would really like and without the Ukrainians really getting any huge benefit out of it.
Y.A.
Yes, we have, here yes, please.
Audience Member
Yeah. So I look at these issues-
Y.A.
Would you put the closer to you?
Audience Member
I look at these issues as a policy advisor, as and also as a business person. the 2020 financial crisis is important because the US put money into this country in order to help get it out of that financial crisis. But in Germany, during that same period of time, they did use the same approach. I know because they used my solution. So, but they did not put money into the economy like the US did. And the reason I point that out is if Germany actually does raise a trillion as it said it would do, I think that says that they're really serious because they're breaking a taboo of putting money into the economy. So it's my thought for it.
Y.A.
Okay, thank you. Yes, please.
Audience Member
Yes. Thank you again for a great free wheeling discussion that gives us a lot to think about. My question is about the incentives or disincentives for Putin to come to some kind of agreement, ceasefire, whatever was mentioned that the estimates in the west of update a hundred thousand casualties, including possibly 200,000 dead, 200,000, we lost 55,000 in 10 years in Vietnam. So my question is-
Y.A.
15,000.
Audience Member
55?
Y.A.
No, 15,000, 15,081 to be precise.
Audience Member
So the, my question is what do we not understand about the Russian mindset, their political philosophy, their history, their religion that would allow Putin to assume that he could grind on for another three years and lose twice as many and still come out ahead? It doesn't make any sense to hear, hear that here in the West.
F.H.
I would actually, you know, so I, you know, you're touching upon one of these kinds of fundamental points here because Trump clearly doesn't understand that, you're absolutely right. I think genuinely Trump does want to end this because he thinks it's a senseless slaughter. And he, like everybody else has been, you know, somewhat shaped by, I mean, he's not a great historian, but you know, the stories of the Great War World War II, you know, there, there's certainly that kind of image. You know, Vietnam probably thinks it's actually a much higher rate of casualties, but the American Civil War, 600,000 people were actually killed. You know, and if you would ever just picked up on any of those figures, you'd think this is, you know, crazy, you know, senseless slaughter. So I do think there's a genuine desire for him to stop that, but that's not Putin. And that's why I said it's about a cost of a price for Putin. and Putin has already figured out. And you know, we've, we've all observed this and many people here as well, that, you know, Russians will not organize against that kind of, you know, casualty rate. And there's a whole host of reasons for that. I mean, they're not all cultural, but they may, they're all deeply, you know, and, in Russian, Soviet history members, Stalin said one person being killed is a tragedy, you know, that becomes statistics. I mean, it's just kind of, people can't envisage all, it's also not everybody's not seeing all of these people dying at once. Right early on in the war, there was a backlash because it was a, you know, massive casualty rates in Peskov and also in Kustimar, and you know, by various divisions who first moved into Ukraine and you, you know, wrote about, you know, all of this. And there was a backlash to some degree there, in fact process in Buryatia and other places where there's been a kind of a concentration of soldiers that have died at the front, but mostly it's been spread around the country. And also people have got incentives, you know, to kind of sign up for money. I mean, you can, you know, talk more about this as well, Lucian. So Putin's called the calculated, you can do all kinds of stealth mobilization that are payments. There's economic incentives for people to sign up. And it's not an existential issue for Russia yet because he thinks that it will be over with, you know, before this. He's not going to fight to the last Russian. Plus there are all sort of others who, you know, we now finding Chinese and hapless, you know, no doubt Chinese and others who are there. So for Putin is a cold calculation that based on a whole host of factors, that he can withstand this in ways that absolutely would not be possible in other settings.
L.K.
Yeah, I would only add to that, for example, when you look at the Soviet Union's war in Afghanistan, you can also compare statistics there. And it seems like, you know, Ukraine has been much more costly even than 10 years of war in Afghanistan. I think one reason why Afghanistan, why there was, you know, at least, you know, in the popular mind there was, there was, you know, people were upset about it because it was, it was a draft. I mean, it, it affected, you know, everybody in the Soviet Union, and I think the difference, one thing that's very hard, because I think you, you're expressing something that's also sort of from the western mindset, how can the Russians take these incredible losses without, you know, becoming outraged or going out in the street? And I think one thing to keep in mind is that Russian society is extremely atomized. Yeah that people are really very, they, there's no sense of being necessarily part of something bigger. They're very concerned about their, about their own survival or their survival of their own loved ones. And then, you know, picking up on what Fiona said, the way that this war has been prosecuted, I mean, once the professional, the ranks of the professional Russian army were, were decimated, you know, it was also very targeted mobilization going after very after vulnerable groups and marginalized groups where actually the opportunity to serve in the Russian army be was, was a great financial boon to entire regions and certainly to families. And so it, it, you know, it sort of defies from an American point of view sort of, you know, how could this actually happen? But I think in a Russian context, the way that he did it, I mean certainly Putin doesn't, personally doesn't care about these, these human losses, but I think it's also been the way that he's sort of been able compartmentalize the losses and that when you go to a place like Moscow, you know, you don't necessarily feel like there, there's a war going on at the country and you know, there, there are a lot of regions that are voiceless or all practically voiceless in Russia, where then you would find a lot more cost.
Y.A.
No, it's not exactly right Lucian, in Moscow, just, you know, GPS is no longer working and it's been going like that for several months. So Moscow's a huge city of about 13 million people with a big Moscow, it's over 80 million people. So, and GPS is not working. There are no GPS maps anymore because, you know, they're so concerned about drones. So they shut down GPS and GPS is a, is American. They tried to build their own, and of course they stole all the money and, you know, there is no nothing else. So that's point one and point two, you know, there is very little possibility to travel and to, and, you know, for, for the big cities, for people who got accustomed to be in to live in the world, not like we in the Soviet Union, we lived in the cell. My father, mother never were abroad, just never ever in their life. They just read about the life in outside the Soviet Union. So, so now about the resistance, you have to understand that those who were capable to resist are unfortunately run away. All of us, you know, I, you know, I, you know, and all my friends, all my friends are either abroad or they're in jails and these are all leaders of the Russian position. My biggest friend a killed, Yashen was in the labor camp, you know, was swamped, Misha Krieger sitting in the camp, Malakhovka was harassed, you know, got 25 years, was, you know, released as a result of each good enough. You know, I can tell you, you know, all leaders of the rational position, you know, they're either already killed or they're sitting in jails and those who are abroad, you know, what can you do abroad? You know, it's not my, you know, 1917, I don't expect Lenin, Trotsky, you know, to go to Moscow. So there was resources at the beginning and people were trying, you know, there were, they were, when the war started, you know, there were all kind of letters, you know, people from different associations of judges, scientists, journalists, blah, you name it. All of them were read writing letters around the war against the war and what Putin did great, you know, they, some were put in jail, others lost their jobs, especially professor, you know, or all professor of the universities who were against were always kicked out. Each and every one in research school, economically, high school of economics, where I taught, nobody left. I just don't understand who is teaching there because everybody, everyone fired, whether we're talking about mathematicians, economists, they liquidated totally, you know, political science department where I taught, you know, liquidated total sociology departments. Of course, why do you not need this? So and finally Russia is a very big country. It is, as you well aware, it's the biggest country on the face of the earth. So what Putin did, he doesn't recruit people from Moscow and San Peter. Where, you know, and we, you know, revolutions happen in the capitals. Yeah. So he recruits people in the most impoverished regions of the Russian Federation, you know, these are very, and when you look the names of the names of those who were killed, you don't see Russian names, you don't see Ukrainian names, you know, that's the all names with, or that's usually Ukrainians. So you see all names we, as you can identify Irish, I can identify, you know, this. So, and that was very smart because there they don't have access to information. Putin did exactly what Soviets did. He divided information space. There is no longer common information space. People in Pakistan don't know what's going on. You know, in the, in Kursk, Kurdoc people in Kursk don't know what's happening. You know, where the people anyway in Russia concerned that their houses were destroyed, you know, when Ukrainians occupied part of Kursk region. So, so it is much more complicated than just, you know, yes. And that all Russians are slaves or anything. Like no, it's not that easy. And trust me, you know, people from my circles, my friends, you know, you know, I, all of us want to be, get to get back home are dying. I never thought that I was going to be such nostalgic as I am, but, you know. Yeah you know, but, and it's the end of life, you know, I once wrote to peace that we are living dead because we have no future. We lost our own country, our homes. So, and once again, I agree. It is our fault we lost to Putin. We did, we did because we enjoyed this, you know, this bush were alive because, you know, it was, we got the possibility to travel to get education. You know, it's hard, you know, when you have something to lose, you know, Navalny was exceptional man. And that's why Putin killed him. Anyway, thank you so much. We have to end up here. It's 7:10 already. So thank you so much and thank you so much to the great panel and our whole team, thank you so much to all of you for coming and for your great questions. Thank you.