Comparing Pathways to Peace in Ukraine

This article was originally published by Harvard's Russia Matters project.

Introduction

Deep into the third year of a devastating war, early optimism that Ukraine could push Russian troops off its territory seems a distant memory, as does Russia’s early ambition to fully subjugate its obstreperous neighbor. Despite an influx of Western weapons and money, Ukraine has been largely forced into a defensive crouch, protecting as much territory as it can while grappling with shortages of manpower and munitions. On the other side, Russia has funneled ruble equivalents of billions of dollars into the war effort, but for months significant battlefield advances have remained elusive. Instead, Russia’s progress has been slow and grinding, epitomizing an attrition war in which neither side can achieve a decisive breakthrough, but both can still inflict heavy casualties on each other.¹

Despite the conflict’s heavy toll—or, perhaps, because of it—achieving peace in Ukraine will be a daunting endeavor. The deep-seated mistrust and conflicting interests between Russia and Ukraine make the path to a resolution fraught with obstacles. Russia’s strategic desire to render Ukraine weak and subordinate contrasts sharply with Ukraine’s pursuit of sovereignty. Russia’s visceral fears over NATO’s eastward expansion directly clash with Ukraine’s aspiration to join the alliance. Ukraine’s determination to regain the land it lost since 2022 collides with Putin’s insistence that it face the “realities on the ground.”² Conflicting narratives about national identity and historical grievances further complicate the situation. Is compromise at all feasible amidst such entrenched positions? Are there ways to address each country’s security concerns that could potentially bring an end to hostilities? Must the sides be resigned to fighting to the bitter end, or is there still hope for diplomatic resolution?

To begin to address these questions, this paper undertakes a comprehensive review of 25 proposals for returning peace to Ukraine.³ To the best of my knowledge, this study is the first to systematically categorize and compare the many constructive—though often conflicting—plans put out by governments, think tanks and independent scholars. The paper’s first aim is to bring into view the broad range of options for addressing the key issues that are likely to feature in any negotiations. Its second, more ambitious and speculative goal, is to evaluate the proposals’ potential to serve as helpful blueprints for ending the war.

As the analysis illustrates, the options currently on the table involve trade-offs between justice and pragmatism, as well as the urgency of halting immediate violence against the goal of achieving a lasting resolution. Proposals that could offer a quicker end to the conflict often come at the cost of significant concessions from Ukraine. Conversely, proposals that could bring about a more morally satisfying resolution require additional resources, which Ukraine lacks and the West may be unwilling to provide. Moreover, it is unclear who will have the final say. While policymakers speak of Ukraine’s right to decide, this regional conflict with global implications involves multiple parties. As a result, plans that could potentially end the fighting may not be endorsed by all involved stakeholders.⁴

At the end of the day, an incremental approach may offer the most workable path forward. As several proposals suggest, such a strategy would first address the more manageable aspects of the conflict, such as establishing a ceasefire, facilitating the exchange of prisoners and deciding on a neutral monitor to enforce the truce. More complex and contentious matters, such as Ukraine’s neutrality, the future of its borders and reparations, would then be deferred for later negotiations.⁵

What’s Past is Prologue

Assessing the feasibility of plans to end the war is a complicated matter, obviously. To do so, I first turn to the peace talks held by Russia and Ukraine in spring 2022 to establish the specific criteria against which proposals can be evaluated. The five rounds of talks held in Belarus and Turkey provide valuable insights into Ukraine’s and Russia’s basic interests and minimum security requirements, and offer a lens into the priorities and non-negotiables for each party. This, in turn, serves to outline the issues that would need to be tackled by any future negotiations.

This approach has several advantages. Despite the ultimate failure of the peace talks, recent reports indicate that negotiators came close to reaching an agreement or, at the very least, found some common ground.⁶ By examining the terms considered potentially acceptable in spring 2022, we can better assess the feasibility of other proposals and ensure they are based on realistic assumptions. Analyzing why the early negotiations failed can also help identify similar pitfalls in existing proposals. Furthermore, using the peace talks as a benchmark provides a consistent standard for judging the novelty or ingenuity of new proposals. For instance, we can sensibly ask whether a plan offers more robust or innovative security arrangements compared to the early negotiation efforts.

Of course, 2024 is not 2022. It is possible that so much has transpired in the intervening years, that neither country would accept the terms to which it appeared ready to acquiesce back then. In this case, using the Istanbul communique still offers analytical insight. At the very least, it allows us to systematically investigate the reasons why proposals that were once deemed acceptable might no longer hold the same appeal.

Getting to Yes (Almost?)

In the spring of 2022, Russia and Ukraine intermittently engaged in talks to address the conflict between them. Judging from recent reports, when the two sides met in Turkey in March, Ukrainian negotiators presented their Russian counterparts with a proposal for ending the war.⁷ The proposal, often referred to as the Istanbul Communique, touched upon two issues of existential importance to both Kyiv and Moscow: Ukraine’s relationship to NATO and its ability to ensure its sovereignty and security in the future. In what seems like an extraordinary concession in hindsight, Ukraine pledged to disavow its NATO aspirations and declare itself a “permanently neutral,” “non-aligned” and “nuclear-free” state. In return, Ukraine sought robust security guarantees from a group of powerful states who would pledge to “immediately tak[e] such individual or joint action as may be necessary … to restore and subsequently maintain the security of Ukraine” were it ever to come under attack again. The communique suggested “Great Britain, China, Russia, the United States, France, Turkey, Germany, Canada, Italy, Poland [and] Israel,” as “possible guarantor states.” The proposal also asks the “guarantor states [to] confirm their intention to promote Ukraine’s membership in the European Union.”⁸

Acknowledging that certain questions were too thorny to approach immediately, the communique proposed that Russia and Ukraine would hold bilateral negotiations “to resolve issues related to Crimea and Sevastopol” over the next “10 (options 15) years.” It also indicated that more concrete plans for “a ceasefire, withdrawal of troops and other paramilitary forces, opening and ensuring the safe functioning of humanitarians corridors” and similar topics would be the subject of continuing consultations that would also involve other guarantor states.   

Russia’s willingness to accept the Ukrainian proposal as a basis for further negotiations suggest that it was willing to temper some of its more hardline conditions that it had issued at the start of the invasion. At the time, Russia had demanded that Ukraine not only lay down its arms and renounce any intention to join NATO, but also to “demilitarize,” recognize Crimea as Russian and the so-called people’s republics of Donetsk and Luhansk as independent, grant the Russian language offi­cial status and more broadly and nebulously, “de-Nazify.”

Negotiations on a peace treaty continued well into the first half of April. According to several participants and recent media reporting, several drafts passed back and forth.⁹ An analysis of an April 15, 2022, draft published by The New York Times suggests that in the intervening time several other matters had been put on the table. In addition to the big issues of Ukrainian neutrality, international security guarantees, control over disputed territory and EU membership for Ukraine, the draft also contained articles concerning the future size and capabilities of the Ukrainian military (in Article 1), the economic sanctions on Russia (Article 6), the status of the Russian language in Ukraine (Article 12) and several Ukrainian laws that, in Russia’s view, concern “Nazification and glorification of Nazism” (Article 13). The draft also included somewhat more specific plans for how the ceasefire could begin (Annex 5).

Lessons From the Rearview Mirror

The 2022 negotiations between Russia and Ukraine offer valuable insights for thinking about the potential promise of proposals for ending the conflict.¹⁰ First, they help enumerate the issues that would need to be addressed in any plan. They also suggest where there may be room for the two sides to compromise, as well as the pitfalls that could sink any deal.

Clearly, the foremost issue concerns Ukraine’s security and its relationship with NATO. Both the Istanbul Communique and subsequent draft treaties demonstrate that were Ukraine to accept a future without NATO, it would require robust security guarantees that are far more ironclad than the assurances it had received in the past. This, in turn, may well require a more nuanced and novel approach to international military alliances. The question of who could serve as the Guarantor States looms large. Notably, the early negotiations over the future security architecture floundered because of Russia’s insistence on requiring unanimous agreement from all guarantor countries, including itself. Simultaneously, as a neutral state, Ukraine would need a military that’s both defensive and armed to the teeth. Finding the right balance will not be easy. In 2022, Ukraine was open to considering some restrictions on troop numbers and weaponry, but it could not live with the crippling military limits that Russia proposed.

Unsurprisingly, disputes over Crimea and other regions currently under Russia’s full or partial occupation are major sticking points. The talks had deliberately skirted these issues, leaving them to be negotiated at a higher level, presumably during a proposed summit between Presidents Vladimir Putin and Volodymyr Zelenskyy. Here, too, creative solutions may be needed, with plans for phased agreements or models that balance de facto control with de jure recognition as possible examples.

Russia’s inclusion of language concerning sanctions relief into the draft treaty suggests that this point will also need to be addressed. As would Ukraine’s desire to join the European Union. Finally, the logistics of implementing a ceasefire, including mechanisms for monitoring and enforcing a truce, may need more prominent consideration that they received in the early negotiations. As Samuel Charap of RAND and Sergey Radchenko of John Hopkins note in their astute analysis of the March 2022 peace talks, “although the parties’ attempt to resolve long-standing disputes over the security architecture offered the prospect of a lasting resolution to the war and enduring regional stability, they aimed too high, too soon. They tried to deliver an overarching settlement even as a basic cease-fire proved out of reach.”¹¹

In what follows, I examine the array of proposals for concluding the conflict. These include official government positions, analyses from think tanks and individual perspectives articulated in prominent media outlets. To better analyze the various proposals, I start with a typology that categorizes them on two principal dimensions: advocacy for unconditional victory and calls for negotiated settlements. The first perspective is driven by the conviction that a decisive Ukrainian victory is not only possible but necessary to restore Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity fully. The second approach is based on the understanding that a negotiated settlement, though it will require some painful compromises, is the more pragmatic or expeditious path to ending the conflict. By grouping proposals into distinct categories, we can more easily identify common themes and divergences. Without such a framework, the sheer diversity of perspectives and recommendations can be overwhelming, making it challenging to discern clear patterns or trends.

No Substitute for Victory

Many have passionately argued that “no peace will come but through strength” and that only Kyiv’s decisive victory can bring lasting peace to the region. These perspectives suggest that meaningful peace talks can take place only after Russia’s (partial or full) defeat, and reject concessions or compromises perceived as undermining Ukraine’s security and sovereignty.  Zelenskyy’s 10-point peace plan, first announced in November 2022 at the G-20 meeting in Bali, epitomizes the more maximalist approach.¹² The plan demands the “unconditional and non-negotiable” restoration of Ukraine’s territorial integrity, calls for the complete withdrawal of Russian troops and, implicitly, the return to Ukraine of the Crimean peninsula, which Russia annexed in 2014. Ensuring justice is another key component, with the proposal explicitly calling for a special tribunal to prosecute Russian war crimes and for Russian war reparations to Ukraine. The plan also emphasizes Ukraine’s determination to “eventually join NATO” while calling for a new security architecture in the Euro-Atlantic space that would safeguard the country in the meantime. The plan envisions Ukraine signing a series of bilateral and multilateral agreements that commit powerful international guarantors to Ukraine’s self-defense. The security guarantees and commitments are further developed in the related Kyiv Security Compact.¹³

Beyond security and territorial integrity, the plan addresses several other critical issues, including nuclear safety, energy and food security and the release of all prisoners and deportees. Its final point makes clear that the war must end with a formal treaty. Ukraine’s “Peace Formula Philosophy,” published in August 2023, envisions a “peace conference to be held with participation of the widest possible range of states.”¹⁴

Numerous other proposals either endorse Zelenskyy’s plan or draw upon it when making their own recommendations. In a detailed study undertaken at the request of the European Parliament’s Committee on Foreign Affairs, Andriy Tyushka and Tracey German conclude that “it is imperative to avoid the pursuit of peace at any cost: Ukraine’s territorial integrity and sovereignty are non-negotiable and must be central to any proposal for war termination and peacebuilding. The core principles of the rules-based liberal international order, including justice, must not be compromised.”¹⁵ While the study bills itself as an impartial assessment of Ukraine’s 10-point proposal relative to three other government-endorsed schemes—namely, China’s 12-point plan, the Indonesian Defense Minister’s proposal and the African Peace Initiative—it often reads more like a plan in its own right. Having reached the conclusion that “all three of the alternative peace proposals examined… [are] self-serving, and were developed with the principal aim of assisting the state proposing the plan to achieve their own objectives,”¹⁶ the study offers a strong endorsement of all key elements of Ukraine’s victory-based peace formula. In its recommendations, it calls for the EU “to withstand the temptation to pressure Ukraine (and Russia) towards quick peace on any condition other than Ukraine’s decisive (or at least de facto) victory, and Russia’s decisive (or at least admitted) defeat.”¹⁷ Instead, Europe should prepare for a long war and commit all resources necessary to help Ukraine succeed.

In a similar vein, in the Chatham House 2023 report, “How to end Russia’s war on Ukraine: Safeguarding Europe’s future, and the dangers of a false peace,” the authors argue passionately against any compromise.¹⁸ Ukraine should not be pressured into negotiations but allowed to fight to a conclusion. Only a clear and full Ukrainian victory that results in the eviction of Russian forces from all occupied territories can bring a durable peace. To help Ukraine prove victorious, NATO and the West must ensure the massive influx of money and weaponry that Kyiv needs in the short-term and be prepared to support the country for “as long as it takes,” in U.S. President Joe Biden’s words. Simultaneously, the noose of economic sanctions must constantly be tightened on Russia to further sap its military capabilities. A ceasefire should not even be contemplated, as any “temporary solution that preserves, or partially preserves, the battlefield status quo will buy time for Russian forces to regroup … and prepare for the next onslaught, while leaving Ukraine enfeebled and less than fully sovereign.”¹⁹

At the conclusion of the war, the report envisions Ukraine’s return to its pre-2014 borders, the country’s reconstruction funded in part by frozen Russian assets, reparations for war damages and justice for war crimes. Crucially, the study rejects Ukraine adopting neutral status, suggesting that “neutrality is … doomed for failure.”²⁰ Instead, Ukraine’s future—if it is to be secure—lies with NATO and the European Union. While supporting multilateral security guarantees for Ukraine, the authors emphasize that these can only be an interim solution. “Ultimately, there remains no substitute for NATO membership, which should be the aim for Ukraine once the war is over.”²¹

Writing in The National Interest, Kaush Arha and George Scutaru likewise call for steadfast Western support to keep Ukraine in the fight rather than enter into “premature” peace negotiations.²² The authors emphasize that anything less than “clear commitment to victory will ensure a frozen conflict,” which would only serve Russia and help it to solidify its gains. Emphasizing Ukraine’s strategic importance to the West and the stability of the Black Sea region, the authors propose that any agreement to end the war must include Ukraine’s swift accession to the European Union and NATO. Moreover, before contemplating an armistice, “all efforts should be made to free Crimea from Russian control.” Any armistice that does not meet these conditions, the authors warn, “would be immoral, imprudent, impractical and short-lived.”²³

Other “peace through strength” proposals likewise suggest that the West must double down on its commitments to Ukraine, but do not seek to fully achieve the above maximalist goals. Rather, they propose that the West’s show of strength is the only means to bring Putin to the negotiating table and ensure favorable terms for Ukraine. In essence, the strategy is to make Putin come to believe that continuing the war is more costly than suing for peace.

In “How to Convince Putin He Will Lose,” Dan Altman suggests that the “best way to bring about a cease-fire as quickly as possible” is for Ukraine’s allies to invest massively in weapons manufacturing to convince Putin that “the West will outproduce Russia in the years to come.”²⁴ According to Altman’s June 2024 article, arming Ukraine to win today’s battles is simply not enough. Rather, the “key to ending the war is changing Moscow’s expectations about how its war effort will fare three, five and even eight years from now.” Crucially, the long-term commitment to arms production is Europe’s responsibility to bear, since American politics in this electoral season are much too volatile to offer much peace of mind.

Another ambitious proposal also suggests that Russia can be strongarmed into peace, though the key to doing so is immediate NATO membership, not just a steady, steadfast and sustainable stream of weapons. Writing in Politico, Tim Malinowski, a senior fellow at the McCain Institute and former member of Congress, called upon NATO to accept Ukraine into the alliance even before the war ends.²⁵ Membership, in turn, would simultaneously guarantee the security of whatever territory Ukraine controls at the point of accession and deter further Russian aggression. This approach, Malinowski implies, would both reward Ukraine for its valor and end the conflict more quickly than other available paths, though it would do so without a formal treaty. In essence, it would freeze the current territorial status quo, similar to how the U.S. handled a divided Germany and a divided Korea. Ukraine would not need to permanently concede the loss of territory but could pursue nonmilitary means to regain its 1991 borders. Russia, for its part, would face continued repercussions, as sanctions would remain in place, and its frozen assets would be used to pay for Ukraine’s reconstruction.²⁶

An Offer Russia Can’t Refuse?

The above “peace through strength” proposals are united in their belief that Russia understands only force, and that the surest way forward lies in Ukraine’s military prowess and resilience. Implicitly or explicitly, plans in this camp assume that Russia can be made to accept terms that it had categorically rejected earlier. At this point in time, however, this optimistic scenario seems less plausible than earlier in the war. In light of the positions articulated by Russia during the spring 2022 talks and since, it is difficult to imagine Moscow not rejecting outright any plan that makes no compromise on the issues of NATO and territory. The proposals’ insistence that NATO membership for Ukraine is non-negotiable is likely their Achilles’ heel. Fundamentally, there is little incentive for Moscow to end hostilities, when continuing the war is its best means to prevent Ukraine’s entry into an alliance Russia has historically seen as an existential threat. Moreover, the thorny question of Eastern and Southeastern Ukraine became even thornier when Russia announced it was officially annexing the regions of Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson and Zaporizhzhia in September 2022, even though it had failed to establish full control over these territories.

Moreover, these plans prioritize long-term issues of achieving a just resolution, often neglecting the logically prior challenge of bringing Russia to the negotiating table without a significant military breakthrough from Ukraine of the kind we were seeing in Russia’s Kursk region at the time this paper was finalized at the end of summer 2024. As of late August 2024, military and strategy experts continued to have differing opinions on the net impact of Ukraine’s incursion into that region. Even though the incursion has been described as “a significant military breakthrough” and “brilliant countermove” in the Western press, the impact on the Kremlin’s bargaining position may nevertheless prove negligible at best, especially as Russian forces continued to advance toward the strategic hub of Pokrovsk in Donbas as of Aug. 29, 2024.²⁷ Potential bargaining tools like sanctions relief and Russia's frozen assets are typically not considered viable options. Instead, plans advocate for more coercive measures and increased pressure to compel Russia to engage in negotiations.

If NATO were to immediately admit Ukraine, as Malinowsky proposed, the Kremlin would likely need to think twice about its aims in Ukraine. However, as the recent NATO summit in Washington, D.C. once again demonstrated, the alliance has no appetite to do so. And while investing heavily in weapons manufacturing may send a strong signal of resolve, Ukraine’s allies may find this strategy financially and politically unsustainable over the long term. Moreover, this approach may inadvertently backfire. Instead of hastening a ceasefire, it could make one less likely. If Russia expects to be in a weaker military position in 5–10 years, it might push harder for a decisive victory now.²⁸

Given these potential limitations, alternative plans that feature a few more carrots than sticks may be worth at least a glance. As Altman acknowledges, “absent catastrophic events on the battlefield, the war will end at the negotiating table.”²⁹

Peace Without Victory?

Moving away from the call for total Ukrainian victory, other plans highlight the necessity of mutual compromise. These proposals argue that a sustainable resolution can only be achieved through diplomatic efforts from all sides. Highlighting the urgency of the situation, these perspectives call for prompt diplomatic efforts to avoid further escalation and bloodshed. A handful of government-backed initiatives have called for Russia and Ukraine to reach a political settlement. While all hew closer to being diplomatic gestures than substantive proposals, they are united in their calls for Russia and Ukraine to resume direct talks as quickly as possible. “Dialogue and negotiation are the only viable solution to the Ukraine crisis,” reads point #4 of China’s 12-point plan first announced in February 2023.³⁰ Virtually the same language can be found in the joint proposal by China and Brazil, the framework suggested by the Indonesia’s Defense Minister, Lt. Gen. (Ret.) Prabowo Subianto and the African Peace Initiative.³¹ But while calling all parties to exercise mutual respect and self-restraint, they necessarily sidestep the most thorny roadblocks to peace.

Proposals made by scholars and policymakers, by contrast, take pains to put forward concrete steps to end active hostilities and offer a diversity of strategies. While united in their push for diplomatic efforts, they often diverge on four key issues. First, there are differences as to whether Ukraine needs to accept permanent and official neutrality. Second, there are different ideas about how to best handle the territory that Russia now controls, including Crimea. Third, there is some disagreement as to whether the conflict can be frozen or whether it needs a formal end, be it a signed armistice or a peace agreement. Finally, the proposals set out very different visions of the future security architecture that could bring long-term peace to Ukraine and the wider European region.

What Is Negotiable?

Those who propose a negotiated end to the war often acknowledge that to get Russia’s buy in, any deal would need to address its basic security concerns. However, what remains a point of contention is whether that requires Ukraine to accept neutrality—and even enshrine that in a formal commitment, as Russia has demanded—or whether NATO membership can be put on (indefinite) hold, with such a promise backed up by side assurances from prominent NATO members.

In “The Diplomatic Path to a Secure Ukraine,” George Beebe and Anatol Lieven of the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft recommend a dual track approach to ending the conflict: while continuing to provide Ukraine with as much defensive aid as it needs, the U.S. must also launch a genuine diplomatic effort to engage Russia. As the authors write, “aid should [serve] not as a means to secure victory but as a source of leverage in negotiations.”³² For the war to end, Ukraine and Russia must be willing to compromise. As importantly, the authors are adamant that both countries have strong incentives to do so. Arguably, the biggest sacrifice would be borne by Ukraine, which would need to accept neutrality as well as some limitations on the size and capabilities of its future military. In return for neutrality, Ukraine would be offered security guarantees by a configuration of international guarantors that would resemble what Ukraine itself proposed in 2022 (more on this below).³³

Russia, for its part, would need to renounce any further territorial ambitions and, in return for caps on Ukraine’s military, to agree to “verifiable limits on the number of Russian troops and missiles deployed in Kaliningrad, in Belarus, in Russian regions bordering Ukraine and in the occupied areas of the country.”³⁴ The West could then use sanctions as both a carrot and a stick –easing sanctions in parallel to Russia’s cooperation with any settlement agreement, and reimposing them in full if Russia were to violate its terms.

Writing less than a month after Russia launched its so-called "Special Military Operation" in Ukraine, Michael O’Hanlon of Brookings Institution also proposed that any deal to end the war would, realistically, require the Ukrainian government to commit to neutrality, and for Ukraine and NATO to “formalize that commitment.”³⁵ In return, “all parties would formally commit to uphold and promote the security of a neutral Ukraine.” To further cement and demonstrate the international community’s pledge to Ukraine, some technical U.N. agencies would be housed on its soil.

Having examined earlier experiences of neutrality, Roy Allison of Oxford University similarly suggests that “well-armed neutrality” should be in Ukraine’s future. Russia, however, should be made to agree that “any Ukrainian commitment to deny its territory to alliances applies both to Western and Russian-led alliance membership.”³⁶ To bolster a neutral Ukraine’s ability to defend itself, the country needs to be allowed a modern and well-equipped army, as well as the promise of EU membership, which would cement Ukraine’s place in Europe and “the Western political community.”³⁷

In “How to Save Ukraine,” Finland-based writer Trevor Corson likewise proposes that “independent neutrality” is the key to peace and Ukraine’s future security, stability and prosperity.³⁸ As Corson notes, “[u]nder this better model—independent neutrality—Finns for decades succeeded in building one of the most stable democracies in the West without joining NATO, earning respect as a peacekeeper and ranking every year as the happiest country on earth.” As was the case with Finland, this arrangement would enable Ukraine to join the EU.³⁹

For others, however, the key is reassuring Russia that Ukraine’s NATO membership is not imminent, even while leaving the door to membership slightly ajar. For example, Lt. Gen. (Ret.) Keith Kellog and Fred Fleitz at the Center for American Security argue that America should continue to arm Ukraine to preclude further Russian gains.⁴⁰ However, future military aid should be contingent on Ukraine’s willingness to engage in peace talks with Russia. To get Russia to the table, the United States and NATO would pledge to “put off NATO membership for an extended period of time.”⁴¹ The West would also offer Russia some partial relief from sanctions once it had agreed to a ceasefire, a demilitarized zone and formal peace talks. Full sanctions relief would come only “after it signs a peace agreement acceptable to Ukraine.” Such an agreement would need to include “a long-term security architecture for Ukraine’s defense that focuses on bilateral security defense” and would not recognize Russia’s claims to the territory it now controls.

Several scholars argue for a similarly equivocal approach to the territory now occupied by Russian forces. O’Hanlon suggests that, to end the war, Russia would need to withdraw its forces from Ukrainian territory, including the Donbas. Crimea, however, would remain in Russia’s hands, though its status could be subject to future diplomatic undertakings. By contrast, Beebe and Lieven imply that Ukraine would need to accept continued occupation of the territory presently under Moscow’s control. However, they likewise propose that the loss need not be permanent and would be up for negotiation between the two sides sometime down the road.

The notion that Ukraine’s sovereignty and independence are not negotiable even though some of its territory is, appears in other proposals. “Maintaining Ukraine’s existence as a sovereign and secure democracy is a priority, but achieving that goal does not require the country to recover full control of Crimea and the Donbas in the near term,” write Council on Foreign Relations President Emeritus Richard Haass and Senior Fellow Charles Kupchan in Foreign Affairs.⁴² While Ukraine would need to accept Russian occupation of Crimea and the Donbas until some future diplomatic breakthrough, it would not be forced to make formal territorial concessions.⁴³ Moreover, the West would also “continue to use sanctions and diplomatic leverage to restore Ukraine’s territorial integrity—but at the negotiating table, not on the battlefield.”

However, it is far from clear whether the Ukrainian electorate would accept a deal that included the country’s neutrality and/or significant territorial concessions. Recent polling suggests that such proposals may not find widespread support. According to a June 2024 poll by the Kyiv-based Razumkov Center, 82% of Ukrainian respondents rejected Putin’s demands that Ukraine cede parts of Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson and Zaporizhzhia, and recognize these territories as part of Russia. Additionally, almost 59% opposed Ukraine becoming a permanently neutral, non-nuclear state. Conversely, any deal that does not include territorial concession may not fly in Russia. A Russian Field May-June 2024 poll showed that while 49% of Russian respondents favored peace talks, around a third said a peace deal should involve Ukraine giving up some of its territory.⁴⁴

Written in Ink or Ice?

More generally, Haass and Kupchan offer a blueprint for both a ceasefire and subsequent peace talks, in which the authors envision a diplomatic path that first ensures the fighting stops and then paves the way for peace talks not just between Russia and Ukraine, but also Russia and NATO.⁴⁵ The process would begin with both countries withdrawing troops and weapons to create a demilitarized zone and agreeing to allow a neutral organization, such as the U.N. or the OSCE, to monitor and enforce the truce.

A successful cease-fire could then lead to peace talks on two parallel tracks: direct Ukraine-Russia negotiations facilitated by international mediators and a strategic dialogue between NATO allies and Russia on arms control and European security. To get Ukraine to the table, the West would offer it a formalized security pact, that could “resemble Israel’s defense relationship with the United States or the relationship that Finland and Sweden enjoyed with NATO.”⁴⁶ Membership in NATO, however, would likely remain an unfulfilled aspiration. Meanwhile, the EU would offer long-term economic support and propose a timetable for admission.

If peace negotiations fail, as the authors acknowledge they well could, the ceasefire could still hold. The frozen conflict that would ensue is not ideal, but far more preferable than an unrelenting, deadly and costly war that neither side can win.

Others, by contrast, caution against a ceasefire without a formal resolution, pointing to the danger that an unstable status quo can quickly lead to renewed fighting. As the late Anthony Cordesman of the Center for Strategic and International Studies noted in 2023, a “ceasefire might necessitate a demilitarized zone and peacekeeping forces but would still leave both sides heavily armed and poised for conflict; similar to the situation between North and South Korea.⁴⁷

Arguing that a formal peace is unlikely, while a frozen conflict is unwise, Carter Malkasian at the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School proposes something of a middle ground, which also has the virtue of having succeeded before. “An armistice featuring a signed document, international mediation, an agreed-on cease-fire line, supervisory mechanisms and enforcement measures,” Malkasian writes, “remains the least bad option.” Malkasian argues that the current conflict in Ukraine closely resembles the Korean War, which, officially at least, has never concluded. Despite not being able to settle the major issues that led to war, North and South Korea have both largely abided by the armistice they signed in 1953. The many months of diplomatic wrangling that preceded the signing of the agreement also has much to teach us. To enhance the prospects of an armistice, Washington and its allies must integrate diplomatic negotiations with ongoing military pressure and economic pressure on Russia. Drawing parallels to Truman’s approach during the Korean War, Malkasian suggests the West should first ratchet up military support for Ukraine in order to incentivize Russia to come to the negotiating table. Subsequently, Ukraine and its allies will need to fight and talk simultaneously. Negotiations themselves, however, need to involve some neutral or even Russia-friendly arbiters, like the U.N. or India, since Moscow may prove more pliant when dealing with such interlocutors. Finally, Ukraine’s cooperation may also need to be bought, or even gently coerced. If Kyiv proves intransigent, the West may need to condition future security and economic assistance on Ukraine’s willingness to make concessions.

Securing Ukraine’s Tomorrow

The question of how best to guarantee Ukraine’s security likewise finds different answers among scholars advocating for a negotiated settlement. The issue is crucial not just for ensuring Ukraine’s and even Europe’s peaceful future, but may help hasten the end of the conflict. As Ruppert and Pascal da Rocha at the U.S. Institute for Peace write, “[r]esearch shows that building institutions and strengthening defensive capabilities help end wars faster and prevents them from reigniting”⁴⁸ But while all agree that Ukraine will need strong assurances to guard against future threats, what counts as “strong” remains up for debate.

For some, Ukraine will not be secure until it is in NATO and any other security arrangement would only undermine that goal. Writing in the Financial Times, Ivan Krastev, Chairman of the Center for Liberal Strategies in Sofia, argues that NATO must admit Ukraine as soon as possible, just as it did a divided Germany during the Cold War. A negotiated settlement makes this need even greater, since, as Krastev argues, “Only a Ukraine that is part of NATO can survive the permanent or temporary loss of control over some of its territory.⁴⁹ This position, however, remains atypical. Instead, most proposals for a negotiated settlement suggest that Ukraine will need to permanently renounce its NATO aspirations or, at least, put them on temporary hold. Instead, several alternative security architectures have been put forward for consideration.  

First, there are those who continue to favor a role for the U.N. Security Council, even as its inability to either prevent or stop the war in Ukraine has certainly tarnished its reputation. Trevor Corson, for example, has called upon the United States to take a “heroic first step” and “lead the U.N. Security Council in collaborative guarantees for Ukrainian security as the basis for a ceasefire. This collaborative, more multilateral and more global approach to Ukraine’s security would address Russia’s stated concerns about NATO.”⁵⁰ Notably, the direct talks between Kyiv and Moscow in spring 2022 envisioned the possibility of “a new system of security guarantees for Ukraine” where the “guarantors will be permanent members of the U.N. Security Council.”⁵¹ Others scholars have concluded that despite its current challenges, the United Nations remains a key pillar in international security because there are “key qualities of the U.N. that no other international organization possesses” even if it needs reforming.⁵²

More frequent, however, are calls to look beyond existing templates and institutions and seek out more innovative solutions. Many proposals have backed a latticework framework of bilateral and multilateral agreements that Ukraine would sign with as many other governments as would be willing to come to its aid.⁵³ Building on the framework envisioned in Ukraine’s Kyiv Security Compact, such proposals envision a core group of powerful states that commit to a “multi-decade effort” to support Ukraine’s development of a “robust territorial defense posture,” as Eric Ciaramella of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace writes.⁵⁴ Commitments should include strong political and legal codification, a predictable, multiyear pipeline for military supplies to Ukraine, sizeable financial support for Ukraine's defense industry, as well as mechanisms for political consultations, information sharing and coordination between Ukraine and its allies. Finally, by some accounts, such security assurances must also be linked to Ukraine’s EU accession process and postwar reconstruction efforts. But while shoring up the resources and capabilities Ukraine needs for self-defense, these agreements notably do not obligate the guarantors to send their own troops to defend the country.

These ideas for a new security architecture took concrete shape in the Vilnius framework, agreed upon during the 2023 NATO summit. The bilateral agreements between Ukraine and an expected 30 or more countries are designed to reassure Ukraine in the near-term.⁵⁵ Going forward, however, some have proposed that such a framework could offer a viable alternative to NATO, even as other see it as a “bridge to eventual membership.”⁵⁶

Writing in The National Interest, Andrew Day, Strategic Coordinator at the Nonzero Foundation, proposes another way.⁵⁷ Day argues that EU membership would not only help Ukraine prosper economically, but also would answers its security needs. The EU’s common security policy obligates aid to a member state in case of “armed aggression on its territory.” Citing French President Emmanuel Macron’s calls to create a “Europe that commands respect and ensures its own security,” the author proposes that Europe now has the will and the capacity to defend Ukraine. As Europe prepares for another possible “America First” U.S. administration, it could well invest more in its military self-sufficiency and step up its defense capacities. To make EU integration more acceptable to Russia, European leaders could promise to block Ukraine’s NATO accession and assure that only European—not American—military cooperation with Ukraine will follow the war.

Another novel possibility has been suggested by the Brookings Institution’s Lise Howard and Michael O’Hanlon, who propose “a new security organization that would include both European and ideally also Asian states.”⁵⁸ While the exact composition is an open question, the authors suggest the founding members could be the U.S., several large European powers and states that border either Russia or Ukraine. The Atlantic-Asian Security Community (AASC) would have two main objectives. Its immediate and medium-term goal would be to provide a deterrent to further Russian conquest in Ukraine. It could do so by deploying uniformed training and monitoring missions throughout Ukraine, with the understanding that its member states would defend their military personnel if they found themselves under attack. Longer-term, however, it could develop into a security architecture that is separate from NATO, and, as such, capable of someday incorporating even Russia. In fact, the prospect of participation in the new security architecture could serve to moderate Russia’s behavior. “As soon as a Russian leadership renounces imperial claims on its neighbors, in the judgment of AASC members, Russia would become eligible to join the AASC,” the authors write.

The Half Empty Glass?

The “negotiated peace” proposals are united by a common thread—an attempt to find a middle ground in the face of uncertainty. However, in light of the positions taken by Russia and Ukraine in the Istanbul Communique and subsequent draft treaties, as well as military developments since then, some proposals may hold more promise than others. The settlement proposals that envision neutrality for Ukraine are likely to get Russia to come to the negotiating table and, perhaps, offer compromises in turn. Proposals that simply shelve NATO membership or kick the can down the road do not seem as promising. Moreover, these kinds of equivocal promises-non-promises are arguably one of the reasons for the built-up tensions between Russia, Ukraine and the West in the first place. However, if NATO membership is off the table, EU membership should not be. During the 2022 talks, Russia indicated that it would accept Ukraine’s membership in the EU. This, in turn, could open up more possibilities for a future security architecture without NATO, with either the EU or a more novel framework like the proposed AASC, serving to ensure the long-term stability of the region.

The issue of territory is another significant hurdle. Putin’s demand that Ukraine give up the regions that Russia now partly controls will not be acceptable to Ukraine, particularly if Ukraine has already negotiated away NATO membership.⁵⁹ At the same time, Russia is unlikely to disgorge this land in the short term. Too much political capital has gone into claiming them as Russian. As many of the proposals suggest, the sides will likely need to find a middle ground. As during the 2022 talks, this issue might need to be settled with a compromise to no one’s liking. In this respect, proposals that temporarily accept, though do not legally recognize, Russian occupation have some merit. After all, much can change in international politics in a decade. Another potential solution that has been pointed out involves an international organization acting as a neutral arbiter or a temporary guardian. For example, “areas of Ukraine currently occupied by Russia could be administered by a UNSC-mandated administration (a kind of protectorate) for about 10 years.”⁶⁰ After that, the region’s future could be decided in an internationally administered referendum.

Several issues still need a lot of thought, particularly the logistics of a lasting ceasefire, which involve numerous complex steps and decisions. Given the daunting nature of these tasks, it is not surprising that no plan provides a fully satisfying picture of how these logistics would unfold in practice.⁶¹ However, plans that incorporate a role for neutral actors may have a greater chance of success. There is also the question of Ukraine’s reconstruction. Here, there is a strong case to be made that the most prudent course of action would be to have Russia contribute but not to call the contributions “reparations,” as O’Hanlon suggested.⁶² The quid pro quo could be Russian money in return for its improved diplomatic standing. Despite its lofty and oft antagonistic rhetoric, the Kremlin still values relations with the West, and as Zalmay Khalilzad points out, has “signaled that in exchange for an agreed-upon road map for better mutual relations [with the United States], [it] would be more flexible on terms for a settlement in Ukraine.”⁶³

Conclusion

As this overview suggests, there is no clear-cut answer to ending the war in Ukraine in a way that is just, expeditious and long-term. Whether considering total victory or negotiated settlements, each approach offers different trade-offs and possibilities. The “peace through strength” scenarios, while appealing in their clarity, may be impractical given the dynamics on the ground. On the other hand, proposals for negotiated settlements present creative solutions but often require compromises that will not satisfy all parties involved. But perhaps by focusing on the possibilities rather than just the limitations, the international community may yet discover a path to meaningful progress.

Footnotes

1. For a recent estimate of Russian armed forces’ land gains in Ukraine, see this issue of the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs’ Russia-Ukraine War Report Card at https://www.russiamatters.org/news/russia-ukraine-war-report-card/russia-ukraine-war-report-card-july-16-2024
2. For more on why rational leaders may fail to find a mutually preferrable negotiated settlement, see Fearon, J.D., 1995. Rationalist explanations for war. International organization, 49(3), pp.379-414. For more on the relationship between territory and war, see Toft, M.D., 2014. Territory and war. Journal of Peace Research, 51(2), pp.185-198.
3. The proposals analyzed here were selected based on their publication between March 2022 and July 2024. To be included, a proposal needed to present a unique approach or offer a new perspective, rather than merely endorse existing plans. Only English-language sources were surveyed, aside from official government documents. Citations for analyzed peace proposals are included individually, but RussiaMatters.org proved an invaluable resource in aggregating many of the plans I analyze here, as well as third-party analyses of these proposals. While every effort was made to include a comprehensive range of proposals, some may have been inadvertently omitted. The author acknowledges this limitation and apologizes for any such oversight.
4. On the partial misalignment between U.S. and Ukrainian interests, see, for example, Charap, S. and Priebe, M. (2024) Avoiding a Long War U.S. Policy and the Trajectory of the Russia-Ukraine Conflict. Washington, DC: Rand. https://www.rand.org/pubs/perspectives/PEA2510-1.html
5. For lessons that might be drawn from the Oslo Peace Process, see, for example, Miller, A.D. “Why the Oslo Peace Process Failed,” Foreign Policy, 15 December 2023. https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/09/13/oslo-accords-1993-anniversary-israel-palestine-peace-process-lessons/
6. Troianovski, A., Entous, A. and Schwirtz, M. “Ukraine-Russia peace is as elusive as ever. But in 2022 they were talking.,” The New York Times, 15 June 2024. https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2024/06/15/world/europe/ukraine-russia-ceasefire-deal.html
7. Sutherland, P. and Chakrabarti, M. “The story behind 2022’s secret Ukraine-Russia peace negotiations | On Point,” WBUR.org, 6 May 2024. https://www.wbur.org/onpoint/2024/05/06/2022-secret-ukraine-russia-peace-negotiations.
8. The original text of the Istanbul Communique (English translation) can be found here: https://static01.nyt.com/newsgraphics/documenttools/ba6c7377883d7829/f5aff231-full.pdf
9. Troianovski, A. and Schwirtz, M. “The sticking points that kept Russia and Ukraine apart,” The New York Times, 15 June 2024. https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2024/06/15/world/europe/ukraine-russia-peace-negotiations.html#
10. For an insightful analysis of the initial peace talks, see Charap S., and Radchenko, S. “The talks that could have ended the war in Ukraine: a hidden history of diplomacy that came up short—but holds lessons for future negotiations,” Foreign Affairs, 26 April 2024. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/ukraine/talks-could-have-ended-war-ukraine
11. Ibid.  
12. The official text (English translation) can be found at: https://war.ukraine.ua/faq/zelenskyys-10-point-peace-plan/
13. Rasmussen, A. F., and Yermak, A. (2022, September 13). “The Kyiv Security Compact—International Security Guarantees for Ukraine: Recommendations’. The Office of the President of Ukraine. https://www.president.gov.ua/storage/j-files-storage/01/15/89/41fd0ec2d72259a561313370cee1be6e_1663050954.pdf
14. President of Ukraine. (2023, July 21). Ukraine’s Peace Formula Philosophy. Office of the President of Ukraine. https://www.president.gov.ua/storage/j-files-storage/01/19/53/32af8d644e6cae41791548fc82ae2d8e_1691483767.pdf
15. German, T. and Tyushka, A. (2024). Ukraine’s 10-point peace plan and the Kyiv Security Compact—An assessment: In-Depth Analysis. European Parliament. https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2024/754444/EXPO_STU(2024)754444_EN.pdf
16. Ibid. p. 6.
17. Ibid. p. 41.
18. Ash, T. et al. (2023), How to end Russia’s war on Ukraine: Safeguarding Europe’s future, and the dangers of a false peace, Report, London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, https://doi.org/10.55317/9781784135782.
19. Ibid., p. 3
20. Ibid. p. 21
21. Ibid. p. 21.
22. Arha, K. and Scutaru, G.“The high cost of frozen conflict in Ukraine,” The National Interest, 7 June 2024. https://nationalinterest.org/feature/high-cost-frozen-conflict-ukraine-211338
23. Ibid.
24. Altman, D. “How to convince Putin he will lose: The West must show that it can outlast Russia in Ukraine,” Foreign Affairs, 18 June 2024. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/ukraine/how-convince-putin-he-will-lose?utm_source=google&utm_medium=cpc&utm_campaign=dsa_tfd&gad_source=1&gbraid=0AAAAAD7NbWllikCbCK11LQ7q3zyUNZ1GD&gclid=Cj0KCQjwhb60BhClARIsABGGtw-mbR1ELn0rtuwxh-Wrsn5UYSG4FXEqOIcBqyP7OvfmtftUNDWEOc0aAoShEALw_wcB.
25. Malinowski, T. (2023) “Here Are 3 Ways to End the War in Ukraine. One Might Actually Work.” Politico, 18 August. https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2023/08/18/how-to-end-ukraine-war-00111752
26. While Malinowski called for NATO to offer Ukraine membership at the July 2024 summit in Washington D.C., his ideas for ending the war could, theoretically, still be implemented at a later date.
27. At the time of writing, it remained to be seen whether Ukraine’s Aug. 6 incursion into Russian territory will alter the peace calculus for Russia. Unexpected events like this, however, should serve as a powerful reminder that war is unpredictable and that states’ bargaining positions can be upended by sudden shifts in momentum.
28. I am indebted to RM Editor Ivan Arreguín-Toft for this insight.
29. Altman, “How to Convince Putin He Will Lose.”
30. China’s position on the political settlement of the Ukraine crisis (no date). https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/202302/t20230224_11030713.html.
31. See Common understandings between China and Brazil on political settlement of the Ukraine crisis (2023). https://www.mfa.gov.cn/eng/zxxx_662805/202405/t20240523_11310698.html; Kapoor, K. “Indonesia proposes demilitarized zone, UN referendum for Ukraine peace plan. 3 June 2023. Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/world/indonesia-proposes-demilitarised-zone-un-referendum-ukraine-peace-plan-2023-06-03/; Singh, P., and Reva, D. (2023). “African peace mission: one step forward, one step back?”, Institute for Security Studies. https://issafrica.org/amp/iss-today/african-peace-mission-one-step-forward-one-step-back
32. Beebe, G. and Lieven, A. (2024) The diplomatic path to a secure Ukraine. Washington, DC: Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft. https://quincyinst.org/research/the-diplomatic-path-to-a-secure-ukraine/.
33. It would include the permanent members of the U.N. Security Council, as well as Germany, Italy, Poland and Turkey.
34. Beebe, G. and Lieven, A. (2024) Coming to Terms: Adapted from “The Diplomatic Path to a Secure Ukraine”. https://harpers.org/archive/2024/05/coming-to-terms-the-diplomatic-path-to-a-secure-ukraine-george-beebe-anatol-lieven/
35. O’Hanlon, M. “A realistic plan for peace for Ukraine and Russia,” TIME, 23 March 2022. https://time.com/6159799/ukraine-russia-peace-plan/.
36. Allison, R., (2022) “Russia, Ukraine and state survival through neutrality.” International affairs, 98(6), pp.1849-1872.
37. Ibid.
38. Corson, T. “Neutrality for Ukraine will unlock peace, if US will allow it,” BostonGlobe.com, 27 June 2024. https://www.bostonglobe.com/2024/06/26/opinion/ukraine-neutrality-nato-peace/.
39. For more on the relevance of the Finnish example, as well as other historical cases, see Davidson, K., Piliero, P., Graber, P. and Henderson, J. (2024) From Stalemate to Settlement Lessons from History for Ukraine’s Peace. Cambridge, MA: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs https://www.belfercenter.org/sites/default/files/files/publication/DiscPaper_UkraineHistory_6.13.pdf
40. Kellogg, K. and Fleitz, F. (2024) America First, Russia, & Ukraine, Center for American Security. https://americafirstpolicy.com/assets/uploads/files/America_First%2C_Russia%2C___Ukraine_.pdf.
41. Ibid. p. 16.
42. Kupchan, R.H. and C. “The West needs a new strategy in Ukraine: a plan for getting from the battlefield to the negotiating table,” Foreign Affairs, 27 July 2023. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/ukraine/russia-richard-haass-west-battlefield-negotiations.
43. A similar point was made by Graham Allison, the Douglas Dillon professor of government at Harvard University. Noting the potential parallel between West Germany during the Cold War and Ukraine today, Allison writes, “[b]y building a vibrant free-market democracy within larger European institutions secured by a U.S.-led NATO, West Germany created conditions in which the recovery of the country’s Soviet-occupied eastern third was just a matter of time.” See Graham, Allison “Consider these 4 inconvenient questions as the Ukraine war moves forward,” The Washington Post, 23 February 2023. https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2023/02/22/ukraine-putin-nukes-zelensky/
44. For more on recent polling in Russia and Ukraine, see Saradzhyan, S. (2024) “Majority of Russians Favor Talks to End Ukraine War, But 1/3 Support Use of Nukes,” https://www.russiamatters.org/blog/majority-russians-favor-talks-end-ukraine-war-13-support-use-nukes
45. While the timeline envisioned by the authors’ plan has come and gone, their ideas remain actionable.
46. Ibid.
47. Cordesman, A. (2023) “How? (and Does?) the War in Ukraine End: The Need for a Grand Strategy.” Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies. https://www.csis.org/analysis/how-and-does-war-ukraine-end-need-grand-strategy
48. Ruppert, K. and Pascal da Rocha, J. (2024). “In Search of a Formula for Lasting Peace in Ukraine.” Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace. https://www.usip.org/publications/2024/02/search-formula-lasting-peace-ukraine
49. Krastev, I. “Is Ukraine’s future West German? Nato membership will be essential to any negotiated end to the war with Russia,” Financial Times, 16 February 2024. https://www.ft.com/content/e08732bf-039d-4b9d-97ac-0aecf6542bf2
50. Corson, “Neutrality for Ukraine will unlock peace, if US will allow it.”
51. President of Ukraine. 29 March 2022. https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/na-peregovorah-iz-rosiyeyu-ukrayinska-delegaciya-oficijno-pr-73933
52. Hathaway, O. and Patrick, S. (2024) “Can the UN Security Council Still Help Keep the Peace? Reassessing Its Role, Relevance, and Potential for Reform,” Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.  https://carnegieendowment.org/posts/2024/07/can-un-security-council-still-help-keep-the-peace?lang=en
53. Ciaramella, E. (2023) “Envisioning a Long-Term Security Arrangement for Ukraine,” Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2023/06/envisioning-a-long-term-security-arrangement-for-ukraine?lang=en. See also Kazdobina, J. (2024) “Making the Glass of Ukraine’s Bilateral Agreements Half Full,” Stockholm: Stockholm Center for Eastern European Studies. https://sceeus.se/en/publications/making-the-glass-of-ukraines-bilateral-security-agreements-half-full/
54. Ciaramella, “Envisioning a Long-Term Security Arrangement for Ukraine.”
55. As of June 13, 2024, Ukraine had signed agreements with all G-7 members, as well as with Denmark, the Netherlands, Finland, Latvia, Spain, Belgium, Portugal, Iceland, Sweden and Norway.
56. Melvin, N. (2024) “Biden Needs to Create a Convincing New European Security Architecture for Ukraine.”  London: The Royal United Services Institute (RUSI). https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/biden-needs-create-convincing-new-european-security-architecture-ukraine#
57. Day, A. “Can Emmanuel Macron end the Russia-Ukraine war?,” The National Interest, 27 May 2024. https://nationalinterest.org/feature/can-emmanuel-macron-end-russia-ukraine-war-211158.
58. Howard, L. and O’Hanlon, M. (2023) “Backstopping Ukraine’s long-term security: Toward an Atlantic-Asian security community.” Washington, DC: Brookings Institution. https://www.brookings.edu/articles/backstopping-ukraines-long-term-security-toward-an-atlantic-asian-security-community/.
59. According to the Institute for the Study of War, Russia was not in control of about 10,000 square miles of the Ukrainian territory Putin declared as Russia’s own and annexed in the fall of 2022, including parts of Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhzhia and Kherson regions as of August 2024.
60. Khalilzad, Z. (2024) “Ending the war in Ukraine: a potential roadmap for peace,” The National Interest, 24 July 2024. https://nationalinterest.org/feature/ending-war-ukraine-potential-roadmap-peace-211993?page=0%2C1.
61. For more on ceasefires, see Clayton, G., Nygård, H. M., Rustad, S. A., & Strand, H. (2023). “Ceasefires in Civil Conflict: A Research Agenda.” Journal of Conflict Resolution, 67(7-8), 1279-1295. https://doi.org/10.1177/00220027221128300
62. O’Hanlon, “A realistic plan for peace for Ukraine and Russia.”
63. Khalilzad, “Ending the war in Ukraine: a potential roadmap for peace.”