Political scientists Adam N. Stulberg and Mikhail Troitskiy will argue that strategic ambiguity and misperceptions in Russia-West nuclear standoffs can serve as a stabilizing “safety valve” under certain conditions, rather than always fueling escalation. Misunderstandings are not uniformly perilous; their impact depends on whether each actor adopts a risk-acceptant (brinkmanship-driven) or opportunistic (cost-imposing) coercive posture. The authors introduce a new theoretical distinction in coercive strategy between risk-taking and opportunistic approaches, showing how each affects deterrence credibility and escalation dynamics in crisis interactions. They examine three high-stakes episodes to illustrate these dynamics: the late-2022 nuclear scare, a strategic drift in 2023-2024, and a brief but intense mutual escalation episode in Fall 2024. These cases demonstrate how mismatched coercive approaches sometimes defused tensions and averted nuclear confrontation despite intense brinkmanship. This research challenges conventional deterrence theory and offers policymakers nuanced insights into managing Russia-West standoffs by recognizing when ambiguity can help prevent conflict.
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