The author gives her sincere thanks to REECA alumna Valerie Browne and REECA students Pawel Pieniazek and Daria Zhukauskaite for their work on this project.
Nearly 35 years after the Soviet Union ceased to exist, the term “post-Soviet” still surfaces as convenient shorthand, lumping together 15 sovereign states occupying about one-sixth of the world’s landmass. Without a doubt, former Soviet republics’ institutions have been deeply impacted by decades of Soviet rule. But research by my team of REECA students suggests that, when it comes to visions of the future and institutional reform, the countries’ differences may be more significant than their shared past—with goals ranging from democratization to strengthening authoritarianism. For foreign policymakers and other analysts engaging with this vast geographic region, this variability demands deep, country-specific knowledge and fine-tuned approaches.
Our first round of analysis focuses on seven sets of institutional reforms undertaken or planned by the elites of three countries—Belarus, Moldova, and Kazakhstan—with more case studies to follow. The reforms under consideration involve not just changes to policy but fundamental distributions of power, defining government bodies’ mandates, relationships with each other and with the outside world. The elites behind the reforms fall into three categories: incumbent elites, in-country opposition elites, and opposition elites in exile.
Main Findings Thus Far
- Different paths: Despite a shared Soviet past, Belarusian, Kazakhstani, and Moldovan elites are pursuing radically different visions for institutional transformation (or stasis).
- Elite dynamics: The structure of elite splits and competition emerges as the most important factor determining reform trajectories. Each country exhibits a unique configuration of forces—not just incumbent versus opposition, but also reformist versus conservative—which are subject to unique domestic and external pressures.
- Russia’s place: While Russia remains a significant factor for all three countries’ elites, its influence operates through different mechanisms in each case. This variation further undermines the usefulness of a monolithic “post-Soviet” analytical framework. (The Soviet past does not serve as an explicit reference point for existing reform plans.)
- External forces writ large: Two types of exogenous pressure play a key role in determining elites’ pursuit of institutional transformation. The first is the degree of a country’s globalization and economic openness, existing or aspirational, including its relationships with international organizations. The second is geography: Whether for trade, security, or other considerations, relations with neighbors matter a great deal.
Country by Country
Moldova—a country of 2.4 million wedged between Ukraine and EU/NATO member Romania—has two political camps that are more evenly matched than in the other two cases. The incumbent reformist elites, both in their ongoing reforms and their plans for the future, are actively implementing a pro-European democratization agenda in collaboration with the European Union. They are pursuing comprehensive institutional changes designed to align the country with EU standards. This “European Moldova” project is attempting a wholesale transformation, encompassing constitutional reforms, judicial restructuring, and fundamental shifts in foreign-policy orientation. It faces challenges from a competing “federalization” project backed by Russia, which seeks to abolish Moldova's unitary state structure and create autonomous regions under a new bicameral parliament, effectively granting Moscow veto power over the country's foreign policy.
Belarus presents a starkly different picture. With an entrenched authoritarian regime and reformist elites in exile, institutional reform projects exist only as opposition blueprints aspiring to future implementation. Four major reform proposals share a common vision of democratization but remain theoretical exercises developed outside the country's borders. They emphasize rule of law, decentralization, and increasing the power of parliament, with only one line of disagreement: the future geopolitical alignment of Belarus. While Svetlana Tsikhanouskaya’s “New Belarus” project calls for closer EU integration, the other three reform plans envision geopolitical neutrality. Unlike Kazakhstan, where incumbent elites have also sidelined domestic political competition, Belarus has far less freedom to diversify its economic portfolio through reforms because of international sanctions and relative isolation from global markets. The state’s options for institutional change are likewise constrained by its growing dependence on Russia.
Kazakhstan, meanwhile, follows a third path, where conservative incumbent elites—free from competitors after recent political purges—pursue limited institutional reforms to achieve specific improvements in governance, without domestic resistance. President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev's “New Kazakhstan” initiative focuses on administrative efficiency and anti-corruption measures by enforcing “controlled liberalization” while maintaining the existing power structure. This technocratic approach to reform avoids the systemic political changes pursued in Moldova or envisioned by Belarusian opposition groups. Its main goal is to “improve” Kazakhstan’s existing authoritarian model to make the oil- and metals-rich country more competitive economically and more attractive and predictable for foreign investors. This involves continuing to balance delicate relationships with neighboring China and Russia, with which Astana has extensive economic ties, but also appealing more to Western players.
Role of Russia
Moscow, naturally, aims to maintain its influence and pursue its interests in all three countries. Thus far, it has done so via attempts at wholesale institutional reform only in Moldova, where domestic political contention is competitive enough that powerful outside players can tip the scales. In Belarus and Kazakhstan, where heavy-handed incumbent elites have stamped out political competition, institutional reform has not been the avenue, for now, by which Russia exerts influence—which is not to say that Moscow doesn’t push strongly for far-reaching policy changes, particularly in Belarus.
For Moldova’s pro-European leaders, Russia functions primarily as a perceived threat that accelerates their determination to pursue Western integration via institutional reforms—an impulse intensified by Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. The competing federalization reform, crafted by the Russian presidential administration in the late 2010s and promoted by Moldovan politicians with deep Russian ties, would de facto give Moscow a much stronger voice in the policies of a small state nestled between its military adversaries, Ukraine and NATO. Moldova’s internal fissures, which Russia has used and amplified for its own ends, were apparent in the results of last fall’s tense parliamentary elections: just over 50% for the ruling Action and Solidarity party and 24% for the pro-Russian Patriotic Electoral Bloc (not counting support for smaller groups with connections to Moscow).
Of the three countries considered here, Belarus already has the closest integration with Russia, codified through a “Union State” confederation established in 1999. Some researchers have pointed to Moscow’s recent efforts to create or strengthen supranational bodies that could weaken sovereign decision-making by Minsk, but incumbent elites in Belarus have not translated this into institutional reforms for the time being. For the Belarusian elites in exile, Russia serves as both an anti-model and a threat: It embodies a system the opposition seeks not to replicate and props up the brutal Lukashenko regime. Moreover, Belarus shares a porous border with Russia, seen by reformists as a challenging security dilemma: how to pursue democratization and closer European ties while avoiding actions that might trigger Russian military intervention? This concern shapes the cautious, even contradictory, nature of some proposed reforms.
In Kazakhstan, our preliminary findings suggest relative Russian indifference to domestic institutional reforms. Possible reasons include their minimal impact on Moscow’s interests, China’s balancing influence in the region, and Astana’s careful policies on Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, as well as Kazakhstan’s size and wealth. Whatever the reasons, this geopolitical breathing room allows Kazakh elites to pursue improvements in governance without intense Russian meddling. Naturally, this could change if Moscow sees these reforms threatening its interests, for example by impeding its ability to sidestep international sanctions.
Taking Our Findings Further
The variety described above clearly shows that “post-Soviet”—though handy for periodization—has limited usefulness as an analytical category. New frameworks can help us better understand salient differences among countries that used to be part of the USSR.
Both the elite configurations of our first three countries and the future trajectories envisioned by those elites differ greatly. It's a laboratory of sorts—with political actors pursuing goals from liberal democracy to entrenched authoritarianism, with some state-controlled capitalism thrown in for good measure. Unlike a single country, the ex-Soviet region does not have a single, shared future.
Even this tiny sample demonstrates the need to continue applying our methodology to other case studies, refining it as we go. This year, our project continues with research on Armenia, Kyrgyzstan, and Russia and we look forward to sharing the results.
Independent Scholar
