Perspectives: Mapping Georgian Dream’s Path to ‘Victory’

This opinion piece was originally published on Eurasianet. 

Georgian Dream’s victory on Oct. 26 was demonstrably corrupt. The evidence — some of it recorded — is clear. There were many opportunities for Georgian Dream to manipulate the results via carousel voting, ballot stuffing, intimidation, and control of precinct electoral commissions. There is nothing new here. The United National Movement under Mikheil Saakashvili and the Citizens’ Union under Eduard Shevardnadze also falsified election results.  

But Georgian Dream has advantages that its predecessors did not enjoy. For one, with billionaire Bidzina Ivanishvili at its head, Georgian Dream has the financial and organizational capacity to manipulate voting on a much larger scale. For the Oct. 26 elections, it also received a lot of help that neither Saakashvili nor Shevardnadze did: The Russian propaganda machine massaged Georgian social media and the Georgian Orthodox Church provided tacit backing.

The democratic record of Georgian elections is dismal. Only one regular parliamentary election in the last three decades — when the Georgian Dream (GD) coalition overturned Saakashvili’s UNM government in 2012 — led to a peaceful transfer of power from one party to another. Popular uprisings historically have proved a more effective way of changing governments in Georgia.

National elections serve different purposes in Georgia — they are used to endorse the dominant party’s authority and solidify linkages between business, the media, and local civil servants. Such networks are the scaffolding of GD’s victory. Georgia’s elections expose the weaknesses of the country’s democratic system. This is despite the glowing references the country garnered from Western leaders in the mid-1990s and 2000s under Shevardnadze and Saakashvili. Such superficial evaluations by Western governments are part of today’s problem; they ignored persistent illiberalism in Georgian politics, which grew under the cover of democracy.  

To say GD’s election victory in 2024 was due to electoral falsification is analytically insufficient. Georgia’s dubious national elections are rooted in the institutions of state and in a longstanding culture of charismatic leaders controlling economic and political clients in the system. Western governments are deluded if they think elections have stimulated democracy in Georgia. The opposite has been the case: They have endorsed non-democratic practices. The Oct. 26 election is a case in point.  

Georgian Dream garnered an inflated 54% of the vote in the recent parliamentary elections. They captured all the regions and rural areas, some with an eye-popping 90% of the ballots cast. They used a system that has benefited all of Georgia’s political incumbents since Shevardnadze but wielded the levers of power much more efficiently. Georgian Dream controls almost all rural municipalities and urban centers in the regions (Shevardnadze’s control was more precarious and Saakashvili’s less monopolistic).  

Despite legislation that for two decades has aimed at decentralizing power, local government has never been more centralized than it is today. Central ministries — currently run by GD — manage local government through their control over resources and powers of appointment. The opposition has no role to play in this political structure. Rural voters are dependent on local patrons — GD mayors, local officials (who supervise property acquisition or administer taxes), GD-controlled school directors, judges and local entrepreneurs. This dependence is amplified at election times by deals — promises of land, promotions, and bonuses for support. And if that does not work, then intimidation and rumor mill.  

The state is the dominant employer in the regions. Local government under GD pays salaries and provides financial support for the unemployed and unhealthy (not a bad thing in itself); the system of local government resembles a corporation with dependent and powerless employees in “debt” to the authorities or fearful of retribution. This gives Georgian Dream the leverage it needs to keep this system in place between election cycles with control of information and opinion-makers at the local level.  

But don’t assume voting for GD is just a rural phenomenon. The difference between rural and urban voting is not as wide as the election results might suggest. Tbilisi and Rustavi, where falsification was harder to hide, voted for the opposition, but in most Tbilisi districts GD received 40-45% of the vote.  For voters, there are pragmatic and ideological incentives to support GD. Although unemployment remains high (officially 16% but likely higher), GD has governed during a period of double-digit economic growth (much of it sustained by Russian businesses in Georgia since 2022), and has overseen an improved public health system, which has eased the stress of high-cost hospital treatments.  

Liberal parties have failed to take root in Georgia. Past elections are littered with failed liberal parties like the Republicans, Free Democrats, and European Georgia. Saakashvili’s United National Movement was ardently pro-American and pro-European but was illiberal in government. Georgian Dream’s anti-LGBTQ legislation, its defense of Georgian “sovereignty” against Western interference, its partnership with the Georgian Orthodox Church to defend the traditional family, and its promotion of “peace and civil order” — even when it restricts peaceful demonstrations — appeal to a large segment of the Georgian electorate. Conversely, GD recently increased the number of strategic buildings where demonstrations are forbidden.

Could GD have won a majority on Oct. 26 without electoral manipulation? Maybe. But GD was greedy to obtain a constitutional majority (113 of the 150 seats) and went all out to maximize votes by cheating on a grand scale.

Georgians wish to be European; most of its citizens want to join the EU and NATO. But Europe is changing, and GD is changing with it. There has always been an authoritarian Europe, but in the last decade right-wing populist parties have surged and acquired a reputation for defending citizens against external forces like immigration, drugs, and the European Central Bank. Georgian Dream has aligned with this European ideology of the right. Its potential allies include Italy, Finland, Slovakia, Hungary, Croatia, and Czechia. Georgian Dream can claim to be European without being liberal or even democratic.  

In a TV interview on the pro-government channel Imedi this October, Ivanishvili declared the October 2024 election would allow GD to refresh the political system. Mimicking the rhetoric of extreme right-wing politicians elsewhere in Europe, he declared the opposition to be “enemies of the people and enemies of the country” who “must be banned.”  

GD’s authoritarianism is underlined by a violent rhetoric of intolerance; it echoes sinister Soviet phraseology when it condemns “unpatriotic” citizens as “those without a homeland.” The government has control over a powerful and violent police force, it endorses targeted beatings and imprisonment of opposition figures. It has concentrated power in Ivanishvili, an unaccountable leader. The judiciary is subservient to the executive, and GD’s control over state institutions is complete — there is no independent civil service. In 2024, the government instituted the laws "On the Transparency of Foreign Influence" and "On Protection of Family Values and Minors," both of which restrict free speech and introduce censorship.

The opposition parties are weak, but they may be able to modify the current authoritarian trajectory if they remain in parliament (currently most opposition parties have declared a boycott). Russia will take advantage of Georgia’s separation from the EU and increase its leverage. The short-term future looks grim for Georgian democracy. But Georgia is not Azerbaijan. Every Georgian government has fallen to Georgian popular protest sooner or later. Will this tradition continue or is GD’s grip too tight? GD has the resources; powerful surveillance systems are in place. So, it is back to the people. Can they prevail?

All opinions expressed herein are solely the author's, unless otherwise noted.